PAINTING BACKWARDS or how my fool encountered the melancholic by Peasnall, Eve
PAINTING BACKWARDS 
or 
how my fool 
encountered 
the melancholic
EVE PEASNALL
PhD
ROYAL COLLEGE OF ART
AUGUST 2013
This text represents the submission for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at the Royal College of Art. This copy has been 
supplied for the purpose of research for private study, on 
the understanding that it is copyright material, and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement.
iii
‘Uncompanionable’ is the word Leo Steinberg used to describe the female figures 
in Pablo Picasso’s paintings of the early forties. This project demonstrates a series 
of attempts to imagine acts of companionship in an area of tension between art 
history and fine art, which it constructs anew. 
The object I’ve most tried to companion is the reproduction of a small portrait 
picture, Picasso’s Weeping Woman (1937), which developed from work surrounding 
his celebrated political mural, Guernica. The effort of companionship makes a 
fool of me and I take my fool as methodology, understood as a set of principles or 
procedures according to which something is done. A key principle of my fool is a 
logic of encounter  in which what’s conscientiously sought gives way to something 
else that emerges, repeats, insists;  it is to this level of experience that my project 
addresses itself. For my fool’s procedures, I turn to a number of others, including 
Picasso’s lover in 1937, the photographer and painter Dora Maar (of whom Weeping 
Woman is a portrait) who made her own enigmatic companion to Weeping Woman, 
a half-painted copy known as Woman in a Red Hat; and psychoanalysis, whose 
own development might be seen as a sustained effort to companion the seemingly 
uncompanionable in the human subject.
I’ve engaged with the PhD as an educational site through which to expose and 
reconstitute previous moments in my education as an artist and art historian. 
Reaching back to my childhood bedroom, the project opens to a reproduction of 
Weeping Woman in one of two art books I owned in my pre- to early teens, around 
1986 to 1992.  The other book is a monograph on Dürer, open at plate 38, Melencolia 
I (1514). Rather than becoming involved in this image’s details, my fool turns from it 
towards the field of melancholy, ultimately coming to the art historical literature of 
the eighties and early nineties that derogated melancholy as a pathological attitude 
to the end of painting, and which informed the discourse of art history to which I 
was exposed as an undergraduate student. My fool speculates as to whether paint-
ing’s sickness might have been misdiagnosed and the search for a cure misguided; 
following psychoanalytic insights, a slightly different problem for painting is 
proposed, one that Dora Maar’s copy of Picasso’s Weeping Woman is seen as a 
response to.
The bedroom setting, two images, and several historical moments, cross the 
painting Weeping Woman with what is experienced as uncompanionable in me. 
This is a kind of pleasure, felt as both strange and intimate, which I take in this 
and other modernist paintings, and which my work continues to circle. Given this 
pleasure troubles as much as supports the working ‘I’, the project adopts the first 
person as the preferred pronoun of my fool and bearer of its principal problems. 
Here, by way of the lacunary autobiographical subject, art history and fine art find 
their interaction, not in fusional plenitude but in restive exchanges that precipitate 
a series of blind fields.  
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preface
The thesis recalls a scene, my childhood bedroom, in which two 
books were opened between 1986 and 1992. The books, mingled 
with my room’s specific décor, and the historical moment, are 
taken together as an educational naevus or birthmark. The 
doctorate represents a later educational scenario, ’fresh circum-
stances’1, through which the earlier scene’s components are 
scrambled and rearranged, gaining in force and significance.
The books lie open on pages where two artworks are reproduced: 
Melencolia I (1514) by Albrecht Dürer and Weeping Woman 
(1937) by Pablo Picasso. Painting, reflecting, reading and writing 
follow paths set by these pictures to discover something about 
their appearance to a young girl in those books, that room, that 
moment. This undertaking makes a fool of me and I take my 
fool—a not-quite-me student engaged in doctoral study—as a 
methodology, understood as a set of principles or procedures 
according to which something is done. A principle of my fool 
is a logic of encounter in which what’s conscientiously sought 
gives way to something else that emerges, repeats, insists; 
my project addresses itself to this level of experience and the 
concomitant task of allowing the subjective disturbance of an 
encounter with an artwork to be not only named but registered 
in the form of response. To this end, academically impure pro-
cedures marshalled by my fool include elaborate punctuation, 
repetition, leaps of loose association, poetry, anecdote, halluci-
nation, and several learned from another student, Dora Maar, 
whose version of Picasso‘s Weeping Woman uses replication, a 
kind of note-taking, and aposiopesis. 
Within the writing room, the encounter with artworks expe-
rienced in that provincial childhood bedroom is repeated in 
kind. My doctoral fool’s resources are limited to the books and 
papers gathered and arranged in my flat around the two mon-
ographs on Dürer and Picasso. Under these circumstances, my 
fool often uses secondary sources—my childhood experience of 
Weeping Woman was of a cropped reproduction in a Phaidon 
book—finding that the distortions of things pre-viewed are 
telling, propitious.    
Two different trajectories of reading and writing are read 
1 In relation to deferred action Sigmund Freud speaks of ’memory-traces 
being subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with 
fresh circumstances’. Quoted in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, 
The Language of Psychoanalysis (Karnac, 2006), p. 112.
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off the pages showing Melencolia I and Weeping Woman: 
 Dürer’s etching is taken as an invitation to find a way 
through the tenebrous field of melancholy: from the myth of 
Saturn and Ops, to the academic preoccupation with mourning 
and melancholy in the 1980s and 1990s, especially the art 
historical discourse on the end of modernist painting, which 
governed my experience as an undergraduate and postgrad-
uate student of History of Art in the late 1990s and early 2000s; 
and to psychoanalytical theories of melancholy.
 The other page, on which Weeping Woman (1937) 
is reproduced, demands a different kind of attention. This 
painting is pored over in detail, along with its caption on the 
facing page. Interpretations of Weeping Woman and its rela-
tionship to Guernica are picked over. Responding to the per-
sistent, troubling pressure of this painting from that childhood 
bedroom into the space of the doctorate induces my fool to fic-
tionalization. Here, the two paths set by the bedroom’s opened 
books converge at the mythic end of painting. Taking Guernica 
as an instance of the end, ’the end of a fine-art-picture-tradi-
tion’2—’the last history painting’3 is how T. J. Clark refers to it—I 
speculate on Weeping Woman as a remainder of the end. The 
painting is not taken to be the end worked-through, proscribed 
by Yve-Alain Bois as painting’s task, but a singular picturing of 
painting’s undeadness, into which the copy made by Dora Maar 
intervenes. Following lessons taken from Dora Maar’s painting 
and lessons from the psychoanalytic clinic, I imagine for 
myself a different task for painting: not finding a cure—sought 
by those writers on painting and melancholia in the 1980s and 
1990s—but a form of treatment.
I've referred to the scraps from which the thesis is composed 
as motes. The word mote, meaning a tiny speck of substance, 
begets the word motley, the fool’s costume, made from coloured 
scraps of fabric stitched together. The arrangement of motes 
offered here constitutes one possible arrangement; the scraps 
have settled into a pattern that becomes my doctorate. At the 
back there’s a Precis: concise summaries of words, motifs, 
punctuating characters, and concepts organized mote by mote 
to be read alongside, before or after them.
2 Ad Reinhardt, 'How to look at a mural (Guernica)' reproduced in Picasso’s 
Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, criticism and 
analysis, ed. by Ellen. C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art History, 1988), 
pp. 234-5.
3 T. J. Clark, ’Looking Again at Picasso’s Guernica’, http://artcriticism.sva.
edu/?academic-year=fall-2010spring-2011 [accessed 12th July 2013]
xDuring the period of registered study in which this thesis was 
prepared the author has not been registered for any other 
academic award or qualification. The material included in 
this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any 
academic award or qualification other than that for which it is 
now submitted.
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1Pausing over how to characterize the two objects put before me.
Not sure whether to call them objects. 
I’ve noted mentally and on the wall stuck with messages 
addressed to me that the problem of designation may be down 
to an oscillation between objects and organs. In my head, as 
with the Post-it note, object and organ surface from a psycho-
analytical discourse whose depth it can’t hold. I’ll not look them 
up yet; waiting in case I recover them as I go or swell them with 
some other, gathered, sense. The two objects/organs placed 
before me are books. Bits of books. Two pages—one from each. 
Images on those pages: the reproduction of an engraving and 
the reproduction of a detail of an oil painting. (The painting cut 
this way is a special feature of its being in this book, on this 
page, making its appearance here unlike its appearances in 
other places.) Both reproduced objects are artworks. They’re of 
different sorts: one of them gives itself to reproduction, being 
a print, and the other doesn’t especially. (It seems unlikely the 
print would be cropped, for example, in the way the painting 
has been1 since this, the printed page, is its original and 
primary support whereas the painting has an anterior, parallel 
life hanging on someone’s wall. Any reproduction is straight 
away a stylized view of the painting.) Both are portrait format. 
The painting is a portrait, among other things, and the print 
could be described that way if the word portrait is allowed some 
looseness. The two artworks were made about four hundred 
years apart, 1514 and 1937, by European males in their middle 
age, 43 and 56 respectively. Both artworks are held in the 
national collection at the British Museum and Tate Gallery, 
London.
 I’m forcing a link. The artworks have in common the 
general commonality of Western canonical artworks. What 
grounds a singular, forced association is a provincial setting: 
my bedroom, around the time of my pre- to early teens, 1986-
1992, in a 1930s semi-detached house on the outskirts of 
Lincoln. These were the only two art books I bought as a child. 
The bedroom was decorated for me in a Habitat style scheme, 
following those British designs of the time that naturalized 
Bauhaus. PRIMARY. PROVENÇAL. My wallpaper or curtains, I’m 
not sure which, were in Habitat’s fleurs des champs pattern. Red, 
yellow, blue, and green flowers scattered on a white ground. 
These books with those artworks set in this bedroom at that 
1 For a discussion of this painting’s croppability, see mote_17: (detail of Fig. 
11).
mote_4 
2time: there’s a concatenation of things, an arrangement of my 
education, a fantasmatic combinatoire2 that I’m trying to pick 
up, handle, rearrange.
In his diary Franz Kafka makes lengthy complaints against his 
education opening and closing with variations on the refrain 
’my education has done me great harm in certain respects’3. 
(I’m copying from the copy of Kafka’s diaries my dad passed to 
me a few months ago. Dates of his readings are marked above 
Kafka’s dated entries: 22.11.65 over 17 December 1910, 23.11.65 
over 7 January 1911, etc.)
This reproach applies to a multitude of people—that is to say, my 
parents, several relatives, individual visitors to our house, various 
writers, a certain particular cook who took me to school for a year, a 
crowd of teachers […], a school inspector, slowly walking passersby; 
in short, this reproach twists through society like a dagger.(15)
The reproach works its way out, turned by degrees around the 
refrain. 
What I still am now is revealed most clearly to me by the strength 
with which the reproaches urge their way out of me. There were 
times when I had nothing else inside me except reproaches driven 
by rage […] Those times are passed. The reproaches lie around 
inside me like strange tools that I hardly have the courage to seize 
and lift any longer. At the same time the corruption left by my old 
education seems to begin to affect me more and more; the passion 
to remember […] opens my heart to those people who should be 
the objects of my reproaches.’ (19)
2  Kaja Silverman, writing on the continuing possibilities of pursuing 
authorship as a way into a body of work, shifts the critical emphasis from ’the 
author “inside” the text’ to the ’text “inside” the author’, which she interprets 
as ’the scenario for passion, or , to be more precise, the “scene” of authorial 
desire. The “scene” to which I refer is what Laplanche and Pontalis, in an 
inspired passage from The Language of Psychoanalysis, call the “fantasmatic,” 
and which they define as that unconscious fantasy or cluster of fantasies 
which structures not merely dreams and other related psychic formations, 
but object-choice, identity, and “the subject’s life as a whole”. The fantasmatic 
generates erotic tableaux or combinatoires in which the subject is arrestingly 
positioned—whose function is, in fact, precisely to display the subject in 
a given place. Its original cast of characters would seem to be drawn from 
the familial reserve, but in the endless secondary productions to which the 
fantasmatic gives rise, all actors but one are frequently recast. And even that 
one constant player may assume different roles on different occasions.’ The 
Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Indiana 
University Press, 1988), p. 216.
3 Franz Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1910-23, ed. by Max Brod (Penguin, 
1964), p. 15. Subsequent references are given in the text.
3His recriminations turn finally to self-reproaches and cede to a 
fictional dialogue about something else. Not until he’s got up to 
open the window and look out, leaving aside the ’lead’ weight 
of his reproaches. (’Not only I at the open window but everyone 
else as well would rather look at the river’ (20).) 
 I’ve typed myself away from where I was. (Opening 
a book here being not unlike opening a window there.) 
Returning: the décor of my childhood bedroom is less a signifier 
of my parents’ personal tastes, though they’re involved, than 
the insistent sensation of society—through which Kafka’s re-
proaches cut like a dagger—present in the most intimate of 
spaces. Not only in childhood or at birth but before, in advance 
of the ’self’4.  The ambivalence felt towards those loved and re-
proached, towards this thing Kafka calls his education, and the 
impasses and paradoxes that follow from it are consonant with 
the feelings, failings, and makings of my education of which the 
two books in my childhood bedroom are an especially twitchy 
manifestation. ’Slowly walking passersby’. (My bedroom isn’t 
cosy. Its constituents connive: synthetic carpet, two books, two 
reproduced artworks set against wallpaper or curtains, I never 
remember which, in Habitat fleurs des champs, colour scheme 
of red, yellow, blue, and green. ’My education has spoiled me 
more than I can understand’ (18).)
The texture of Kafka’s entry begins to change. His desire to make 
reproaches is a limit to creation—the stuckness of insistent 
repetition—and yet becomes transformed, too, into a strange 
tool with which to write. An organ even. Is it this paradox of 
limitation and facilitation that Kafka circles in his diary entry?5 
The repeated reproach, the reproach emptied of anger, the 
self-reproach, the downed tool, the ‘still’ self revealed in the 
force of reproaches against shadows of his education, a passion 
to remember, to open to those reproached, rising to leave pen 
and pad, opening a window, some relief in watching the river, a 
brief, long-awaited trickle of fiction.
4 For the development of the subject it’s the relation to the enigmatic desire 
of the Other, into which the subject is born, that’s decisive. See Precis for a 
summary of ‘self’ following this psychoanalytical insight.
5 The melancholic suffers this paradox especially keenly: ‘The artist 
consumed by melancholia is at the same time the most relentless in his 
struggle against the symbolic abdication that blankets him’, writes Julia 
Kristeva. Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (Columbia University Press, 
1989), p. 9. Darian Leader observes that the sense of impossibility plaguing 
the melancholic is something he or she is ‘desperate to articulate’; it is for 
this reason that Leader recommends artistic procedures, the poetic use 
of language in particular, as a mode of treatment: ‘melancholics “require 
the poetic to deliver them”’. The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and 
Depression (Penguin, 2009), p. 199.
4’Sunday, 19 July, slept, awoke, slept, awoke, miserable life’ (14). 
A melancholy scene.
5Weeping Woman 
(detail of Fig. 11). 1937. Oil on canvas, 54 x 44.5 cm. Tate Gallery, London.
PICASSO
Roland Penrose
with notes by David Lomas
Phaidon Press Ltd. 1991
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Melencolia I. 1514. Engraving, 2nd state. 24 x 19 cm. London, British Museum.
Albrecht Dürer
PAINTINGS, DRAWINGS
AND PRINTS
Selected and Introduced by 
Nigel Lambourne
The Folio Society 1969
6fig. 1
7fig. 2
8An echo implies not only resonance and harmonics but also 
divergences. 
(Jean Laplanche, Essays on Otherness)
It’s unclear when she painted hers. Picasso’s was bought by 
Roland Penrose in November 1937, just after it was painted. 
Did she begin right away or paint from memory? Or a photo-
graph? Did she stop halfway because the original left the studio 
suddenly or was leaving the bottom half unpainted an aposio-
petic gesture?
It couldn’t really be written down, the precise balance of con-
tingency and premeditation informing and deforming a paint-
ing’s parts. So it remains unsettled by what degrees a painting’s 
look has come about by chance or conscious intention. But 
how to hold the unsettling note of indeterminacy—rasping not 
romantic—in the ’untidy and lively affair’1 of interpretation? 
 This painting looks precarious. Top-heavy, off-balance. 
It’s unclear why Dora Maar painted it, for what purpose, where 
it belongs categorically. Confusion could even be claimed 
among its properties. Not the sort of confusion that would be 
cleared-up (even theoretically) were more information available 
but a confusion proper to it, to its self-interruption. It mobilises 
a kind of uncertainty if that’s the word for it. 
And the “Therefore …” following from this? 
Some see in Dora Maar’s painting a triumphal rescue of her 
image2; I’m taken with how she displays a mysterious, contra-
dictory effort at something. A feat abandoned maybe through 
exhaustion or boredom or because at a certain moment it struck 
1 The phrase is Michael Baxandall’s. Patterns of Intention: On the Historical 
Explanation of Pictures (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 63.
2 Anne Baldassari and Mary Ann Caws both make claims to this effect. For 
example, two rhetorical questions conclude Baldassari’s discussion of the 
painting: ‘Was Dora seeking to contest the Picassian system by turning 
the painting against the painter, the copy against the original, the woman 
against her model? And was she defending the integrity of an image that 
belonged to no one other than herself?’. Picasso Love and War 1935-1945 
(Flammarion, 2006), p. 202. Baldassari’s earlier analysis of Dora Maar’s 
photomontages from 1936 suggests more interesting ways, I think, of 
considering the painting: ’Dora Maar mobilises her camera more in the 
manner of ’perhaps’ and of uncertainty. […] It is as if the image emerges 
from the photographic medium by mistake and presents in all its intractable 
and unfinished character an iconographic phatasmatisation that strives 
to actualize, perceptibly, its split from reality. And it was on this territory of 
procedural impurity, in which the painter had excelled ever since his proto-
Cubist researches in the years 1907-08, by juxtaposing a combination of 
sources and physical media, that the philosophies of the image practiced by 
Picasso and Dora Maar overlapped’ (75). 
mote_6
9fig. 3 
Dora Maar, 
Woman in a Red 
Hat (c.1937), 
Private 
Collection.
her that the empty bottom half no longer needed filling in. 
She’d uncovered something worth privileging above the task 
originally set about. Not incompatible these possibilities since 
it could have been her apprehension of the look of exhaustion 
given in the bottom half that encouraged her to decide the 
painting was finished. Finished enough. 
 As to finish, there’s an indicative detail. A signature can 
act as a statement of completion if not satisfaction: "I’m done 
with this". It marks a work’s passage from the only someone for 
whom the artist’s name need not be spelled out to addressing an 
audience of others3. Here Dora Maar’s carefully plotted name, 
3 The act of signing might have been a way of performing, for herself, the 
transition from her identity as photographer to painter. As Man Ray put it 
in Self-Portrait: ’Having photographed Picasso at work on his Guernica in 
Paris, she now abandoned the camera and turned to painting, contrary to 
what some biographer of Picasso has written, that a painter having seen 
Picasso’s work, threw away his brushes and took up photography’. Quoted 
in Anne Baldassari, Picasso: Love and War 1935-1945 (Flammarion, 2006), 
p. 199. Whilst much seems to turn on her signature it’s difficult to say what 
it signifies: a pugnacious self-declaration in painting, a medium Man Ray’s 
anecdote makes synonymous with Picasso, or an experiment in self-
inscription and authorization negotiated through (Picasso’s) painting? It may 
be more important that the signature is the sort of sign that signifies to, that 
it makes her provisional painting an address to someone. The act of signing 
not only advances a painting from the private world of production to the 
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prominent in cooler blue over warmer yellow, may have sealed 
the painting for an immediate audience of two: herself and 
Picasso. It may, in the way of an ellipsis, have made the tailing 
off of her copy into a deliberate bit of rhetoric in the exchanges 
between the artists in this period.4
There’s more to her signature as punctuation. The kind that un-
derlines or presses a point. Compared with Weeping Woman it’s 
the only element out of place; otherwise the design is followed 
scrupulously, more so than in any of her renditions of Picasso’s 
other paintings. In positioning her signature Dora Maar takes a 
liberty, moving the site of signing to the top right from where 
Picasso had put his (with the date5) on a background band of 
colour running across the painting’s middle. This move exag-
gerates a strange feature of Dora Maar’s copy: it shifts the paint-
ing’s orientation. The whole thing seems to hang off the top 
edge making obvious the downward direction of her activity. 
The original is spread; it doesn’t descend. It’s raised weave of 
marks left-right-up-down catches the woman’s expression in 
a tense immobility. With the placement of her signature Dora 
Maar lays emphasis on the vertical inclination of her progress: 
"I started at the top and worked my way down bit by bit". The 
mustering of a student’s programmatic plodding dedicated to 
diagramming the image rather than reproducing the master’s 
manner. 
(Supposing this is Dora Maar performing as apprentice, her tone 
isn’t stroppy or facetious. The dynamic of mastery—a battle of 
wills between lovers or the power play of an older, famous, 
male artist and a younger, less famous, female one— often 
seen to be at issue in the after-Picasso works Dora Maar made 
wider world of social relations, it also constitutes that gap between public and 
private, in a sense creating—or recreating—these spheres as distinct from 
one another.
4 From the start of their affair, Pablo Picasso and Dora Maar exchanged 
objects, drawings, notes and letters, as well as working together, 
experimenting with photograms for example. Maar also used her camera to 
document works by Picasso and photograph Picasso at work on them; he 
made numerous studies and paintings of her.
5 Picasso dated his works with a view to offering a comprehensive database 
to a future science of creativity he imagined would take him as an exemplary 
specimen. Since Dora Maar did not, as Picasso had done, date her version 
of this painting she either didn’t share his fantasy or didn’t think herself or 
her work likely candidates for study. Nevertheless, her documentation of 
Picasso’s work, especially Guernica, might well have been motivated by a 
like-mindedness in this respect, since the photographs carefully plot the 
development of that painting. To this extent Dora Maar, with her camera, 
worked as an enhanced dating machine in the terms of Picasso’s project for 
posterity.
11
in this period seems too pantomime for them. Those awkward 
questions of sexual difference, the relationship between art and 
life, questions Weeping Woman itself circulates, loosen their 
purchase when Dora Maar’s copies are counted exclusively 
within an economy of possession and exploitation.) 
She presents a mechanical method quite at odds, apparently, 
with his way of constructing a painting. She finds by her careful 
misreading, what strikes her as suddenly successful, delightful 
even, about her efforts when she gets half way down, stops and 
realises what her painting reveals, is that something mechan-
ical is at work in his painting. Not in the application of paint, 
perhaps, but in his application to painting and as an element of 
the human suffering he pictures.  
‘There is nothing that throws more into question our status as 
living beings than the sheer, quasi-mechanical automaticity of the 
compulsion to repeat. It is, in other words, in this compulsion that 
we recognise the workings of the drive, precisely that excessive 
“inhuman” vitality that sets us apart from the animal and in some 
sense first makes us distinctly human.’6
The making of his painting in October 1937 extends backwards 
to the making of Guernica in May. (And beyond: the recurrent 
turns to portraiture and its significance for Cubism, which 
Weeping Woman retrospects, clutches, as a style.) The weeping 
woman motif repeats insistently over those six months. It 
descends early from the Guernica project, undigested, and 
repeats on him one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, 
seventeen … twenty-five … thirty-six … . (He’s relieved on 
holiday in Mougins, Provence; in August portraits of his female 
companions, Dora Maar, Nusch Eluard, Lee Miller, take its 
place.)  Then hers is one more repeat. Another repeat. Echoing 
the motion of this gristly bit of Guernica which hits a peak of 
6 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), p. 191.
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inhuman velocity at its terminal point in October 1937. 
Yet their repetitions diverge, his and hers. She answers his with 
a drama of lost momentum as if her self-interrupting copy 
could alter the force of repetition and the painting it seemed at 
first to embrace. Not in turning against it but leaning in as an 
attentive listener would. Hers lends his an ending. Dot, dot, dot, 
she goes, allowing a breath where, in his, none’s allowed. (As 
the weeping woman stuffs her mouth with a handkerchief his 
painting smothers itself in impasto.) 
In every act of punctuation […] one can tell whether there is an 
intention or whether it is pure sloppiness. To put it more subtly, one 
can sense the difference between a subjective will that brutally 
demolishes the rules and a tactful sensitivity that allows the rules to 
echo in the background even where it suspends them.7
  
She is a shrewd, delicate copyist. She echoes and suspends. 
7 Theodor Adorno, ’Punctuation Marks’ (1956), http://www.ubu.com/papers/
index.html [accessed 12th July 2013].
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I learned at some point how to touch-type.  A habit of my hands. 
I don’t have a feel for the ridges on F and J, which someone 
pointed out to me later. As a teenager, in bed with flu, my mum 
began to teach herself touch-typing from a book; she woke one 
morning with hands so swollen they wouldn’t move.
My hands enjoy being administrative. I’ve seen it recommended 
that the psychoanalyst be a secretary in the analysis: arranging 
the schedule, taking notes, underlining, punctuating, keeping 
time. The analyst refusing to play the part of prophet, saviour, 
and redeemer to the patient. Working against the grain of the 
unconscious she pursues interpretation’s reverse side which 
moves backwards from reading to perplexity.1 I sometimes 
dress quite secretarial: pencil skirt, mid-heels, blouse, good 
nails. A look that doesn’t wear well in the studio. 
 I paid £18 for false nails an inch long. At Greengate Nails 
& Hair on the Barking Road a young woman, whose nails are 
plain and cropped, turns my fingers in her hands marshalling 
tools laid out on a cloth to clip cuticles, file away excess, sand 
the nail plate. Acrylic nails are pressed in place, glued. Powder 
in an engraved glass pot is mixed with fluid, congealing into 
resin expertly applied with a sable hair brush, forming a mound, 
modelled with motorised grinder. Two colours, iridescent 
1 ’To play the part of prophet, saviour, and redeemer to the patient’, is rejected 
early on by Sigmund Freud. Quoted in Paul Verhaeghe & F. Declercq, ’Lacan’s 
analytical goal: "Le Sinthome" or the feminine way’, in Essays on the final 
Lacan: Re-inventing the symptom, ed. by Luke Thurston (The Other Press, 
2002), f.n.23, p. 65. ’Against the grain of the unconscious’, ’that is properly 
analytic’, ’reading to perplexity’ are all phrases of Jacques Alain-Miller's 
from ’Interpretation in Reverse’, in The Later Lacan: An Introduction, ed. by 
Véronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf (SUNY, 2007) pp. 3-9 .
fig. 4
Mum painting 
in her bedroom 
studio some time 
in the 1980s.
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purple tipped matte grey, topcoat of hardener. My hands are put 
under a heater, alarm set. PING. I leave with nails against 
painting; library nails, laptop nails. Read and type. Edit. The 
contact lens department manager at Specsavers in Stratford 
types my address into the computer lifting long ornamental 
nails, her fingers straightened to expose the pulp of finger to 
key. She types my phone number differently: nail tip of index 
finger perpendicular to the keyboard pecking its keys like a 
beak.
fig. 5
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Wallpaper or curtains, I never remember which, in the Habitat 
pattern fleurs des champs. Flower heads in primary colours, 
stems and leaves in green scattered across a white ground. I 
scanned an image of this pattern as it appears on a duvet cover 
in the Habitat catalogue 1984/5 so that I could enlarge it to 
digitally print a monochrome version on silk for use as a mobile 
background. The repeat is big allowing for a surprising degree 
of variation in flowers, leaves and stems; the larger arrange-
ment is also complex. Whilst there is regularity in the pattern 
through the repeat, palette, and even distribution of flowers 
over the white ground, the flowers themselves are hand-drawn 
and their orientation in relation to one another is composed, 
decided by eye. 
Habitat took Britain out of the gloom of post war austerity into 
a vision of what the domestic world could be like. It was a very 
particular version of modernism, based on simple forms, natural 
materials, and a fresh colour palette. It was a humanised, British 
version of Bauhaus.1 
A 1930s semi-detached house with original fixtures and 
fittings. A bedroom in the 1980s decorated for a child in a 
British version of Bauhaus. Red, yellow, blue, green. Fleurs des 
champs. PRIMARY. PROVENÇAL.
Walter Benjamin said of himself that he was born under the 
sign of Saturn2. So does W.G. Sebald in the poem After Nature: 
’the cold planet Saturn ruled this hour’s constellation’, the hour 
of his birth. The cosmic sign is translated by Eric Santner into a 
bodily one: ’Sebald suggests, in a way, that the rest of his life—
including, of course, his particular sort of literary productivity—
was something like an elaboration of this original “birthmark”’.3 
 An obstetric sonographer told me that a slight glitch in 
chromosomal arrangement—the genetic constellation—creates 
a birthmark or naevus (from natus, ‘produced by nature’). 
1 From the Design Museum’s profile of Terence Conran, Habitat's founder, 
http://designmuseum.org/design/terence-conran [accessed 12th July 2013]
2 ‘In his youth he seemed marked by a “profound sadness”, Scholem wrote. 
He thought of himself as a melancholic, disdaining modern psychological 
labels and invoking the traditional astrological one: “I came into the world 
under the sign of Saturn—the star of the slowest revolution, the planet of 
detours and delays.”’ Susan Sontag, Introduction to Walter Benjamin: One 
Way Street and Other Writings (Verso, 1997), p. 8.
3 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago 
University Press, 2006), p. 44.
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The original birthmark of my doctorate is the bedroom of my 
childhood, the particular decorative scheme and its strange 
alignment with two objects (or organs) encountered there: 
a pair of books represented by two pages and their images, 
Melencolia I and Weeping Woman. 
 I find, then, that I’m also under the influence of Saturn 
though not quite as Walter Benjamin and W.G. Sebald say they 
are since the cold planet’s power appears in books, an etching 
and a painting: the sullen angel of melancholy set amongst 
abandoned instruments of study and ’a highly stylised and 
brilliantly coloured profile portrait of a grief-stricken woman’4. 
Without being stricken with grief or melancholy I’m marked by 
this subject matter: the books, their images, carry the influence 
of Saturn to my room where I’m addressed by it. Neither happily 
nor unhappily located by the light of a distant planet rather 
I’m mystified by the shadow this subject matter casts. By what 
necessity, by what contingency, do these representations of 
melancholy and grief taken into my bedroom appear to belong 
there more than me? 
4 Tate Gallery: Illustrated Catalogue of Acquisitions 1986-88, (London, 1996) 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-weeping-woman-t05010/text-
catalogue-entry [accessed 12th July 2013].
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Pathological. And is that it, my relationship with two books 
held onto, carried along? And an academic relationship with 
them would be a variant pathology rather than the mark of its 
opposite. Concluding a paper on pathology Ian Parker confesses 
his anxiety in writing it, seized by the panic of losing connec-
tions between components ’in different bits of my mind’: 
I guess we have all met characters in this predicament in the clinic, 
we have a name for them, obsessional-neurotic, and I will bet that 
a good proportion of them are academics of some kind. A scholarly 
argument calls for some measure of hysterical complaint harnessed 
to an obsessional apparatus of citation that marks the place of the 
argument in a particular history of debate.1  
A delusion circling something or a reasoned argument for its 
significance are both defences against overwhelming anxiety, 
perhaps. Ways of taming and answering through elaborate 
construction the grip a thing has on you as you hold onto it fal-
teringly. A thing brought into existence in being carried along 
in communications, hallucinations, and complaints.
(The reproaches lie around inside me like strange tools that I hardly 
have the courage to seize and lift any longer. At the same time the 
corruption left by my old education seems to begin to affect me 
more and more; the passion to remember opens my heart to those 
people who should be the objects of my reproaches.2)
Drawing down pages of my old education, middle shelf, 
window-side, a moderate stretch of right arm and left leg. 
Performing the Body/Performing the Text. Fionna Barber turns 
to reconsider Willem de Kooning’s ’Women’ paintings in 1999 
with complaint and confession:
I want to try to understand my pleasure in these paintings, a 
pleasure that is problematic by its very existence. As a feminist, I 
feel that I’ve been caught looking, caught speaking, in the territory 
of deviance in even wanting to name a desire capable of being 
triggered by these works.3  
1 Ian Parker, ’Lacan’s Seminar XXIII: Sinthome, Creativity, Culture and 
Pathology in Psychoanalysis’, Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and 
Research: Psychosis, 22 (2012), 15-46 (p. 40).
2 Franz Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1910-23, ed. Max Brod (Penguin, 
1964), 19. See mote_4: 'My education has done me great harm …'.
3 Fionna Barber, ’The Politics of Feminist Spectatorship and the Disruptive 
Body: De Kooning’s Woman I reconsidered’, in Performing the Body/
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Her complaint is against the limits set by feminist art history in 
the 1970s on aesthetic discourse ’by identifying areas which 
were neither desirable nor indeed permissible for feminist 
spectatorship.’ She counters: interpretation is an ’ongoing, per-
formative process’; meaning in visual culture is ’not static or 
predetermined’ but ’continually enacted through the opera-
tions of art historians, critics, and other interested viewers’ 
(127). Including artists. There’s that memorable exchange in 
1986 between the art historian, Benjamin Buchloh, and the 
artist, Gerhard Richter. The artist defends his work from the 
rescue the art historian insists on.
Again, swivel and reach. Behind my head, lower, clamped 
under Thesaurus, extreme right, window side. Bible black, 
white sans serif centred vertically on the spine, On abstract art. 
Upright. Open at the back to ’Postscript: Vision and Blindness’. 
Page 157. Recollecting the quarrel between these two men the 
writer tactfully suggests that contemporary art, rather than ful-
filling the trajectory of past traditions, ’puts pressure on what 
we know’4.
 
[Buchloh:] ”Not a perversion of gestural abstraction?”
”Certainly not! ” replies Richter. ”What kind of questions are these? 
How can my pictures be devoid of content, and what is this content 
that the Abstract Expressionists are supposed to have had as 
distinct from me?”(157)
Perhaps the confrontation between an art historian’s vision 
and an artist’s blindness or the illumination of an art histori-
an’s blind spot by an artist’s insights, is part of what’s alluded 
to in the chapter heading’s second, specific, clause, ’Vision 
and Blindness’. Maybe this is what’s expressed in the image of 
contemporary art as anamorphic, it puts pressure on what we 
know. 
As such the work of both [Gerhard Richter and Rachel Whiteread] 
may tap the anomalies of abstraction’s past, yes, but never ties up 
its loose ends. (154) 
Performing the Text, ed. by Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson 
(Routledge, 1999), p. 129. Subsequent references are given in the text.
4 Briony Fer, On Abstract Art (Yale University Press, 1997), p. 154. Subsequent 
references are given in the text.
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I like the phrase, ’tap the anomalies’. I read its verb as “to strike’ 
as well as “draw liquid”. To gently strike the past and collect 
what falls which might be torrential and dazzling or more 
meagre or gritty or stagnant. It might stink. Fionna Barber 
freshens it up. Briony Fer tidies a bit. It’s cleansed with the same 
instrument, the academic essay, which can describe anxiety—
Briony Fer writes especially well on this—but can admit little of 
its own. 
Reading back the quote ending in loose ends I wish it’s ”yes” 
advanced the metaphor of artists getting tied up in the loose 
ends of art’s anomalous pasts. The urge to seek sanction from a 
respected teacher is overwhelming. 
And then there is that autobiographical past. Tap the anomalies 
of mine: artist and art historian fall out, a bundle of eyes, 
mouths, smudges, spectacles, paint, apples, books, fingernails, 
arguments, paper, complaints, stretchers, photocopy cards, 
confessions etc. And binding them in their graceless clinch? 
The mysterious interaction of a bedroom, its décor, a painting in 
a book, several historical periods, a print, a provincial location, 
a synthetic carpet, and many other mured scenes immediately 
overlaying this one, subtly shifting the furniture. Neither artist 
nor art historian seems equipped to disentangle herself and 
undo the knots against which they’re both straining but it’s 
hard to see whether either would have a meaningful existence 
were they, by some sleight of hand, set loose.
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SCISSOR
The spelling dates from the sixteenth century and follows the 
medieval Latin scissor, meaning “tailor”, and in classical Latin 
“carver, cutter”, from scindere “to split”1. I take the confusion 
between instrument and user in the word’s background as 
license to imagine the painting, Weeping Woman, as a sort of 
scissor: made of splits while also working as a splitter, a cutter. 
It’s propitious too for my purposes that scindere, “to split”, 
begets scissor, “tailor”, and scissors—via French, cisoires, 
“shears” from vulgar Latin, cisoria, “cutting instrument” and 
caedere, “to cut”—thereby bringing together haberdashery and 
the function of split. Weeping Woman does something similar. 
Besides the overall attention to apparel there’s a peculiar nick in 
the sleeve on the foremost left wrist as if the scissors slipped, 
suggesting, perhaps, a homology of brush and cutting instru-
ment, or else it shows the remains of a line taken by the cutter 
before this was a sleeve when it was just a shape belonging to a 
different series of interconnecting polygons, rhombuses, 
oblongs, and triangles, meant to form a shoulder or trouser leg. 
It resembles too the triangular cuts in a dressmaking pattern 
indicating pleats, which allow for flat shapes to be sewn together 
in such a way as to fit a solid, curved body. The jacket is patterned 
with lighter coloured lines exaggerating the seams—given by 
heavy back lines—which double as folds and as contours of 
abstract shapes. These marks recall those made by a tailor’s 
chalk. An unfinished garment hung on the tailor’s dummy 
seeming to be inside-out or have its nether-side showing—how 
hairy and coarse it looks—is a seeming shared with the painting, 
along with the overall sense of pieces stitched together.
Here: a trimming. Walter Benjamin’s beautiful simile visual-
izing the relationship between comedy and tragedy:
Comedy—or more precisely: the pure joke—is the essential inner side 
of mourning which from time to time, like the lining of a dress at the 
hem or lapel, makes its presence felt.2
1 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=scissors [accessed 12th July 
2013]
2 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John 
Osborne (Verso, 1998), pp. 125-6. 
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A little book from a London paint maker introducing the colour 
theory of a chemist, Wilhelm Ostwald: 
Ostwald was the man who pointed out that for all practical 
purposes the idea, first suggested by that astounding genius, 
Leonardo da Vinci, and afterwards restated by Hering, is correct, 
that there are not three but four fundamental colours, these being 
yellow, red, blue and green.1
These are the colours of Weeping Woman’s ’brilliant contrasts’, 
though Roland Penrose, who bought the painting from Picasso, 
before the paint was dry on the canvas, lists them in a different 
order: ’red, blue, green and yellow,’2 yellow alone with its extra 
syllable. I prefer the list order in the 1938 manual, with green 
coming after ’and’, as the fourth colour supplementing the solid 
trio of primaries. (Despite using blue for ’b’ the ebay logo uses 
green, not yellow, for its terminal ’y’ so that here too green is 
fourth and last.)
Bauhaus. Yellow triangle, blue circle, red square, grey cover. 
’Teaching Color at the Bauhaus’, page 392: 
In the Weimar days there had been protests about him. But in 1927 
he was invited to lecture. Soon his 22-part color circle hung in the 
wall painting workshop. Even Kandinsky examined his ordering of 
colors. Klee always rejected it as mere “colors for industry” and 
“chemical coloring,” because in his teaching on harmony Ostwald 
took no account of the subjective effects of color.3
Hinnerk Scheper and Joost Schmidt in the wall painting 
workshop enthusiastically embraced Ostwald’s strictly 
schematic colour ordering ’in keeping with the drive toward 
standardization’ (399). (Amongst other things the wall painting 
workshop developed wallpaper, ’one of the classic products 
which perfectly fulfilled the later principles of the school and, 
additionally, brought in the greatest license revenue’ (452).) 
1 Jan Gordon, An Elementary Introduction to the Ostwald Colour System 
(Reeves & Sons London, 1938), p. 13.
2 Roland Penrose quoted in Judi Freeman, Picasso and the Weeping Women: 
The Years of Marie Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (Los Angeles County Museum 
of Art/Rizzoli, 1994), p. 117.
3 Bauhaus, ed. by Jeannine Fiedler & Peter Feierabend (Verlag, 2006), p. 392. 
Subsequent references are given in the text.
mote_12
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My bedroom knows something about the painting. The shared 
palette of PRIMARY and PROVENÇAL. Between Guernica 
and Weeping Woman Picasso took his holiday in Mougins, 
Provence. There, in the sunshine, portraits appeared. It knows 
this, the wallpaper or curtains in fleurs des champs. Knows 
something of Weeping Woman’s distance from its source; 
Weeping Woman is to Guernica as Habitat is to Bauhaus. 
I press the bedroom on this matter: "Is it your suggestion that 
Weeping Woman signals a retreat from the world to the wallpa-
periness of portraits and bourgeois interiors? To rooms?
"Or," deferring once again to my bedroom’s expertise, "was 
the bourgeois interior a problem, a risk, which hovered as a 
half-formulated question in front of Guernica during its de-
velopment but, having been dismissed in its final state, now 
sought restoration to it via Weeping Woman?" The bedroom is 
unresponsive. 
Another line of questioning: "What am I to understand about 
the colour scheme and what it harbours: chemical colouring, 
colours for industry? Is this the palette of Weeping Woman? 
Not Leonardo da Vinci’s insights backing Weeping Woman but 
Wilhelm Ostwald’s dogged drive towards standardization? Not 
colours from painting’s past but from an industrial-commer-
cial present? Moreover," I ask, gesturing to the room with my 
Phaidon book open to the page, "how am I to understand the 
insinuation of a colour system that takes no account of the sub-
jective effects of colour in a painting in which the subjective 
mood appears to be of primary concern?" Dropping the book 
to open another: "Could the ’empathetic encounter that was 
the hallmark of the bourgeois portrait’4 be here disfigured by 
a colour scheme that limits the occasion for empathy, deliber-
ately shorts it?"   
4 Tamar Garb, The Painted Face: Portraits of Women in France 1814-1914 (Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 244.
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mote_20 My flat is usually cool in summer warm in winter. One room. 
Third floor. 1a Jedburgh Road, London E13. According to a 
postman at the local sorting office, it was a notorious sweatshop 
before conversion into residential flats. The communal hallway 
of my block has pictures on the walls: Keith Haring repro-
duction slipped in its mount, photo of toads, baboon eating a 
banana. Janet, the new cleaner, tells me she moved to Stratford 
from Portsmouth, met her husband, settled here. He offered to 
help with her shopping bags. She has black hair with a severe 
fringe, which I like. She loves Turkey and has a tattoo on her 
chest saying so. We talk in the hallway or outside in the car-park 
sometimes. She tells me she carries everything on her hoover: 
tobacco, rizlas, cup of tea, mobile phone, detergent, duster.
The front half of our flat has three bookcases, six chairs, five 
tables, two sets of drawers, two computers, sofa, milk trolley for 
tools, laundry bags and boxes for art materials, some lengths 
of wood, plastic bags, speaker, headphones, paper, clothes, 
pot plants. The back half has a bed in it. In the middle there’s 
a white cube split between bathroom and kitchen. The pitched 
ceiling reaches nine feet above the cube’s flat top. By climbing a 
ladder things can be accessed and put away in the space above 
the kitchen-bathroom. Sit back on the sofa and you can see it: 
stacked pictures, stretchers, boxes, defunct things, things used 
now and again, suitcases, sewing machine. Only the bathroom 
has a door. Sleep and wakefulness, noise and silence, labour and 
leisure, the couple living here, separate off from one another 
with effort. 
Writing happens indoors. ’It is in a house that one is alone. 
Not outside it, but inside. Outside, in the garden, there are 
birds and cats. And also, once, a squirrel, and a ferret.’1  Writing 
by Marguerite Duras, second shelf down on the bookcase 
nearest the kitchen. ’The person who writes […] must always 
be enveloped by a separation from others. That is one kind of 
solitude. It is the solitude of the author, of writing’ (3). Indoors, 
this solitude is created rather than found: 
My room is not a bed, neither here nor in Paris nor in Trouville. It’s 
a certain window, a certain table, habits of black ink, untraceable 
marks of black ink, a certain chair. And certain habits I always 
maintain, wherever I go, wherever I am. (3)
1 Marguerite Duras, Writing, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2011) p. 1. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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 This room is ’real, corporeal solitude [that] becomes the invio-
lable silence of writing’ (3). But it is not an untethered projection 
this room for writing which moves about, travels from town to 
town; she says it is the creation of an existing place, a house: 
I decided that here was where I should be alone, that I would be 
alone to write books. […] This house became the house of writing. 
My books come from this house. From this light as well, and from 
the garden. From the light reflecting off the pond. It has taken me 
twenty years to write what I just said. (5)
In English it has good onomatopoeia, room, rolled and 
moulded in the mouth, better even than chambre. In transla-
tion the doubled vowel spins the unstable interaction of world 
and mind and brain—the space of meaning—between ’r’ and 
’m’. A writer, Duras says, must make a forced separation from 
others which she secures through consonant objects, routines, 
and lights with reflections off the pond, here, at home. A well 
arranged situation together with the flicker of contingent lumi-
nosity is room. This light, which may not literally be present at 
the time of writing, is turned on repeatedly by the writer in the 
rituals of black ink, a certain chair. (Room is an embodied space 
crossed and amplified with a charge.) An agent both of sepa-
ration from outdoors and interference indoors, light from the 
pond enchants the writer’s solitude and simultaneously brings 
in the garden menagerie. Think of a room, then, as a condition, 
symptomatic of local, fierce negotiations played up in the 
word’s senses: at once an opening of indeterminate space and 
time—room to do, say or be something—and a strictly delimited 
enclosure, a part or division of a building. (A room is full of 
oxymorons.) It flits from the simple architecture of floor, walls 
and ceiling to becoming those persons enclosed: the room 
turned to look at her as she came through the door, the room 
howled with laughter.  
 If a room is like a person, what kind of person? If room 
is an easy metaphor for self, what image of self does it figure? 
Room associates with homeliness, comfort, and shelter whereas 
space extends and reaches. 
Spaces are not nearly as enclosing as rooms. 
Rooms are man made. 
Rooms tend towards the private, domestic. Spaces tend towards 
the public, municipal.
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How sturdy, though, is room’s construction? 
Suppose a room is a defensive invention, designed to separate 
and insulate one activity from another, one person from 
another, one social group from another. How successful is it? 
How well does it represent, to its inhabitant, a self well-de-
fined and secured? (Making a room also creates the threat of 
intrusion.) ’What does it mean to live in a room?’ asks Georges 
Perec, under the section, ’Bedrooms’. ’Is to live in a place to take 
possession of it?’, he continues, as if to live in a room meant 
suffering the pressure of this question and those that follow. 
’What does taking possession of a place mean? As from when 
does somewhere truly become yours?’ He runs through the 
gamut of a person’s peccadilloes and fancies elaborated in 
pursuit of an answer: 
Is it when you’ve experienced there the throes of anticipation, or the 
exaltations of passion, or the torments of a toothache? Is it when 
you’ve hung suitable curtains up on the windows, and put up the 
wallpaper, and sanded the parquet flooring? 2
The list breaks off—it could go on—the questions of possession 
and  self-possession unanswered. A room incubates these sorts 
of uncertainties.
 
Philip Guston’s daughter, Musa Meyer, prints her father’s un-
published autobiographical reflections on his childhood habi-
tation of a cupboard:
As a boy I would hide in the closet when the older brothers and 
sisters came with their families to Mama’s apartment for the 
Sunday afternoon dinner visit. I felt safe. […] I read and drew in this 
private box.3
There follows an apparently contradictory admission: what 
safety sought in the cupboard provides for is estrangement:
After a lifetime, I still have never been able to escape my family. It is 
true that I paint now in a larger closet […]. Yet nothing has changed 
in all this time. It is still a struggle to be hidden and feel strange—
my favorite mood. Or to put it more precisely, to live my life as a 
stranger or to be vacuumed up by family. […] All that I can truly say 
is that I am still struggling, like a drowning man, to be unrecogniz-
able, unknowable, to myself. The stranger. 
2 Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces (Penguin, 2008), p. 
24. 
3 Musa Meyer, Night Studio: A Memoir of Philip Guston (Da Capo Press, 1997), 
p. 24.
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For Guston, family extends beyond his immediate relatives 
to the world of social relations, especially the professional art 
world. What this world outdoors threatens to interrupt indoors 
is not the self made homely but the self made strange. The 
room, modelled on a closet, is not synonymous with a unified 
"I" but with an "I" ’struggling, like a drowning man, to be un-
recognizable, unknowable’ to itself. In Philip Guston’s story the 
external charge that makes the space an interior, from which 
books or paintings come, is symbolised by light: the single 
electrical bulb substitutes for the pastoral of Marguerite Duras’s 
pond reflections. 
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’Painting is not done to decorate apartments’1, said Picasso. If 
true of Guernica, could the same be said of Weeping Woman? 
Some points put by Mary Thomas in editorial remarks made to 
Frances Morris, compiling Tate’s catalogue entry for Weeping 
Woman in 1994:
Can you mention that the hat has a blue flower and specify, too, 
whether DM said she ever had such a hat. Do such hats and tweedy 
jackets feature in any of the other works? What about the dado 
rail? You could perhaps specify whether DM swept her hair back in 
the way shown in WW, and whether she had a fringe? Do any of 
the other portraits have a similar striped background, suggesting 
wallpaper? 2
No suggestion of wallpaper3 in Guernica, no dado rail, no 
tweedy jackets or blue flowers. Faces in Guernica are deindivid-
1 Interview with Simone Téry in 1945, excerpt reprinted in Theories of 
Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics ed. Herschel B. Chipp 
(University of California Press, 1968), p. 487.
2 1987 acquisition file for Pablo Picasso’s Weeping Woman (T05010) Tate 
Archives.
3 See mote_18: Fleeing Woman.
fig. 8
At home in 
Hampstead: Lee 
Miller, peeling an 
apple; Roland 
Penrose opening 
a book; Weeping 
Woman in the 
background 
above the drinks 
cabinet.
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uated. There’s no one behind them to ask about how they wear 
their hair. Weeping Woman: not so much dressed for a fête4 as 
dressed for an apartment. 
Middle shelf, window-end, big hardback laid flat under loose 
papers: Tamar Garb’s The Painted Face.  In the past a portrait 
had been ’a luxury commodity, with [a] traditionally elaborate 
surround, destined for Salon or sitting room’5.  Besides its role 
as luxury object it had two others:  ’commemorative icon or 
piece of interior decoration’ (224). The female portrait, in par-
ticular, provided for an interaction between the interior of the 
room it both represented and hung in and the fantasy of the 
sitter’s interiority offered up by the painting. These features of 
portraiture and its traditions were those that Picasso’s painting 
Portrait of a Girl (1913) flaunted and flouted.  
Evacuating the genre of its ’subject’, Picasso revealed the artifi-
cial make-up of the female portrait, rendered here as entirely a 
matter of costume, patina and adornment. Interiority, whether 
conceived as the psychological material of which subjectivity is 
constituted and in which Realist portraiture had revelled, or as the 
inner sanctum of the bourgeois woman, enshrined as the domestic 
interior, is dramatically denied, turned inside out, in a virtuoso 
display of painted effects.(250) 
’Now,’ she writes, ’portraits were just pictures.’ 
Just pictures or pictures heightened, haunted, by the stub-
bornness of the referent (it’s Roland Barthes’s phrase)? Why, if 
portraits were just pictures, did Picasso keep working on them? 
What were they for? For the interior? Or the problem of interi-
ority they continued to bring to painting? Or was the return to 
portraiture just a recapitulation, a retreat? Trouble at home. 
4 Roland Penrose makes this suggestion about the figure’s attire. See 
mote_62: 'The result of using color'.
5 Tamar Garb, The Painted Face: Portraits of Women in France 1814-1914 (Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 224. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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A Vogue shoot by Cecil Beaton. The inescapable strangeness 
and poignancy of Weeping Woman in this setting: stern Lee 
Miller, proprietress in her apron, armed with a peeler, upright 
in the centre with her husband, Roland Penrose, bespectacled 
and awkwardly jutting from the chaise longue, holding open 
a book. He pretends to read, she pretends to peel. And all the 
while Weeping Woman crumples over the drinks cabinet, lit 
smack in the face. As if the misdemeanour of this bibulous face, 
the indiscretion of her contortions—her loss of face—were what 
the peeling Miller stiffens herself against.
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My favourite anecdote from Hattie Hayridge’s 1997 autobiog-
raphy, Random Abstract Memory: A surreal life story goes like 
this:
’Who writes your jokes?’ someone asked me after a show. 
’I do,’ I said. 
’Really!’ he said, surprised, ’because I didn’t think you really under-
stood them.’1 
There’s a clip on Youtube from the 1980s or 1990s of Hattie 
Hayridge performing in Scotland. She has on the black-and-
white striped dress, 1920s or 1960s, she never knew which, 
bought from a jumble sale. She decided it would be her stage 
dress in 1987 after giving up her day job as a secretary and 
’starting to organize’ herself in comedy. She looks around, eyes 
measuring the space between jokes. Breathes out, sighs, “Ah, I 
don’t know …”, before offering her next line to the room. 
Authenticity and performance are of special importance too 
to the doctor. The word’s etymology goes like this: agent noun 
from docere ”to show, teach, cause to know”, originally ”make 
to appear right”, causative of decere ”be seemly, fitting”. The 
verb form meaning ”to confer a degree on” has a later, addi-
tional sense, ”to alter, disguise, falsify”2. 
Not long ago I overheard a woman in the lunch break at a con-
ference warning her friends off Fine Art PhDs. 
“It’s like playing chicken with your practice.” 
1 Hattie Hayridge, Random Abstract Memory: A surreal life story (Penguin, 
1997), p. 204.
2 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=doctor [accessed 12th July 
2013]
mote_8
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What I took her to be saying was that either you earn a doctorate, 
in which case your practice will have yielded to the doctorate, 
or you maintain an art practice, in which case you will have 
given up on the doctorate. Or both art practice and doctorate 
will yield to their mutual destruction. What I took her to mean 
was that for an artist it’s possible to know too much. Just enough 
knowing for an artist, not too much. 
Like the comedian, the doctoral candidate is expected to 
perform as if she understood her own jokes. It is not enough 
to simply write them. She must show, by means practical and 
verbal, that she understands them. Her jokes must seem to fit, 
must not be too big, too crude or too funny. Just right. If she 
convinces her audience, the symbolic alteration she’ll undergo 
in her investiture as Doctor attests to this precisely. From now 
on she will be disguised as an authority. Not of this or that 
obscure academic material but of herself. Of her own obscure 
material. It is herself she’s been writing down, ensuring all parts 
are balanced exactly. Now. She will be wholly in possession of 
herself.
She will be doctored.
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Under directional lamplight the couch intensifies its embrace 
aided by a blanket borrowed from the bed, wrapping feet, 
belly, arms, shoulders up to the chin, with one unswaddled 
hand holding a book, face folded into cushions plied against 
the armrest, right eye closed/left eye foundering on lens and 
rim of spectacles pushed sideways. Sleep reading. Residues of 
the day’s readings press Theory and Technique1  into wonted 
shape: the various ”a”s consort. 
Of course the artist does not really want to change! From our 
perspective, it is clear that the artwork cannot rely on some sort 
of “will to do better” on the artist’s part—some kind of genuine 
“desire to change”. There is no such thing. Indeed artists often 
no longer have any will to be an artist, or to do anything at all, or 
sense that their practice is stifled and withering; in short their 
desire is dying. How then could it possibly serve as a mainspring 
for change?
If there is a desire in art that serves as its motor force, it is the 
artwork’s not the artist’s. Many feel that it is inappropriate for 
artworks to express any desire at all to artists. What this perspec-
tive fails to realise is that the artist’s desire to continue making 
must at certain times wane or disappear altogether—otherwise 
the artist’s essential conflicts tied up in his or her practice are not 
being affected. Artists tend to stop coming to the studio when they 
sense that they are being asked to give up something or make a 
sacrifice they are not prepared to make.
It is the artwork’s desire, not the artist’s flagging desire, that 
allows them to continue. Even very subtle expressions of the 
artwork’s desire may suffice to keep certain artists coming back 
to the studio when they have no will of their own to continue. The 
artwork’s “I’ll see you tomorrow” may be enough to bring certain 
artists back even though they believe they have nothing more to 
say and feel stuck.
1 What follows is an hallucinatory reading of the opening section, ’Desire in 
Analysis’, in Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: 
Theory and Technique (Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 3-10. The ’a’ 
words have switched: artist for analysand, artwork for analyst, and art for the 
analysis. Some other substitutions, such as ’practice’ for ’symptom’, and a few 
elisions notwithstanding, Bruce Fink’s text is quite faithfully reproduced.
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The artwork is an actor or actress playing a part. The artwork is not 
“authentic”, not communicating its deepest beliefs and reactions 
to the artist as one being to another. The artwork must maintain 
a position of desire. The artwork is called upon to maintain this 
same position, this same strictly art oriented desire.
“The artwork’s desire” refers to a kind of “purified desire” that is 
specific to the artwork—to the artwork not as a being with feelings 
but as a function, a role, a part to be played. “The artwork’s desire” 
is a desire that focuses on art and only on art. “The artwork’s 
desire” is not for the artist to do better, to succeed in life, to be 
happy, to understand him or herself, to achieve what he or she 
says he or she wants. It is an enigmatic desire that does not tell 
the artist what the artwork wants him or her to say or do. 
“The artwork’s desire” is a kind of pure desiring that does not 
alight on any particular object, that does not show the artist what 
the artwork wants from him or her—though the artist inevitably 
tries to read a specific desire into even the slightest gesture or 
intonation. “The artwork’s desire” walks a fine line.
KNOWLEDGE AND DESIRE
Artists do not come to the artwork with a “genuine desire for 
self-knowledge”.  Although many artists express a desire to know 
there is a more deeply rooted wish not to know. Once artists are 
on the verge of realizing exactly what it is they have done or 
are doing, they very often resist going any further and flee the 
artwork. When they begin to glimpse their deeper motives and 
find them hard to stomach, they often drop out. Avoidance is one 
of the most basic artistic tendencies.
In the studio, the artist’s basic position is one of a refusal of 
knowledge, a will not to know. The artist wants to know nothing 
about his or her mechanisms, nothing about the why and 
wherefore of his or her practice. We can even go so far as to classify 
ignorance as a passion greater than love or hate: a passion not to 
know.
It is only the artwork’s desire that allows the artist to overcome 
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this “wanting to know nothing”, sustaining the artist through the 
process of formulating some kind of new knowledge. The artwork 
must essentially open-up a space of desire, a space in which the 
artist can come to desire. If the artist resists knowing, and the 
artwork fails to bring its desire to bear, new knowledge cannot be 
formulated. 
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STATE I The woman ’straining as she flees toward the center [sic]’1 
becomes Fleeing Woman in the literature, which partitions the 
painting’s figures according to type—a shaky taxonomy—and 
the composition’s sliced-up scheme. That is, the woman iden-
tified as fleeing ’[creates] an important compositional diagonal 
leading to the lamp in the upper center [sic]’ (113).  A peculiar at-
tribution of agency to Fleeing Woman, perhaps, who might just 
as well be described as lit by the lamp in the upper centre that 
casts light along forty-five degrees, the angle to which her body 
inclines. The figure follows the diagonal, maybe, or repeats it, 
or extends it to the bottom edge. It would make sense to say that 
the figure strains along a diagonal created by the light source, 
towards which her face and eyes are turned.
(She has the blankest expression of all the pictured faces. Struck 
dumb. Stupefied.)
Is she acting in the tragedy or acted upon by it? What kind of 
intent attaches to that verb this Woman contracts? Is she fleeing 
from or towards? Fleeing from the fire on the right? Or towards 
the light, centre? Is she a subject fleeing from or towards any 
determinate object or is fleeing, here, stalled in the continuous 
present of its tense? Fleeing. Neither from nor towards, caught 
in that mode of activity that feels like passivity. Boxed into the 
square crossed by the diagonal of which she’s a function. 
1 Herschel B. Chipp, Picasso’s Guernica: History, Transformations, Meanings 
(University of California Press, 1988), p. 113. Subsequent references are given 
in the text.
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The geometry she’s locked into is unvarying but her figure’s in 
flux.
 
STATE IA She acquires a chair that later becomes her thigh. She 
drags it. It exposes her missing limb section. Beneath her the 
demure female corpse palms the back of it with a hand attaching 
to a third arm, seemingly left behind when she fell off her chair. 
(Her features resemble those of the Marie-Thérèse character 
Picasso developed in so many seated and reclining portraits.) 
Both women have a claim on the chair. The one relinquishing, 
the other gripping it absent-mindedly. An attribute of the 
elegant slain woman which attaches to the other one acciden-
tally as baggage? She clatters along with it as if it had just joined 
in her general deformity. Or is furniture what these figures 
share? A thing from indoors—the object world—home to chairs, 
tables, fabrics, wallpaper; finery when touched by the elegant 
woman, creaturely when shackled to the fleeing one. Early on 
these two take most of the pattern—frills, braiding, checks. 
They’re bothered by attachments in a way the other figures 
aren’t. As the pretty corpse disappears it’s Fleeing Woman who’s 
burdened most of all with these ’sensual titillations’2.
STATE II She trundles on, statically. The elegant woman has 
2 Ibid., p. 130. Chipp is referring to the wallpaper Picasso affixes to the canvas 
in States IV and VI. Bits of this same wallpaper appear in Women at their 
Toilette (1938): ’The ornate and elegant wallpaper fragment, quite in harmony 
with the women’s languid and colorful air of preoccupation with the sensual 
titillations of the bath, was, as Picasso surely realized, quite unsuited for a 
permanent place in the developing Guernica.’
fig. 11
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popped forward and shrunk. She’s Fleeing Woman’s homun-
culus now, filling her crotch. The elegant woman has on shoes, 
high heels, and a sort of skirt. Her eyes are open. She might 
have a handbag under her bare breasts. (They all, the women, 
have bare breasts. This particular signifier of exposure has to be 
repeated five times over.) Fleeing Woman has more hair, more 
definition in her headdress. The line of her face has been re-
asserted. Her chair is almost gone, become her thigh and knee 
shaped like a leg of mutton. 
 
STATE III The elegant, classical woman has been withdrawn 
except for her beheaded head rolled away from Fleeing Woman 
who’s gained another foot from the torso of her homunculus. 
Not a dainty one in a high heel: bare, thudding and massive. 
And the elegant woman, a head only, looks less like a woman 
and more like a guillotined prince. Fleeing Woman looks in-
creasingly compromised. Her buttocks are there, both cheeks, 
impossibly, where her spine should be. Her eyes are two circles 
with dots at their centres. Shorthand shocked eyes. The least 
fussy means to express wide open surprise. And such simplicity 
here insinuates haplessness.
She has another companion: Woman With Lamp. Woman With 
Lamp was there from the beginning, the earliest sketch. Their 
faces are similar. Twinned. They incline towards one another, 
looking into the scene. They’re onlookers. The two other 
remaining women, one far left, one far right, are suffering; 
their faces and expressions match one another. Two pairs of 
women. Woman With Lamp casts the line of light according to 
which Fleeing Woman organizes her body. The light to which 
she turns her open eyes. They come together to the scene as 
witnesses3. 
Fleeing Woman, with all her limbs articulated, approaches 
STATE IV in which she acquires a tear and two bits of wallpaper. 
No tears in Guernica except hers. When tears come they come 
with wallpaper. And toilet roll. (Henry Moore and Roland 
Penrose visit the studio in early June. Henry Moore recalls: ’“You 
know the woman who comes running out of the little cabin 
on the right with one hand held in front of her? Well, Picasso 
3 Judi Freeman also considers these women ‘witnesses rather than emotional 
participants in the scene’. Picasso and the Weeping Women: The Years of 
Marie Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (LA County Museum of Art/Rizzoli, 1994), 
p. 42. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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told us that there was something missing there, and he went 
and fetched a roll of paper and stuck it in the woman’s hand, as 
much as to say that she’d been caught in the bathroom when the 
bombs came”’; Penrose adds, ’“There,” said Picasso, “that leaves 
no doubt about the commonest and most primitive effect of 
fear”’ (75-8).) Her wallpaper comes off in STATE V and returns in 
STATE VI. This time bits attach to other women. But don’t stick. 
Fleeing Woman is the one things get stuck to and taken off, the 
stuff of houses and toilets and tissues and excrement and tears. 
Pinned to her and unpinned. Pinned, unpinned. 
STATE VII Her tear remains, the wallpaper is dropped. STATE 
VIII The tear disappears too. Witness, weeper, wallpaper. If she 
flees, her flight through Guernica’s transformations is marked 
by all the ’unsuited’ things she accrues. She takes up and 
displays dissonant bits of interiors, of rooms and the body, as if 
they were parts of a question that wouldn’t cohere and had to be 
dropped. The agitating fringe material of Guernica—scooped 
from the space around it in the studio—that seemed to be im-
plicated in its surface but nevertheless couldn’t be incorporated 
there.
 If there’s a figure in Guernica to whom Weeping Woman 
relates, it’s Fleeing Woman, not the mother and child or her 
partner on the far right. Weeping Woman descends from the 
two witnesses. Her problems are theirs.
fig. 12
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The dead have no colour.
(Ad Reinhardt, ’How to look at a mural’) 
Hollywood in the 1930s imagines its monsters—those between 
life and death, such as Frankenstein—with green skin. 
On-screen black and white turns in posters to the colour of 
absinthe, that fin-de-siècle drink of Paris’s most miserable 
creatures: women, in particular, suffering symbolic ruin and 
psychological breakdown in chalk and paint. 
Green skin marks the outcast. A body excluded from ordinary 
human life but animated nevertheless by some unknown force, 
at times chemical, electrical, bestial. 
Edgar Degas puts this green to work.  Ushered in by the flesh 
of performers at the Café Concert it becomes the deformity of 
low-life imitation: satin paws up, a green woman like a dog, 
singing.1  
Vulgar, theatrical green, between animal and human, horror 
and comedy, presents itself in my bedroom scheme picked 
up in the Phaidon page’s face flushed with biliverdin2. If that’s 
nature’s green it’s not Leonardo’s; green of water balancing 
1 The figure represents Thérèsa, née Emma Valadon, singing The Song of the 
Dog at the Café Concert. She was famed for her distinctive, vulgar style of 
performance.
2  Shortly after death the human body starts to putrefy. As part of this process, 
the blood becomes coloured with biliverdin, a green tetrapyrrolic bile 
pigment released from the liver, giving the skin a green appearance.
fig. 13 
Poster for the 
French release 
of The Bride of 
Frankenstein in 
June 1935. 
fig. 14
Pablo Picasso, 
Absinthe (Girl in a 
Café), 1901. 
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yellow of earth, blue of air, red of fire.3 (But then, even in da 
Vinci’s grouping of elementaries, green is distinguished from 
the others—red, blue, yellow—in being a mixture of the last two. 
Green is an elemental compound.) Her face is nature’s green 
at the end of its spectrum, green crossed over from verdure to 
ordure. She articulates the necessity of green to those other 
three through its unbalanced deliquescence, its extimate4 
ooze. There in my bedroom, wallpaper or curtains in fleurs des 
champs, I’m not sure which, backing the Weeping Woman’s 
skin which palpates with a green of uncanny vitality.  
3 Green is the third simple colour, according to Leonardo da Vinci, 
designating the element water, as against white (light), yellow (earth), blue 
(air), red (fire), black (darkness).
4 Jacques Lacan’s neologism, combing ex from exterieur with intimité. 
It ’neatly expresses the way in which psychoanalysis problematizes the 
opposition between inside and outside, between container and contained. 
[…] The Other ’is something strange to me, although it is at the heart of 
me’.’ Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
(Routledge, 1996), p. 58. See mote_20: Room setting.
fig. 15
Edgar Degas, The 
Song of the Dog, 
1876-77. 
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PART I
The Notion of Melancholy and its
Historical Development
In modern speech the word “melancholy” is used to denote 
any one of several somewhat different things. It can 
mean a mental illness characterised mainly by attacks of 
anxiety, deep depression and fatigue—though it is true 
that recently the medical concept has largely become 
disintegrated. It may mean a type of character—generally 
associated with a certain type of physique—which together 
with the sanguine, the choleric and the phlegmatic, 
constituted the system of the “four humours”, or the “four 
complexions” as the old expression was. It may mean a 
temporary state of mind, sometimes painful and depressing, 
sometimes merely mildly pensive and nostalgic. In this 
case it is a purely subjective mood which can then by 
transference be attributed to the objective world, so that one 
can legitimately speak of “the melancholy of evening”, “the 
melancholy of autumn”, or even, like Shakespeare’s Prince 
Hal, of “the melancholy of Moor-ditch”.
Lessons from the first page of Saturn and Melancholy1, the 
primary reference for most subsequent excursions into the 
melancholy field. A taut opening, the text neatly disposed on 
the page in a block. This paragraph stands at the beginning as 
an acrobat would, displaying his toned physique in a held pose 
before breaking into his routine. 
Here it is, melancholy divided in three: illness, character and 
mood. The first of these has largely disintegrated. Second and 
third impress, the second grounded in classical philosophy, 
the third expanding from the subjective through ’the objective 
world’ as far as stinking Moor-ditch. 
1 Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: 
Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (Thomas Nelson 
& Sons, 1964), p. 2.
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In the early pages of Black Sun under the heading, ’Is a mood 
a language?’, Julia Kristeva insists that moods record, they are 
’inscriptions, energy disruptions, not simply raw energies’1. As 
very rudimentary representations, moods are ’insufficiently 
stabilized to coalesce as verbal or other signs’: ’On the frontier 
of animality and symbol formation, moods—and particularly 
sadness—are the ultimate reactions to our traumas, they are 
our basic homeostatic resource’ (22). Moods are not equivalent 
to affects, but sadness, which is the fundamental mood of de-
pression, ‘leads us into the enigmatic realm of affects—anguish, 
fear, or joy’ (21). 
According to Eric Santner, mood, for Heidegger, ’is the primor-
dial mode in which our “being in the world”, our existential im-
plication in a concrete historical situation, is registered’2. Here, 
too, in the chapter ’Melancholy and its Vicissitudes’, moods are 
described as inscriptions; Santner writes of mood as a ’virtual 
archive in which are inscribed traces of an originary—and at 
some level traumatic—opening or attunement to “otherness” 
below the level of intentional states’ (45). For Heidegger, he 
continues, ’mood registers our sense of “always already” 
finding ourselves stuck in a specific historical constellation, 
which means first and foremost being stuck with, being riveted 
to, ourselves’ (46). Like the punctum, ’the disclosure proper 
to mood is to be distinguished from any sort of propositional 
attitude’ (46). Rather, mood registers ’a vulnerability to the 
mattering of things before any choice or decision on our part, 
before any reflection about value’3. This mattering, he writes:
refers to our ex-citation, our being called out or addressed […] by 
that to which we are delivered over. Indeed we might even say that 
we are delivered over to an address (rather than an inert otherness 
that might or might not address us). (47)
1 Kristeva defines affect as ’the psychic representation of energy 
displacements caused by internal or external traumas’. Mood seems to 
be operative at a still more basic level, registering trauma but only in ’a 
very rudimentary representation’.  Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia 
(Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 21. Subsequent references are given in 
the text.
2 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), p. 45. Subsequent references are given in the text.
3 Ibid., 47. Mood could be said to follow the peculiar movement of the 
punctum, which appears radically involuntary to the spectator but 
nevertheless rivets her to herself. Mood, ’attuned to “otherness” below the 
level of intentional states’ arrives ’right here in [the] eyes’, so to speak, as a 
’floating flash’, to borrow one of Roland Barthes metaphors. Mood follows, 
too, the sequence of contradictions familiar from the punctum, being 
somehow both sharp and indistinct, an inscription of sorts but not one that 
achieves the coherence of sign etc. See mote_27: mien mean. 
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A bearded man with toothache: ’this boss is an expression of 
pain’1. What purpose in a space of meditation the face in pain? 
Toothache Man, companion to Headache Man, grimacing with 
head in hands, put here in Lincoln Cathedral on the low, vaulted, 
wooden ceiling of the cloister built towards the end of the thir-
teenth century. Cloister, claustrum, meaning enclosure, comes 
to stand for monastery or convent, signifying the enclosed life 
of religious meditation and study separated from ’the world 
and its affairs’2. The locked rectangular cloister, invented in the 
1 Christopher Brighton, Lincoln Cathedral Cloister Bosses (The Honywood 
Press, 1985), p. 17. 
2 ’The themes which monastic discipline assigned to friars for meditation 
were designed to turn them away from the world and its affairs.’ Walter 
Benjamin, ’Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations (Pimlico, 
1999), pp. 249-50. 
fig. 16
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Age of Charlemagne, ’consists of a large square yard entirely 
surrounded by galleried porches and usually attached to the 
Southern flank of the church’.3 An enclosure within an enclosure. 
Within the monastic enclosure the U-shaped cloister yard was 
screened by high walled buildings from the activities of fowl-
keepers, coopers, wheelwrights, shoemakers, saddlers, grinders 
and polishers of swords, shieldmakers, turners, curriers, gold-
smiths, blacksmiths, fullers, shepherds, goatherds, swineherds 
and their various beasts. 
Its development was dependent, for one, on the rejection of the 
semieremitic forms of living of the Irish monks in favor [sic] of the 
highly controlled and ordered forms of communal living prescribed 
by St. Benedict. It was an answer also, on the other hand, to the 
need for internal architectural separation of the monks from the 
monastic serfs and workmen, who had entered into an economic 
symbiosis with the monks, when the monastery, in the new agricul-
tural society that arose north of the Alps, acquired the structure of a 
large manorial estate. (40)
The ’corporate community for whose sustenance this organ-
ization was maintained consisted of monks who served God 
in chant and spent much of their time in reading and writing’ 
(41). The slim book I have on Lincoln Cathedral’s cloister bosses 
speculates on the function of a cloister in the cathedral setting:
in monastic establishments the cloister was a place of study and 
was also used for informal meetings. […] It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that the cloisters built for secular cathedrals […] were 
required for a similar function, although it has been suggested that 
they were built merely for show.4 
I Am Sitting in a Room, the publication issuing from Brian Dillon’s 
site-writing residency at Cabinet Gallery in London. A smaller 
than average book, big pocket or man bag size. Looking for the 
section on Antonello da Messina’s painting of Saint Jerome in 
3 Walter Horn, ’On the Origins of the Medieval Cloister’, Gesta, 12, (1973), pp. 
13-52.  Subsequent references are given in the text.
4 Christopher Brighton, Lincoln Cathedral Cloister Bosses (The Honywood 
Press, 1985), 3. 
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his Study (1475), depicting the scholar on a wooden stage within 
a cavernous cathedral space … . (While I’m here, there’s George 
Perec’s image of the writer’s study deduced from this painting: 
’surrounded by the uninhabitable, the study defines a domesti-
cated space inhabited with serenity by cats, books and men’.5) 
Brian Dillon lays his emphasis on enclosure: Jerome is here 
’several times enclosed’ but ’all this careful activity of enclosure 
and protection has been in the service of something frail and 
unfinished’6, referring to St Jerome’s angled writing surface, 
which to him looks provisional. Possibly recalling the reader 
to a photograph of Dillon’s ’temporary desk’—laminate board 
suspended over trestles—at the front of the book, captioned 
THE AUTHOR AT WORK. Reading backwards from the painting 
of St Jerome reproduced, page 23, the chapter opens, page 21, 
onto acts of enclosure and their architectural support:  
The writer’s study or office is a machine for enclosing the self and 
at the same time letting the mind wander, and the architectural 
volume with its props and accoutrements has to do the complex job 
of actually achieving both while allegorizing or exaggerating those 
processes so as to convince the writer that they are truly afoot.
According to a text by William Durandus from 1296, the clois-
ter’s architectural symbolism is twofold: on the one hand, it 
represents Paradise, an interpretation based on the life to come, 
on the other it represents the contemplative soul.  This second 
interpretation of the cloister’s moral significance is based on a 
twelfth century work by Hugh of Fouilly, ’On the monastery of 
the soul’, recommending the enclosed life as ’protection from 
temptation’, relevant not only to monastic life but to any life 
’devoted to God and cut off from the distractions of the outside 
world’7. Hugh of Fouilly’s text goes further, to enumerate the 
dangers of reclusion and the role of architecture in forestalling 
such dangers, beginning with the cloister, which represents 
’not the contemplative soul but the act of contemplation as 
such, when the soul turns in upon itself and directs its attention 
exclusively on heavenly things, divorced from the throng of 
carnal thoughts’ (1).  This act of contemplation unfolds from the 
four sides of the cloister: contempt for self, contempt for the 
world, love of God and love of one’s neighbour.
5 Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces (Penguin, 2008), p. 88.
6 Brian Dillon, I Am Sitting in a Room (Cabinet, 2012), p. 22.
7 Christopher Brighton, Lincoln Cathedral Cloister Bosses (The Honywood 
Press, 1985), p. 1. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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Does an ’ailment’ head, contorting and grimacing, invite the 
studious mind to wander? Is it a lure to dissipation or a reminder 
to the contemplative soul of fleshly woes he must set about 
transcending by way of scholarly devotion? Is the face in pain a 
figure of contempt or an inducement to neighbourly love? 
Another face in a room where there are studious minds at 
work. Freud’s consulting room, Vienna in 1907, with his patient 
known as the Rat Man, a model for the modern ailment head. 
His face appears in the text of Freud’s case study, not quite a 
face in pain but a face, unbeknownst to its wearer, enjoying 
the pain of ’a specially horrible torture punishment used in the 
East’. Freud records his observation: 
At all the more important moments while he was telling his story 
his face took on a very strange, composite expression. I could only 
interpret it as one of horror at the pleasure of his own of which he 
himself was unaware.8
Eric Santner quotes Freud’s portrait of the Rat Man’s face as an 
instance of the creaturely expressivity he’s tracing and names 
the call it makes on us to respond:
The being whose proximity we are enjoined to inhabit and open to 
according to the imperative of neighbor love is always a subject at 
odds with itself, split by thoughts, desires, fantasies, and pleasures it 
can never fully claim as its own and that in some sense both do and 
do not belong to it.9
In the enclosure of the clinic, the excess unconscious jou-
issance animating the Rat Man’s countenance is what the 
psychoanalyst companions:
Psychoanalysis differs from other approaches to human being by 
attending to the constitutive ”too muchness” that characterizes the 
psyche; the human mind is, we might say, defined by the fact that it 
includes more reality than it can contain, is the bearer of an excess, 
a too much of pressure that is not merely physiological.10 
8 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, Vol X, Two Case Histories: 'Little Hans' and the 'Rat Man', 
(Vintage Books, 2001), p. 166-7.
9 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), p. xii.
10 Eric L. Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life (University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), p. 8.
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mote_54
Tate Gallery, marble floors and a bench, paintings, a space heavy 
with top-lighting. My head is bent to a cold floor, eyes shut. 
Folding myself again against their pleading and I groan into 
mausoleum quiet, palms pushing my eyes backwards. Grateful 
the leatherette has hold of my legs. Feverish bubble and gasp. It 
is boredom or fright or portent. A headache, head aching. I am 
not here. Breathing in the sulphurous ends of life. Coughed up 
then for days and years after, to their surprise. How much did 
she see? We left early. She was ill. Her eyes were closed. Could 
she have taken it in? Late Picasso, Tate Gallery, London, 1988. 
’Too soon’ changes suddenly into ’too late’ without [our] detecting 
the exact moment of their transformation. The whole affair thus 
has the structure of the missed encounter: along the way, the 
truth, which we have not yet attained, pushes us forward like a 
phantom, promising that it awaits us at the end of the road; but all 
of a sudden we perceive that we were always already in the truth. 
The paradoxical surplus which slips away, which reveals itself as 
’impossible’ in this missed encounter of the ’opportune moment’, is 
of course objet a: the pure semblance which pushes us toward the 
truth, right up to the moment when it suddenly appears behind us 
and that we have already arrived ahead of it, a chimerical being 
that does not have its ’proper time’, only ever persisting in the 
interval between ’too soon’ and ’too late’.1 
She came too soon to late Picasso. Too early. So early to late 
Picasso her head hurt. She caught a hectic in her brain. That 
image of artists going off like milk or fruit left to ripen too long 
in the sun. Suddenly overnight leaking and wrinkling old artists 
turned from firm young artists the day before. Artists lose their 
stuff. The stuff of timeliness. She’s off the sofa crawling between 
piled papers, knees picking up crumbs and things under the 
table; she hustles and wiggles for a line in Stanley Cavell’s book, 
second shelf down, kitchen-side, Must We Mean What We Say, 
overdue January 22nd 2013: ’What makes a statement or a 
question profound is not its placing but its timing.’2  
Which is not something she understands. Precisely. She thinks. 
Timing. As with a joke? Or—and this is not what Stanley Cavell 
1 Slavoj Zizek: Interrogating the Real, ed. Rex Butler & Scott Stephens 
(Bloomsbury, 2005), p. 17.
2 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say (Cambridge University Press, 
1976), p. 28.
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has in mind, she thinks—eventful synchronicity, Eric Santner’s 
phrase felt-tipped on a Post-it note above the bench. But she’s 
looking for the book—red, on the couch—where he advances 
his method:
Rilke’s method in Malte as well as my own engagement with his-
torical texts, figures, and events in this study would be in terms 
proposed by Walter Benjamin in his reflections on the “mimetic 
faculty” and the “doctrine of similarities”. For Benjamin, too, the 
task of reading, of the critical engagement with history and with 
cultural texts of any kind, involves the seizing of a moment in which 
a constellation of what he refers to as “nonsensuous similarities” 
comes into focus, or to use Rilke’s acoustic figure, a moment in 
which the frequencies of vital intensity dispersed across historical 
epochs becomes synchronized.3  
It’s in the timing: elements in different places—texts, figures 
and events—drawn together, by language, at a critical moment. 
Though she wonders if her child’s body didn’t manifest her in-
capacity to take advantage of just such an opportunity. The 
undetectable moment of transformation, a flash between too 
early and too late, that lodged in her persistently aching head. 
To pluck her own doctrine of similarity from the pages of 
someone else’s preface … Without knowing too much about it, 
she embarks, a simpleton, on another effort of thought. A taste 
for simile has grown up in her alongside the one for artists going 
off like foodstuff. The simile is a figure of speech that conjures a 
fresh image from a comparison of two unlike things that share 
some common feature4. The advantage of ’such reciprocal rep-
resentation’ is that it ’places both subjects of comparison before 
3 Eric L. Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the 
Endgames of Sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. ix-xx.
4 In his treatise on rhetoric Aristotle praises metaphors and similes that give 
an idea of activity. Movement is what makes the listener ’see things’: ’By 
’making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as 
in a state of activity’. The successful simile makes a listener/reader see what 
is not apparent at the level of surface appearance by producing a movement 
in the things compared, causing a new concept to be grasped: ’Metaphors 
must be drawn from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not 
obviously so related—just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive 
resemblances even in things far apart.’ Rhetoric, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts 
(Digireads.com, 2005), pp. 93-4. 
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our very eyes, displaying them side by side’5. The cost of this 
arrangement is the gap it also demonstrates, one the similaic 
copula—’like’ or ’as’—exaggerates. A doctrine of similarity based 
not on metaphor, where one thing becomes—’is’—another, but 
on simile, where two things placed side by side display the split 
between them: what would this look like?
 
The similaic gap would be one through which vibrations of 
vital intensity might echo across generations and epochs.  So 
she’ll understand the similarities to which Eric Santner refers 
pertaining less to some positive content of things or features-
in-common and more to this peculiar connective zone that 
provides the spark of comparison but inhibits fusion. The 
simile is less prompt than metaphor6 but well enough equipped 
to figure the paradoxical moment of missed encounter. (She’s 
aware this borrowed phrase carries more than she’s able to 
lay hold of. She’ll make do with its lightened form.) She hunts 
again under her bench7 for a chapter photocopied from a book 
on early modern literature in which there is, she remembers, 
some discussion of simile versus metaphor in relation to desire, 
which could expand her experiment. Scanning highlighted 
phrases, the association of simile in early modern literature 
with sexuality and excess begins to clarify. Where metaphor 
represents a non-erotic matrimonial reproductive unity, 
simile represents a licentious ’shifting triangle of desire char-
acterized by an open-ended supplementarity exceeding the 
illusory unity of the dyad as sum’ or, a phrase she prefers, ’God’s 
Arithmeticke’8. Skipping to page 283, she finds a note to herself 
and a bandy arrow down the page. The protraction of discourse 
characteristic of simile is associated by Early Modern theorists 
with various forms of expansion of the female flesh, predom-
inently ‘copia, dilation and amplification’. There’s a flurry of 
5 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria Book VIII, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/
Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/8A*.html [accessed 
12th July 2013].
6 Following his disparagement of simile for being ’longer’ and, therefore, ’less 
attractive’ than metaphor, Aristotle writes: ’We see, then, that both speech 
and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize a new idea 
promptly’. Rhetoric, trans. by  W. Rhys Roberts (Digireads.com, 2005), p. 91.
7 The bench, Perch, was a component in the show, Room Setting, at Royal 
College of Art, 2012. It’s a metal frame construction (the dimensions match 
the cream couch in my flat) modelled on an Ikea table (used in my studio 
over the course of the PhD) with a cream leatherette and leather covered 
foam cushion.
8 Shirley Sharron-Zisser, The Risks of Simile in Renaissance Rhetoric (Peter 
Lang, 2000), pp. 277-278.  Subsequent references are given in the text. ’God’s 
Arithmeticke’ is a moral treatise by Francis Meres in which he ’commends the 
principle of heterosexual joining generated “When God had marryed Adam 
and Eua together”’(278).
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asterisks beside the sentences below, in which copia reveals 
its background in the letters and person of the goddess Ops, 
consort of melancholy Saturn (she feeds him the stone). In the 
Renaissance, ‘copia is theorized through images of plenty’—
Ops Mater is a figure of abundance—and constitutes a form of 
unstable signification: ‘the aesthetic category of copia dissolves 
boundaries. Copia ultimately involves not a celebration of 
eloquence but its crisis’ (284). It is to this aesthetic category 
that simile belongs, with its side-by-side display of parts and 
its non-fusional copula, its differentiating ”cut”, which makes 
vulgar show, through the excesses of ‘like’ and ‘as’, of a struc-
tural absence proper to comparison.
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mote_56
We’ve reworked our room. Temporarily, we thought. For the 
wedding. One bookshelf remains. Two topmost shelves given 
over to the books needed for writing. My doctoral self forced to 
edit her furniture, choosing against her earlier determinations 
according to the shelves’ dimensions and the requirements of 
a feast. (A five metre table, to seat seventeen, cuts the room in 
half.) What remains? For the writing she wants various books 
kept in view, knowing they won’t be opened. Not their content 
that’s required, then, just their spines. Rows of implacable backs 
turned to the room:
THE ULTIMATE PICASSO  |  Giving an Account of Oneself  |  Billie 
Whitelaw … Who he? An autobiography  |  The Odd One In  |  The 
Neighbor |  Visions of Excess  |  Thinking through Painting: Reflexivity 
and Agency Beyond the Canvas  | Late Picasso  |  Black Sun |  WHAT 
IS MADNESS?  |  The Fall of the Studio  |  Please don’t leave me | 
A five metre table cuts the room in half. This is a new way 
of living. We breakfast and dinner at one end, I write at the 
other. Furthest from the windows, beside the bookshelf. In the 
middle: a dispersal of things unfixed but purposeful. In use. 
And in two low dishes pot pourri from the wedding flowers. 
The table is no longer a surface. It’s a field. And a crossing.
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mote_36
Simile, an indecorous figure of speech that says too much, lays 
itself bare, ’displays the moment of resemblance’1. Aristotle 
warns against its use, preferring metaphor’s economy; the 
simultaneity of its substituted terms—’this is that’—establishes 
stylistic elegance. The vulgar excesses of ’like’, the similaic 
copula, inducing the sense of bodily copulation from its Latin 
root, drives the many disavowals of simile. Exiled from the 
realm of rational argument where metaphor retains its cen-
trality, simile washes up in the province of song. 
1 Paul Ricoeur, ’Between Rhetoric and Poetics‘ in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, ed. by Amélie Rorty (University of California Press, 1996), p. 329. 
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mote_47
New items that match: habitat catalogue
eBay <ebay@ebay.co.uk> 
to me
You saved habitat catalogue as 
something you are looking for. We’ve 
found 1 newly-listed items that match. 
Just click 'Show items' to see these 
matching items. We hope this helps you 
find exactly what you want.
We found a match.
The cover  of 1983/4 is divided into 
nine square photographs, each with 
a caption: PRIMARY, PROVENÇAL, 
FIRST HOME, BASICS, COMFORT, CITY, 
COUNTRY, CLASSIC, IDEAS. The image 
above PRIMARY  shows four, stacked, 
plastic colanders in yellow, red, blue, 
and green.
Page 135 describes fleurs des champs 
as ’a charming, fresh floral design 
with scattered blue, yellow and red 
flowers on a crisp white background’. 
The flower stems are green. A mix of 
PRIMARY and PROVENÇAL.
56
mote_27
What is Weeping Woman’s mien? Mien. This word I write with 
pleasure but don’t like saying. How to form it in an angled 
mouth? Me-un, ”n“ in the throat, or mean? Too French, too 
English. And the received question shaped by its homophone: 
What does Weeping Woman mean? Not immediately my 
question. Not quite or altogether nor primarily the question this 
painting presses me to ask. It demanded this kind of question of 
another child, Antony Penrose, living with it in his home: ’Why 
is the woman crying?’ he asked his father, Roland Penrose, 
who answered where the painting would not. Young Antony 
repeated his question, ’Why is she crying?’. The painting 
refused to answer. No visible cause of the woman’s suffering 
to be found there within the frame. And is not the omission of 
narrative content adequate to the pictured affect what makes 
the painting so demanding?1 
What does Weeping Woman mean? Not my first question. The 
painting does not readily communicate meaning. No, I think, I 
don’t know what it’s asking, only that it asks something of me. 
Which unformulated question grows up into one that won’t roll 
right off my tongue: ”What is Weeping Woman’s mien?“ Driven 
by a feeling for some perturbation, not altogether displacing 
sense and reason, but quite. Quite displacing. The painting’s 
museological time, its agreed place in history, muddled by its 
appearance in my bedroom, with soft furnishings, crocodile 
tears, the insinuations of futures past and things unknown. 
Museological time not wholly displaced by my bedroom time—
pre-teen, about 1992, suburban Lincoln, 1930s semi, synthetic 
carpet, RED-YELLOW-BLUE-GREEN—not altogether displaced 
but wrinkled. Quite wrinkled. Hiked-up like a man’s trouser leg 
caught in his sock, which just wrecks his equipoise.
Mien: has pursued me as I’ve unwittingly pursued it, it would 
seem, over thirty years more or less. Impetus and spectral 
object of my peregrinations. It set-off in that bedroom to move 
surreptitiously through my education disorganizing things in 
1 In his case study of the ’Rat Man’, Freud offers a memorable simile for the 
subject’s tendency to reach for a ready explanation, whether or not it is the 
right one, in order to fill a gap between ’ideational content’ and ’affect’: ’We 
are not used to feeling strong affects without their having any ideational 
content, and therefore, if the content is missing, we seize as a substitute 
upon some other content which is in some way or other suitable, much 
as our police, when they cannot catch the right murderer, arrest a wrong 
one instead.’ The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud Vol X, Two Case Histories: ’Little Hans’ and the ’Rat Man’ 
(Vintage Books, 2001), p. 176.
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accordance with its sensorium. Which is composed of various 
parts: facial expression; appearance; beak, muzzle, nose, 
mouth; character or mood;  of mine; mine, my own; make as if 
to; make a show of. 
Mood and character on the underside of ’mean’. The question 
limping along, “What does Weeping Woman mean?”, with the 
other one, “What is Weeping Woman’s mien?” stuck in the volar 
softness of its foot.
Camera Lucida, warming at the edges, bending its corners. 
Page 26 onwards on the interaction of studium and punctum. 
The studium classes as ’a kind of general, enthusiastic com-
mitment but without special acuity’2, by way of which a pho-
tograph’s ’figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the 
actions’ become interesting, legible.  This legibility depends 
on a complicity between sovereign consciousnesses, that of 
the photographer (Operator) and the viewer (Spectator), which 
reach out, meet and congratulate one another across the pho-
tograph. Experience of a photograph’s studium is grounded in 
’a kind of education (knowledge and civility, “politeness”) which 
allows [the Spectator] to discover the Operator’. Thus, what the 
studium provides for is the pleasure of concord: ’to recognize 
the studium is inevitably to encounter the photographer’s in-
tentions, to enter into harmony with them, to approve or dis-
approve of them, but always to understand them, to argue them 
within myself, for culture (from which the studium derives) is a 
contract arrived at between creators and consumers.’ 
The punctum, by contrast, cuts through the studium’s tact 
with a wounding act of punctuation. It is characterized by the 
irruption of a detail or details from the photograph: ’it is not I 
who seek it out […] it is this element which rises from the scene, 
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me’. The punctum 
is a detail, an arrow, ’sting, speck, cut, little hole’, appearing 
as an emissary of the accidental, finding its addressee in the 
Spectator called to it: ’A photograph’s punctum is that accident 
which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me.)’.  The 
poignancy of the eventful detail, which ’traverse[s], lash[es], 
2 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage 2000), 
pp. 26-28. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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stripe[s]’ a photograph’s studium, is tied to being involun-
tary, received by the Spectator ’right here in [the] eyes’ (43); 
it cannot be intentionally included in the photograph by the 
Operator but must have lodged there as ’a supplement that is 
at once inevitable and delightful’ (47). Roland Barthes describes 
this happenstance as the result of a photographer’s “second 
sight”, which ’does not consist in “seeing” but in being there’ 
(47). Similarly, the punctum cannot be searched for, peered at, 
nor analysed by the Spectator; it sticks out and snags the eye of 
someone otherwise engaged in the decorous exchange of the 
photograph’s studium, and dissolves the familiar code: ’I am 
a primitive, a child—or a maniac’, writes Barthes, ’I dismiss all 
knowledge, all culture, I refuse to inherit anything from another 
eye than my own’ (51). 
This punctum he describes makes strange movements. It can 
catalyse a special growth in the character of the one whose 
eye it pokes; his or her person is both flattened by it, pushed 
towards a primitive existence, and expanded by it: ’the punctum 
has, more or less potentially, a power of expansion. This power 
is often metonymic’ (45). In which case the punctum rouses 
the Spectator’s memory, exciting the rapid recollection of 
things forgotten. It is at once beneath or beyond the scope of 
intention—sovereign consciousness is the studium’s purview—
and acutely personal, appearing ’for me’, insisting as ’my own’; 
it is both animating—’at once brief and active’ (49)—and morti-
fying, the motor of an ’intense immobility’ (49). These and more 
paradoxes of the punctum are encapsulated on page 55 in one 
succinct lesson: the punctum ’is an addition: it is what I add to 
the photograph and what is nonetheless already there’.
59
mote_61
Norman Bryson reminds the reader of Looking at the Overlooked 
that:
The constative level of a text or image is that of its content or 
message; the performative level is that of the enunciation or 
enactment of that message. At the constative level there appears 
the literal dimension of a statement, in separation from the local 
circumstances of its utterance; the performative level embraces the 
context surrounding the utterance—its speaker, its addressee, its 
modes of address and reception, its place in the network of commu-
nicative acts.1 
What concerns him in these pages is the interplay of consta-
tive and performative levels in Pieter Aertsen’s The Butcher’s 
Stall (1551), a still life of enormous sausages, hams, fowls 
and carcases of all sorts piled high in the foreground, almost 
entirely obscuring the distant background where the Flight into 
Egypt is depicted in miniature, a picture within a picture. The 
painting’s lavish, foreground flesh is opposed to the indistinct, 
biblical scene in which Mary is engaged in the spiritual work 
of charity. The few paintings, of which The Butcher’s Stall is 
one, featuring this collision of sacred and profane, wherein the 
pleasures of the flesh and ’the everyday world of kitchen work’ 
are massively inflated in the pictorial economy at the expense 
of a diminished, distant biblical scene, do not, the reader’s told, 
constitute a reversal of the theological message: ’the life of the 
spirit is higher than creatural or animal existence’. Rather, what 
distinguishes the fundamental structure of these works is how 
the coded hierarchy of sacred and profane, at the constative 
level of message—unchanging theological truth—is performed 
by the image. In these paintings ’access to the transcendent is 
exactly blocked and prevented: transcendental truth does not 
belong to the realm of the visible; it cannot simply be pictured’. 
Whilst the viewer is able to take in with ease the immediate sen-
suality of the butcher’s stall, of ’animal matter in its lowest and 
least redeemable aspect’, the sacred background event demands 
some considerable effort to be seen and can, even then, only be 
glimpsed. 
1 Norman Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life 
Painting (Reaktion Books, 1990), pp. 146-50. 
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In colour [Weeping Woman] is very different from the studies made 
before going to Mougins. The lurid acid effects had been exchanged 
for brilliant contrasts—red, blue, green, and yellow. The result of 
using colour in a manner so totally unassociated with grief, for a 
face in which sorrow is evident in every line, is highly disconcerting.1
Roland Penrose directs his reader’s attention to drawing and 
colour brought to work not in harmony but totally dissociated. If 
sorrow is the summary message evident in every line—Weeping 
Woman, Roland Penrose explains elsewhere, gives ’an account 
of the agony caused by fascist aggression on humanity’2—then 
this message is brought into collision with a colour setting 
’totally unassociated with grief’. 
The black line in Weeping Woman is heavy, indurating. It 
doesn’t move in a lively way, creating depth through shifts in 
thickness but treads slowly—concentrating—round face and 
features. It makes its rounds of the colourful patches as if it 
might, with diligence, bind all the colour’s energetic activity. 
If the line tenses its grip to harness colour to its purpose—the 
message—it does not succeed, since the sorrow it’s meant to 
express is contested by colour ’totally unassociated with grief’. 
Then again, Roland Penrose implies, colour adds to the line’s 
intense sorrow by its eccentricity, elaborating the whole dis-
concerting narrative: ’It [is] as though this girl, seen in profile 
but with both the dark passionate eyes of Dora Maar, dressed 
as for a fête, had found herself suddenly faced by heartrending 
disaster’3. Colours of the fête confronted with the line of disaster. 
Some disconcerting things my child’s eyes couldn’t get the 
measure of: the colour conspires with the paint surface. (Dora 
Maar’s thinned version embodies this lesson: the effect of 
colour depends on its quantity and handling.) The colour is 
caked, the way foundation gets on a face, applied too thick 
and sweated into its pores and crevices. There’s no reprieve; it 
carries the intensity of an improper disturbance  all over the 
canvas. (Figure is differentiated from background, readable as a 
bit of room behind her, but this behind is extremely shallow—it 
1 Roland Penrose quoted in Judi Freeman, Picasso and the Weeping Women: 
The Years of Marie-Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art, 1994), p. 117. This message is not given but assumed; it has to 
be read into the line, so to speak. The word ’account’ suggests an explanatory 
dimension to Weeping Woman that for me is—disconcertingly—absent.
2 Roland Penrose quoted in A Picasso anthology: documents, criticism, 
reminiscences, ed. by Marilyn McCully (Thames & Hudson, 1981), p.211.
3 Ibid., p. 211.
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backs rather than spaces. There’s an unforthcoming density 
to the surface, which is hard to describe. It’s without the in-
flections and gradations of Guernica’s; that painting exposes 
layers, it reveals its processing eventfully. Whereas Guernica’s 
surface unfolds, Weeping Woman’s sticks.) 
When colour breaks into white, within the contours of what 
ought to be a handkerchief held to the face, there’s the rev-
elation … that’s not the word … the laying bare of something 
underneath. The handkerchief doesn’t conceal what it covers 
as a handkerchief should; it’s a kind of nested screen on which 
another reality fires: extra digits fanned under the eyes, cleft 
chin, a not very feminine thumb4, fingers connected to teeth 
via cartoonish electrical waves. In this section, there’s more 
than there ought to be if we expect a skeleton consistent with 
those fleshy features which hang on it. As if this armature 
had suffered a double exposure, producing the odd spread of 
fingers, one of which—index finger or thumb?—elongates and 
morphs with a tendon in the neck. 
In the caption from my Phaidon book, David Lomas says the 
handkerchief is ’like a picture within a picture’ (108). The 
handkerchief picture is close to being black and white, it in-
sinuates a skull or death’s head. Can David Lomas’s simile be 
borrowed and extended to the painting’s overall working of 
colour as both embedded in and extraneous to what’s depicted? 
As if the collision between two orders of reality—the handker-
chief scene versus the other, coloured up to ’a jarring expres-
sionist pitch’ (108)—weren’t also more generally applicable to 
a collision between line and colour in the painting? To think, 
that is, of colour as a picture within what’s pictured? And that 
colour’s picture here is one of the ’bright outside of things’5, 
operating not in the service nor even the sphere of depiction, 
but somewhere else?
4 Dora Maar was known for her elegant fingers and long painted nails, details 
Picasso celebrated in a number of his portraits of her. Here the figure’s nails 
are bluntly cropped, the fingers stumpy.
5 ’The early writers on Cubism could exalt all they liked in the style’s 
sloughing off of the bright outside of things. […] [But] the world of the mind, 
in Picasso’s hands, turns out to have a brutal inconsistency that makes the 
worst colorist look well behaved.’ T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes 
from a History of Modernism (Yale University Press, 1999), p. 187.
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She’s been squinting at this cropped face for a while, dis-
solving it, reviewing it, turning away to the wall. The hand-
kerchief distinguishes itself from the rest as a piece cut from 
Guernica’s cloth. Handkerchief, like a picture within a picture. 
Handkerchief, like a canvas. A handkerchief falls from one 
canvas into another. Weeping Woman, the whole thing, like a 
handkerchief, scrumpled and folded and found compressed in 
the pocket of a winter coat worn a while ago, before the summer.
 The smaller handkerchief—Weeping Woman’s syn-
ecdoche—falls out of Guernica into the hands and mouth of 
this other one. Eyes like spoons scoop up bits of Guernica’s 
congealed fluids. The hanky is received into this head rheumy 
with colour, colours beside themselves and quite antithetical to 
Guernica’s. ’He worked feverishly every day, using only black, 
white and grey values: he was too angry to bother with the 
niceties of colour’6. Too angry, too much in haste to bother with 
colour. Nicety not necessity. A non-essential luxury, like a hat 
with a flower, an earring, mascara, a tailored jacket, wallpaper. 
’The color [sic] is black, white, pale and dark gray. (The dead 
have no color.)’7. The ’last history painting’8 needs colour like 
the dead need clothes. The handkerchief picture within the 
Weeping Woman picture is the emblem of a dead zone, shaken 
from Guernica.9 Charged with electricity—the handkerchief 
picture’s expressly cartoony bit—the rest of the flesh, the paint-
ing’s and the woman’s, is, what, resuscitated? Shocked into a 
paradoxical form of existence, petrified and energized. (She 
hears that phrase echoing, from the poet she forgets, through 
Walter Benjamin and the pages of On Creaturely Life: "petrified 
unrest". And Barthes’s description of the punctuating detail as 
an "intense immobility", something undevelopable in the pho-
tograph: ’an essence (of a wound), what cannot be transformed 
but only repeated under the instances of insistence (of the 
insistent gaze)10.) 
6 Man Ray quoted in Anne Baldassari, Picasso Love and War 1935-45 
(Flammarion, 2006), p. 166.
7 Ad Reinhardt, 'How to look at a mural (Guernica)' reprinted in Picasso’s 
Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, criticism and 
analysis, ed. by Ellen. C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art History, 1988), 
p. 234-5. 
8 T. J. Clark, ’Looking Again at Picasso’s Guernica’, http://artcriticism.sva.
edu/?academic-year=fall-2010spring-2011 [accessed 12th July 2013]
9 ’The white handkerchief […] serves merely to bleach her cheeks with the 
color of death,’ writes Roland Penrose. Quoted in Judi Freeman, Picasso and 
the Weeping Women: The Years of Marie-Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art, 1994), p. 117.
10 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage, 
2000), p. 49.
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mote_21
She’s pouring apples in front of a kitchen wall shared with Philip 
Guston. A poet’s fingers steadying the platter for apples shaken 
from a plastic bag. Melencolia I on the kitchen wall. Dürer’s 
print broods there, quite large. In the kitchen where apples are 
poured by a poet who was once a painter. In the kitchen where 
apples are poured onto a platter for them to share. Fruit’s laid 
out on tables. Social or just short of that, friendly. Apples, es-
pecially, get poured for more than one. Falling from the plastic 
bag in the poet’s right hand, apples settle their lexis of temp-
tation, eroticism, conspiracy, discourse, curiosity, knowledge, 
thud, thud, thud, thud, thud, onto a shiny dish.
fig. 17
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mote_59
And how am I to ready myself for wounding by the punctum? 
What degree of looseness should I adopt in my stance before 
such and such a photograph, or text, or painting, or object, in 
anticipation of special punctuation? 
’It is sharp and yet lands in a vague zone of myself; it is acute yet 
muffled, it cries out in silence.’1
Can I volunteer myself to this quiet abrasion? There but not 
there. There but not there until I am there to add it and receive it 
in an abrupt, undirected glance. A question of timing, perhaps, 
more than placement. (’I cannot say why, i.e., say where: is it the 
eyes, the skin, the position of the hands, the track shoes?’ (51).)
The punctum wanders. I’ve learned already that it can’t be 
willed or scrutinized, coded or named, for its ’effect is certain 
but unlocatable, it does not find its sign’ (51).  
A clear instruction: ’Shut [your] eyes to allow the detail to rise of 
its own accord into affective consciousness’(55). To catch and 
be caught by the (is it my?) punctum, I shall close my eyes. Or 
remove myself altogether. For it is the punctum, as the “blind 
field”, which ’takes [me] outside [the] frame and it is there that I 
animate this photograph and that it animates me’ (59). 
This, an especially vital step to learn in the punctum’s weird 
choreography:
Nothing surprising, then, if sometimes, despite its clarity, the 
punctum should be revealed only after the fact, when the photo-
graph is no longer in front of me and I think back on it. I may know 
better a photograph I remember than a photograph I am looking 
at, as if direct vision oriented its language wrongly, engaging it in 
an effort of description which will always miss its point of effect, the 
punctum. (55)
The instruction, written again: 'Ultimately—or at the limit—in 
order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close 
your eyes' (53).  This inadequacy of the open eye to the punctum 
recalls me to an earlier entry in the inventory of failed looking:
The that of facticity is never to be found by looking  […] we must 
ontologically in principle leave the primary discovery of the world 
to “mere mood”. Pure beholding, even if it penetrated into the 
1 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage, 
2000), p. 53. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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innermost core of the being of something objectively present, would 
never be able to discover anything like what is threatening.2 
2 Martin Heidegger quoted in Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Benjamin, 
Rilke, Sebald (University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 47. See mote_60: Mood.
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mote_26
As if we’d touched that rock at Delphi, worshipped as a 
monument and a thing of wonder for mortal men. 
Robert Graves says it was a meteor. 
Captivated by an impression of the mute and mendacious 
Goddess of Abundance and Fertility, a marvellous Booby and 
Giantess tearfully encumbered …
She was meteoric! 
(If we believe the ancients.)
Rocked by the rapture of hundreds laying palms to earth and 
begging her likeness,
Ops or Opis, or Rhea, opens her own composition 
joining Melancholy with something else some 
Ingenuity mixed with tears of anamorphic 
Lubricity that skew this rock into a baby— 
an absurd thing—shattering the old Sot bent on 
consuming his own loins. So addled, so hubristic, 
he mistakes a rock for a baby? And with what 
audacity Ops offers it up swaddled in cloth 
she must throw it into his gob not to betray 
its portentous weight. A heavy baked baby 
at the bottom of his belly eighteen years 
or more or less until the mother’s son is back 
calling his indigestible double from Saturn’s gut 
in a staggered puke. 
Ops looking on: to one side, erubescent,  
with floating eyes and quivering lip, 
watching him vomit up her strange nourishment.
Ops or Opis, occasionally Goddess of Clod, Sprout 
and Seed. Thorny wise, hedgerow smart. 
(There’s dirt under her nails.) 
She knows how to zhoosh a boulder.
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Rouge its cheeks a little. Oil the craggy thing.  
Use that nursling voice whispered in Saturn’s ear, 
moderately, melodiously: 
This is the last one,
down in one, my dear, the very last. 
Just one more and you’re done.
Ops has him by the chops.
Her trick ministering to his insensibility— 
an appetite eyeless enough she can feed
him anything, even a rock. 
Else she convinces with some flourish in the act; 
spontaneous proof, like lactation.
Ops insists. 
Squirts a milky circle, there, into the firmament.
Ignorance, or rather madness, of the men of that 
time! (If we believe the ancients.)
Ops or Opis, or Rhea, glittered with great fame.
A woman troubled with long sufferings finally 
dies in old age. By mistake Queen and Goddess, a 
woman, turned to dust and forgotten;
but for us dragging her up 
with her oddly shaped stone. 
Thud slop come O and P
in copia, opus, and copy.
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[…] This leap I’m wanting to make between two pairs of com-
parisons, from German Trauerspiel and Greek Tragedy to 
Weeping Woman and Guernica, is a leap of loose association. 
Comparing Greek Tragedy/Trauerspiel and Guernica/Weeping 
Woman would be futile if the purpose were to equate these 
dramatic genres and paintings; that’s not where I’m heading. I 
want to see whether the comparison made by Walter Benjamin 
to dismantle and reconstitute the images of Greek Tragedy 
and German Trauerspiel, can illuminate the drawing apart and 
together I’m trying to trace in the interval between these two 
paintings, Guernica and Weeping Woman.
Does Trauerspiel become fascinated with what appears of 
tragedy on its surface? And misrecognize what’s there, where 
it comes from? On page 121, Walter Benjamin discusses 
the different functions of the chorus in Greek tragedy and 
Trauerspiel. There are no ’loudly lamenting Greeks’, he says, 
answering an opposing voice, there is no ”susceptibility […] to 
gentle tears”. 
Really the chorus of tragedy does not lament. It remains detached 
in the presence of profound suffering; this refutes the idea of 
surrender to lamentation […] Choric diction, rather, has the effect 
of restoring the ruins of the tragic dialogue to a linguistic edifice 
firmly established—in ethical society and in religious community—
both before and after the conflict. Far from dissolving the tragic 
action into lamentations, the constant presence of the members 
of the chorus […] actually sets a limit on the emotional outburst 
even in the dialogue. The conception of the chorus as a Trauerklage 
[lamentation], in which the “original pain of creation resounds”, is a 
genuinely baroque reinterpretation of its essence. For the chorus of 
the German Trauerspiel does, at least partially, have this function.1 
Three connected speculations: Weeping Woman is to Guernica 
as German Trauerspiel is to Greek Tragedy in so much as it 
misrecognizes something of the earlier painting or precipitates 
something on its own surface which is not there in Guernica 
but which is retroactively attributed to it. Or Guernica tries to 
embody something like the condition of classical Tragedy, 
which it misunderstands, coming closer to Trauerspiel; 
meanwhile, Weeping Woman has a choric function in relation 
to Guernica. But which one: setting ’a limit on the emotional 
1 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John 
Osborne (Verso, 1998), pp. 121-2. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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outburst’, as in Tragedy, or figuring a primal cry of lamentation, 
as in Trauerspiel?  Most descriptions of the painting would 
suggest the second, as if it amplified the ’cry and outrage of 
horror’2 heard issuing from Guernica. There are features of 
Weeping Woman that don’t wholly match this perception, the 
mouth, barely open, biting on a handkerchief, for example. 
Guernica’s ’cry and outrage of horror’ plays around Weeping 
Woman’s mouth as gnawing, nail-biting, anxiety; the cry is 
muffled, gagged even. 
There is this mystery of why what’s visible is ignored repeatedly3 
in preference for what is not. Is it possible the painting acts as 
a lure to emotional flow—an invitation to elaborate an affective 
discourse—even though, of itself, it pictures something closer 
to constraint, to constriction? In which case, the painting has a 
paradoxical function vis à vis Walter Benjamin’s description of 
the chorus in Greek Tragedy, since Weeping Woman pictures 
a limited emotional outburst but the effect on its audience 
seems to be largely the opposite, corresponding better with 
Trauerspiel, as a means by which an audience’s ’mournfulness 
finds satisfaction’ (119).
[…]
2 Herschel B. Chipp, Picasso’s Guernica: History, Transformations, Meanings 
(Thames & Hudson, 1988), p. vi.
3 The caption by David Lomas in my Phaidon book describes ’an elegant 
Parisian woman, who gives vent to an ocean of tears’. Picasso (Phaidon, 
1992), p. 108. The tears are few, not oceanic. See mote_68: Drainage.  The 
Tate Modern display caption for Weeping Woman reads: ’Picasso responded 
to the massacre by painting the vast mural Guernica, and for months 
afterwards he made subsidiary paintings based on one of the figures in the 
mural: a weeping woman holding her dead child.’ http://www.tate.org.uk/
art/artworks/picasso-weeping-woman-t05010 [accessed online 12th July 
2013]. Here the effect of Weeping Woman, painted several months after 
Guernica’s removal to the Spanish Pavilion, is to make a figure of a weeping 
woman holding her dead child appear where she is not. There are no tears 
in Guernica. See mote_18: Fleeing Woman, for a discussion of Weeping 
Woman's connection to Guernica's female figures.
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mote_52
When Weeping Woman hung in Roland Penrose’s London 
home, Antony Penrose asked his father many times why the 
woman was crying. Roland replied that her child had been 
killed by bombs.
If the woman grieves her lost child, what loss does the painting 
itself register? If the face is not only pictured content but coin-
cident with the painting’s own surface (looking to the concubi-
nage of paper support, table and figure worked over in the early 
1930s1) … not an allegorical figure quite but a face figuring the 
seizure or compression of surfaces, then what kind of loss does 
the painting face, what—if not the aeroplanes Penrose strains 
to see mirrored in the woman’s eyes—does Weeping Woman 
reflect? 
Picasso began work on a version of the painter’s studio, given 
up for Guernica’s subject matter a month later. An historic call 
from the present, from the country with which he symboli-
cally identifies his artistry, must be met with a painting. What 
painting? What can painting do? In response: hesitation. And 
one painting that didn’t materialise; the fulcrum of the painter’s 
studio could not generate a work adequate to the historic 
demand. Speaking of his painting and the war, Picasso linked 
the forces of reaction “killing” Spain and his own struggle 
against the death of art:
The war in Spain is a war of reaction—against people, against 
liberty. My whole life as an artist has been a continual struggle 
against reaction, and the death of art. In the pictures I’m now 
painting—which I shall call Guernica—and in all my recent work, I 
am expressing my horror of the military caste which is now plunging 
Spain into an ocean of misery and death.2 
Events in Spain gave Picasso subject matter with which to meet 
the commission. But did it discharge, in full, the summons to 
painting and it’s struggle? And if it did give its answer, was it 
this one: ’a last recombination of cubist and expressionist-sur-
realist-illustration, the end of a fine-art picture tradition’3? 
Could it only answer by self-slaughter?
1 See mote_37: Her face set like a table.
2 Picasso’s statement in The Springfield Republica, 18th July 1937, probably 
made in May/June of that year, quoted in Mary Ann Caws Dora Maar with & 
without Picasso: A Biography (Thames & Hudson, 2000), p.103.
3 Emphasis mine. Ad Reinhardt, ’How to look at a mural (Guernica)’, 
reproduced in Picasso’s Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, 
documents, poetry, criticism and analysis, ed. by Ellen C. Oppler, (Norton 
Critical Studies in Art History, 1988), p. 235.
72
mote_7
I’ve picked up a pair of books, two artworks reproduced in 
them, Habitat wallpaper or curtains, I don’t remember which, 
my childhood bedroom, a period of time between 1986 and 
1992, from age eight or nine to twelve or thirteen, bookended 
by buying those books. 
This set of materials would fall into the first portion of my 
education. Except first gives too easy priority to them; the order 
of my education isn’t as linear as a numbered sequence. ‘I came 
by them’, an expression of discovery in which ’them’ finds ’I’ as 
much as ’I’ finds ’them’, better describes how this arrangement 
of materials becomes the special property of my doctorate. It is 
the doctorate, putting a candidate’s art making and learning on 
stage, that finds in these materials the shape of an educational 
arrangement. The materials are the properties—stage prop-
erties—of the doctorate; as the subject of my education, I am 
staged by the doctorate and its assembled props.
An account of this category of object gives motion as the prop’s 
defining feature. To become a prop, an object must be moved by 
an act of theatre, it must be ‘triggered’ by an actor or else remain 
simply stage furniture1. The doctorate, to my way of thinking, 
provides for some act of theatre by furnishing the actor—my 
doctoral me—with an occasion for triggering, for a movement 
of the educational arrangement as it otherwise appears, stati-
cally, in the wings. If they are props proper then the materials 
I’ve come by must move and be moved by the action of my 
doctorate. 
The same account says that the prop is an uncanny sort of 
symbol, able to mobilise memory of its past incarnations in a 
moment of representational difficulty. It brings along a memory 
of its own, which it throws into gaps developing between 
script, stage, and actors. Though a prop’s past associations and 
movements might do more than just fill those gaps to which 
it’s called; a prop might also swell with its own memory and 
significance beyond the proportions of the space available, to 
overwhelm the play. 
Described more often as a disease of time, tales of melancholy 
nevertheless deal plentifully in the metaphorics of space. 
1 Andrew Sofer, The Stage Life of Props (University of Michigan Press, 2003), 
pp. 11-12.
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Melancholy is figured in its most well-known representa-
tion as a dejected angel seated in a work space scattered with 
abandoned tools and instruments of study. It may well be the 
load of these instruments, the heavy world of things, that brings 
the angel to sit down in her chair. It may be the lead weight 
of these objects’ escalating pasts, a temporality she’s unable 
to grasp in these things, around which the melancholic body 
and mind is bent. Above the angel’s thinking head sand pours 
through an hourglass.  
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mote_11
Bedroom scene in place.
Pre-teen lying on a blue synthetic carpet
one hand cupping her chin the other turning pages.
Stopped by Melencolia I at an angel sitting with chin in hand,
dog asleep in the corner, industrious putto writing on a tablet.
In another room at the same time in an altogether different age,
Yve-Alain Bois’s essay, ’Painting: The Task of Mourning’1, is 
being written to figure in my education twenty years later: 
Modernism and Its Subjectivities, masters degree in History of 
Art at University College London. The course takes modern-
ism’s beginnings with its dissolution; modernism as endgame
and painting the field in which it hotly plays itself out.
Painting as Model, new, grey softback with orange spine, top- 
left beside Late Picasso. The essay’s aged. ’Painting: The Task 
of Mourning’. Title out of proportion somehow, as ears become 
on an old man, too big and flappy. A list of rhetorical questions 
to begin, levelled at too-big claims for ’the end’ circulating in 
’our present situation’ (230). Bois writes against the ’endless 
diagnoses of death’ since painting ’might not be dead’ (243). 
Then advances the future cleared by that modal auxiliary: 
Its vitality will only be tested once we are cured of our mania and 
our melancholy, and we believe again in our ability to act in history: 
accepting our project of working through the end again, rather than 
evading it through increasingly elaborate mechanisms of defense 
(that is what mania and melancholy are about) and settling our 
historical task: the difficult task of mourning. (243) 
Once we are cured of our mania and our melancholy, and we 
believe again in our ability to act in history. I’m not sure, now, of 
his diagnoses, nor the therapeutic challenge. Not so much the 
diagnosis of our present situation—the one then, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the end was fascinated over—than of Modernist 
painting’s activity: ’mourning has been the activity of painting 
throughout this century’ (243). The strange noisiness of those 
essays footnoted, ones by Benjamin Buchloh, Hal Foster, 
Douglas Crimp, as if the dedicated frequency for Art History’s 
1 Yve-Alain Bois's essay ’Painting: The Task of Mourning’ first appeared in 
the catalogue for Endgame—Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting 
and Sculpture at the Boston Institute of Contemporary Art, 1986. A version 
of the essay is reprinted in Painting as Model (MIT Press, 1993), 229-244. 
Subsequent references to this edition are given in the text.
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discourse on the end of painting had its own, default volume 
setting. It’s in this essay too, the loud derogation of mania and 
melancholy in preference for normal mourning. Perhaps in 
1986 the ’we’ of ’our present situation’ would have fully recog-
nized the imperative to seek a cure and for what precise ideo-
logical malignancy surfacing in mania and melancholy. It may 
have sounded clearly then but reaches my doctoral subject all 
crackly. Something else becomes audible. Holding broadly to 
his analysis, the terms of Bois’s essay transpose themselves. Not 
mourning but melancholy coming to characterize the activity 
of modernist painting. It would behove our present situation, 
then, to attune itself not to cure but treatment.
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mote_9
In 1937, Picasso was asked to design a mural for the Spanish Pavilion 
at the international exposition in Paris. The result was Guernica—
named after a Basque town that had been bombed some months 
before, during this first year of the Spanish Civil War. It is Picasso’s 
best-known painting and one of the masterpieces of our time. Yet it 
is a problematic work, stylistically complex, with images difficult to 
decipher, whose meaning is unclear.1
The introductory essay, written by Ellen C. Oppler, editor of 
Picasso’s Guernica (1988), begins this way. A neat, flat summary: 
the request was made, a painting resulted.
Open another book, Picasso’s Guernica (1989), written by 
Herschel B. Chipp: this one has a more rumpled beginning. As 
if to underwrite the book’s title, Guernica is first established as 
primarily Picasso’s:
This book is a search for the meanings underlying one of Picasso’s 
greatest paintings, Guernica. The work comes from the time when 
the artist was fifty-five years of age, at the height of his artistic 
powers, and keeping company with two beautiful women, both of 
whom obsessed his imagination and were reflected ambivalently in 
his art.2 
The foregrounded reciprocity of Pablo Picasso’s art and personal 
life is maintained up to paragraph two:
But the shock that with overpowering urgency was to call into 
being the painting, with its cry of outrage and horror, came from 
another, wholly unexpected, source—the brutal terror bombing of 
the peaceful Basque town of Guernica. 
Both books begin by describing Guernica’s beginnings, the 
cause of it. Though a delay, between the bombing and news 
of the atrocity reaching Paris, is written-up by Herschel B. 
Chipp, the genesis of Picasso’s Guernica appears emphatically 
immediate, as if for this man at the height of his artistic powers 
there were no gap, not even a minimal one, between event, 
affect, and representation. Chipp ends the preface: ’even as the 
largest May Day demonstrations ever seen thronged the boule-
vards of Paris, Picasso took up pencil and paper and in a single 
day conceived his vision of Guernica’ (vi).
1 Picasso’s Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, 
criticism and analysis, ed. by Ellen C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art 
History, 1988), p. 47. 
2 Herschel B. Chipp, Picasso’s Guernica: History, Transformations, Meanings 
(Thames & Hudson, 1989), p. vi. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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Writing in 1966, Clement Greenberg has Guernica be a terminal 
point in the artist’s career, marking the moment Picasso “lost 
his stuff”3. Not a man at the height of his powers but one whose 
art had ’ceased being indispensable’4. Greenberg does not 
count Guernica amongst Picasso’s greatest paintings, which 
he says were all done before 1925, with the qualified exception 
of Charnel House (1942). The problem with Guernica is that it 
’suffers from being boxed-in, too compressed for its size’. It 
‘tends to be jerky,‘ says Greenberg, ‘it stops and starts, buckles 
and bulges. […] Guernica aims at the epic and falls into the 
declamatory’.
Descriptions of Guernica’s beginnings make me uncomfort-
able. Closing the gap—between commission and fulfilment, 
between news report and the mural’s execution, between 
call and response—should quell the feeling, but the diverting 
melodrama of immediacy is unable to magic away details of 
Picasso’s slow, lukewarm response to the commission, related 
later by Herschel B. Chipp in his book. And the image of a 
consummate synthesis—of Picasso passionately in love, twice 
over, at the height of his powers, the commission, an event 
on the world stage unfolding at just that moment—does not, 
ultimately, insure the mural against problems of the sort that 
Clement Greenberg, for example, bothers with.
Those details related by Chipp: in January 1937, a delegation 
of architects and embassy officials representing the Spanish 
government  came ’to ask Picasso to participate in a project of 
great symbolic significance for the Spanish Republic’5. When 
asked by the delegation ’to contribute a large mural painting on 
a subject of his own choice […] Picasso’s response was typically 
non-committal. He hesitated to join his countrymen and fellow 
artists’ (3).  Escalating tensions and violence in Spain did not 
prompt Picasso to respond decisively through his artwork or in 
other ways6. Troubled by the events in Spain,  Picasso it seems, 
3 An expression favoured by Clement Greenberg to describe an artist’s 
demise: ’Sooner or later all great artists lose their stuff, after which they just 
keep going in the day-to-day activity of the artist treading water’. Rosalind 
Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (MIT Press, 1993), p. 251.
4 Clement Greenberg, ’The Charnel House: Picasso’s Last Masterpiece?’, 
Picasso’s Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, 
criticism and analysis, ed. by Ellen C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art 
History, 1988), pp. 345-6.
5 My emphasis. Herschel B. Chipp, Picasso’s Guernica: History, 
Transformations, Meanings (Thames & Hudson, 1989), p. 3. Subsequent 
references are given in the text.
6 ’Almost nothing in Picasso’s statements or his work prior to the Spanish 
Civil War indicates a particular concern over the dramatic political struggles 
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didn’t know how to respond: 
His reply to Sert was only that he was uncertain whether he could 
paint such a picture. He had never conceived a painting to order, 
so to speak, and the conditions surrounding this one placed him 
between two opposing emotions: his deep concern for the suffering 
of his compatriots, on the one hand, and his antipathy toward 
political dogmas and polemic painting, on the other. It would have 
seemed inappropriate to simply donate “a Picasso” from the studio, 
as he had done before, to a historic cause such as this one. (6)
The uncertainty about how to respond with a painting, may 
have been compounded by the conditions of Picasso’s practice 
at the time: in 1935 and 1936 he did little painting7. The com-
mission pointedly posed the question of painting’s capacities 
and function for an artist who had, for a time, been unable to 
discover or work his concerns through painting. Where Picasso 
says, in Chipp’s voice, “I am uncertain whether I could paint 
such a picture”, in my voice he stage-whispers, “I’m uncertain 
whether such a painting is possible”. The doubts, that is, concern 
painting’s adequacies as much as Picasso’s sympathies, antip-
athies and so on. 
At first Picasso made no move in connection with the com-
mission. Three months later, in April, he began preparatory 
drawings on the theme of the artist’s studio. Whilst noting 
features of the sketches surviving to Guernica, Chipp puzzles 
over how Picasso could have conceived such an ’inappro-
priate’ response to the ‘clearly politicized purpose to which the 
pavilion of the Spanish Republic was dedicated. Yet‘, he writes,  
most of these pencil sketches suggest that at the time his plan was 
to devote his great mural to the ivory-tower existence of an artist 
enamored of his way of life and the charms of his woman. (66)
The studio, though, is a symbolic space—and conventional 
subject for painting—riven with contradictions through which 
artists, including Picasso, have exposed and played with 
problems of representation. If the call of historical events for-
malized in the commission is taken as a call to painting and its 
in his native land.’ Ibid., p. 6.
7  Gertrude Stein writes: ’So Picasso ceased to work./ Which is very curious/ 
He commenced to write poems but this writing was never his writing.’ 
Quoted in Judi Freeman, Picasso and the Weeping Women: The Years of 
Marie Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (LA County Museum of Art/Rizzoli, 1994), 
p. 159.  Freeman reiterates the point: ’Picasso wrote voluminously in 1935 and 
1936. While he did […] produce art, it was to an extremely limited degree.’
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resources as well as to Picasso personally8, then an attempt to 
answer that call with a painting about painting, its possibilities 
and limitations, doesn’t seem so inappropriate. 
Chipp judges The Studio sketches an aberrant effort by Picasso 
at ’monumentalizing [...] his private life’ (67), too local, too 
personal, insufficiently public, not worldly enough. Although 
the theme of the painter’s studio is abandoned by Picasso in May 
when reports of Guernica’s bombardment dominate the news, 
the architecture of these drawings haunts the finished mural: 
the central, overhead light source, annotated lumière electrique 
in the seventh sketch; the central triangle illuminating and de-
limiting the painter’s space; the doubled light source (there’s a 
lamp on the floor); and the window on the right. Mightn‘t these 
traces carry something of Picasso’s preliminary, unfulfilled, 
response to fester in the space of the subsequent painting? 
As a pictorial space the studio deals in the complex interac-
tions of competing realities: social, private, psychic, sexual, 
historical. It is painting’s ability to successfully register, rene-
gotiate and recreate these realities that’s explicitly tested by 
this theme. Perhaps the painting never developed past those 
initial schematic sketches because what struck Picasso wasn’t 
that the studio’s way of staging the impasses of representation 
was obviously inappropriate on that scale, but that it was not 
obviously possible. The studio motif has the virtue of putting 
big, worldly questions into the artist’s domain, making them a 
personal matter at the same time as displaying the opposing 
movement of the artist withdrawing from the world. This is 
the studio’s edge. Mightn’t this very tension have incubated 
in those three months of hesitation following the request to 
participate in the  Pavilion project, and in the preceding years 
of not-painting, a tension that isn’t resolved in Guernica but 
salinates in the weeping woman motif, which in turn turns to 
portraiture? This trouble of registration and adequacy, of the 
relationship between event and affect, witness and scene, call 
and response, responsibility, as an intimate question addressed 
to persons and to painting "in their own homes", so to speak?
8 Part of my point—and the pointed bit of the thing I’m trying to push 
along from the symbolic demand of the commission through to Weeping 
Woman and the portraits that follow it—is that it isn’t possible to satisfactorily 
disentangle these two dimensions but nor do I think that they (nor could 
they) find the fantastic, erotic, synthesis in Guernica that Chipp’s preface 
suggests we see there.
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What fails for Greenberg is Guernica’s Cubism: ’Picasso’s 
Cubism or neo-Cubism has never been comfortable in a very 
large format’9. For T. J. Clark, Cubism always did labour under 
the sign of failure. Discussing a photograph of Marie Laurencin 
playing a mandolin, with right leg raised on a chair, posed in 
front of an incomplete Man with a Mandolin (1912) in Picasso’s 
studio, Clark writes: 
It is a joke about likeness—about Cubism being obscure by excess 
of illusion, and sometimes taking steps to give the viewer ground 
to stand on and room to breathe. […] The photograph is a staging 
of the great scene in Balzac’s Le Chef-d’oeuvre inconnu, where 
Frenhofer’s dream of complete resemblance—resemblance to the 
female model—gives rise to a canvas no one can read. Cubism 
proceeds, in other words (like modernism in general), under the sign 
of Frenhofer’s failure. It stages the failure of representation.10
Picasso, who‘d illustrated Le Chef-d’oeuvre inconnu in 1927, 
moved to a new studio, in January 1937, at 7 rue des Grands 
Augustins, suggested by Dora Maar, who knew it as the former 
meeting place of the revolutionary group Contre-Attacque, and 
as the fictional location of Balzac’s Le Chef-d’oeuvre inconnu. 
How to interpret this coincidental mix of fictional space and 
the place in which Picasso worked on the commission he first 
answered with the studio theme, an art historian’s commentary 
on Cubism’s conditions and the Frenhofer sign of failure under 
which Modernism laboured? 
What’s observable surviving from the "private" Studio to the 
"public" Guernica is its spatial co-ordinates. And it is Guernica’s 
space, in Greenberg’s eyes, that is uneasy, ’boxed-in’, ’too com-
pressed’. Some sort of indoors stays obstinately put, and it is 
exactly here, for Greenberg, in Guernica’s space, that Picasso’s 
work as a whole fails, loses its relevance: ’It no longer contrib-
uted to the ongoing evolution of major art; however much it 
might intrigue pictorial sensibility, it no longer challenged and 
expanded it.’11 
9 Clement Greenberg, ’The Charnel House: Picasso’s Last Masterpiece?’, 
in Picasso’s Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, 
criticism and analysis, ed. Ellen C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art 
History, 1988), p. 348. 
10 T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism (Yale 
University Press, 1999), p. 191.
11 Clement Greenberg, ’The Charnel House: Picasso’s Last Masterpiece?’, 
Picasso’s Guernica: illustrations, introductory essay, documents, poetry, 
criticism and analysis, ed. Ellen C. Oppler (Norton Critical Studies in Art 
History, 1988), p. 346.
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Disordered picture books, bookcase between the windows, 
second shelf right: Courtauld Institute Galleries illustrated 
catalogue. Entombment.
A division of labour: male figures lower Christ into the tomb, 
straining against the dead weight of his body. Mary stands 
above, centre, face as pale with grief as Christ’s is in death, 
flanked by female mourners: one holding Mary back from 
following Christ into the tomb, another holding a handkerchief 
up to her eye with both hands, another at the back wiping away 
a tear with her sleeve. A division of physical labour, or action, 
and emotional response, or reflection, along the axis of sexual 
difference. Female figures, weepers, watch the muscular activity 
of male figures weighing Christ’s significance in lead white. It’s 
with the female faces above that the viewer identifies, seeking 
instruction in how to view what happens in the lower half of 
the painting; the event of entombment and its perception, the 
event of painting and its reception, are balanced within the 
twin enclosures of cave and panel.
fig. 18
Sr Peter Paul 
Rubens, 
Entombment 
(c.1615-16)
Courtauld 
Institute Galleries
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Some of this painting has never addressed itself to my under-
standing. Guernica invites decoding eyes to build coherence 
around its symbols: sword, flower, light, candle, horse, bull, 
mother and child. Whole books, lots of books, written on these 
signs. Detecting. Extrapolating. Deciphering. Building 
arguments on bookshelves in library stores.
Even the name, Guernica, taken by the painting, comes to 
signify well beyond its locale, becoming ’synonymous with 
indiscriminate slaughter in whatever corner of the world such 
tragedy takes place‘1. Weeping Woman can stand for something 
universal too, as ’the greatest representative of inner and outer 
grief in Western painting’.2 Or combined with Guernica, as the 
emotional response to atrocity allegorized there. 
But, spoons for eyes? A kitcheny tabletop thing fetched up in 
the wrong place, a surreal absurdity … 
1 Gijs van Hensbergen, Guernica: The Biography of A Twentieth Century Icon 
(Bloomsbury, 2005), p. 6.
2 ’A Picasso Saved for Britain’, Sotheby’s Preview, 8 (April/May 1988).
fig. 19
On the way home 
from college I 
met a woman in 
the supermarket 
carrying a bag 
with Weeping 
Woman printed 
on it.
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Weeping Woman can be printed on a cloth bag, carried round 
the supermarket in a woman’s trolley past fabric conditioners 
and toilet rolls. And it can be ridiculously out of place here and 
yet not wholly wronged by the setting. Weeping Woman does 
not carry a reliable standard of meaning enclosed within it. It 
constitutes an appeal to its surroundings, what’s off to right or 
left. And since it lacks self-sufficiency, when it fetches up in 
Waitrose one summer evening in 2012 it doesn’t collapse but 
announces itself as fundamentally a painting of estrangement 
and displacement. 
And the spoons and hat and hairy coat and all the knick-knacky, 
dress-up things gathered around the glutinous tears cry out 
their buffoonery. (‘The buffoon,’ writes Enid Welsford in 1935, 
’resembles other comic fools in that he earns his living by an 
openly acknowledged failure to attain the normal standard of 
human dignity.’ 3)
3 Enid Welsford, The Fool, His Social and Literary History (Peter Smith, 1966), 
p. 5.
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New grey soft-back back broken already from flattening 
for photocopy. Remember a teacher’s injunction once: 
PHOTOCOPYING IS NOT READING. But I do read under the 
green light of my Epson Stylus SX525WD, lovely, granular, proxy 
processing steadily breaking my books. New grey soft-back 
pared with other implements. Underlining, asterisking, pencil, 
scaffolding phrases to be cut from this chapter for making the 
new arrangement. My reading. Which mistrusts the ’metaphor-
ical’ mobilization of Lacan’s three registers and the summary 
dispatch of melancholy. With glue and scissors I’m anatomizing 
the photocopy in my foolscap folder, the terms switched and 
recomposed, set for my doctorate’s self-serving eyes under the 
heading melancholy not mourning.
Say, as my recomposition says, that melancholy, not mourning, 
were to characterize modernist painting. Not its practitioners 
particularly but the structure of modernist painting as described 
there in the book. Take the essay’s foremost insight, that 
modernist painting from the beginning longs for the death of 
painting; its ’vitality’ depends on a pre-emptive mourning that 
is the very distinction of melancholia, according to some. ’We 
ought to say,’ says Giorgio Agamben ’that melancholia offers the 
paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates 
the loss of the object.’1  And this anticipation of loss involves a 
misapprehension, (not unlike the ’confusion between the end 
of the game itself (as if a game could really have an end) and that 
of such and such a match’): ’the melancholic libido has no other 
purpose than to make viable an appropriation in a situation in 
which none is really possible. From this point of view, mel-
ancholy would be not so much the regressive reaction to the 
loss of the love object as the imaginative capacity to make an 
unobtainable object appear as if lost.’2  Or, as Slavoj Zizek says, 
the melancholic suffers ’the confusion between loss and lack: 
insofar as the object-cause of desire is originally, in a constitu-
tive way, lacking, melancholy interprets this lack as a loss, as if 
the lacking object was once possessed and then lost. In short, 
what melancholy obfuscates is that the object is lacking from 
the very beginning, that its emergence coincides with its lack, 
that this object is nothing but the positivization of a void or lack, 
a purely anamorphic entity that does not exist in itself.’3  The 
1 My emphasis. Quoted in Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, 
Sebald (University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 90. 
2 Ibid., p. 90.
3 Slavoj Zizek, ’Melancholy and the Act’, Critical Inquiry, 26, no. 4 (Summer, 
2000), 657-681 (pp. 659-60).
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melancholy misapprehension of structural lack as determinate 
loss strongly resembles, following my cut-and-paste legend, 
the contours of a sentence such as: ’through it’s historicism 
(its linear conception of history) and through its essentialism 
(its idea that something like the essence of painting existed, 
veiled somehow, waiting to be unmasked) the enterprise of 
abstract painting could not but understand its birth as calling 
for its end.’4  The invention of abstract painting—’its idea that 
something like painting’s essence existed’—would, in the mel-
ancholic way, be ‘a positivization of a void or lack, the produc-
tion of a purely anamorphic entity that does not exist in itself.’ 
Cut with Giorgio Agamben’s conclusion, modernist painting 
and melancholy are pushed even closer: ’in melancholia the 
object is neither appropriated nor lost, but both possessed and 
lost at the same time.’5  The essentialism of abstract painting 
brings into existence an essence, painting, which is ’possessed 
and lost at the same time’; in Bois‘s words, ’the enterprise of 
abstract painting could not but understand its birth as calling 
for its end.’
Turned a little the pieces are sided with other material from the 
lessons of melancholia. After the turn already made, the essay’s 
concluding points—that ’mourning has been the activity of 
painting’ throughout the last century, that this mourning is not 
pathological because it produced ’a cogent history of painting, 
modernist painting’ (243)—must be reordered to frame 
modernist painting as structurally melancholic. It is to melan-
cholia, not healthy mourning, that modernist painting would 
thus owe its cogency. And then the stipulation that painting’s 
current possibilities can be tested only if the present situation 
is cured of its ’elaborate mechanisms of defense’ (243), namely 
melancholia and mania, does not fit my arrangement. 
Unsticking the last parts of the essay and holding them 
up against a set of extracted points from Mourning and 
Melancholia, Sigmund Freud’s 1917 essay … to my eye, the 
difficult task of mourning that Yve-Alain Bois proscribes can, 
in its deconstructive mode, be coordinated with the work of 
mourning described by Sigmund Freud, ’carried out piece by 
piece’. A task Bois elsewhere pits against manic (pathological) 
4 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model (MIT Press, 1993), p. 230. Bois allows 
abstract painting to be emblematic of ’the whole enterprise of modernism'. 
Subsequent references are given in the text. 
5 My emphasis. Quoted in Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, 
Sebald (University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 90.
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mourning of modernism with the help of George Bataille’s de-
scriptive resources: ‘To break up the subject and re-establish 
it on a different basis is not to neglect the subject; so it is in 
a sacrifice, which takes liberties with the victim and even kills 
it, but cannot be said to neglect it.’6 Bois’s cautious prediction 
is that ’the three instances that modernist painting has disso-
ciated’ (143) (which he identifies metaphorically with Jacques 
Lacan’s three registers of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary) will 
be individually gone through. The work mourning performs 
proceeds from an acknowledgement, writes Freud,
that the beloved object no longer exists. […] Normally, respect for 
reality carries the day. But its task cannot be accomplished imme-
diately. It is now carried out piecemeal at great expenditure of time 
and investment of energy, and the lost object persists in the psyche. 
Each individual memory and expectation in which the libido was 
connected to the object is adjusted and hyperinvested, leading to 
its detachment from the libido.7 
This process is described again by the Lacanian analyst 
Darian Leader as ’the sequential work of moving through 
one’s memories and hopes linked to the lost loved one’, which 
allows, ’a gradual fractioning off of agony and longing.’ But, 
he continues, ’in melancholia, the possibility of this process is 
compromised by the fact that the melancholic does not occupy 
a place from which such work could be started.’8  A first lesson 
would seem to be that melancholia is structurally different from 
mourning. The melancholic is not a defective mourner, unable 
to acknowledge reality, but lives in a place where another 
reality is in force. Therefore, as Leader puts it, ’a melancholia 
can certainly improve. But this won’t be due to its transforma-
tion into a mourning’ (192). 
The melancholic is faced with a difficulty here for the precise reason 
that there is no difference for him between the object and the place 
it occupies. It is as if a real empirical object like a person has come 
to embody the dimension of lack. (193) 
Laid back on my table the confusion of lack with loss brought 
out by Agamben and Zizek is copied and inserted, here, between 
the clippings. 
6 Yve-Alain Bois, 'The Use Value of the Formless’, in Yve-Alain Bois & 
Rosalind Krauss, Formless: A User’s Guide (Zone Books, 1997), p.25.
7 Sigmund Freud, ’Mourning and Melancholia’, in The Future of an Illusion 
(Penguin, 2008), p. 75.
8 My emphasis. Darian Leader, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and 
Depression (Penguin, 2009), p. 192. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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Lessons from Sigmund Freud’s concise wartime essay on 
mourning and melancholia, relinquishing ’any claim to the 
universal validity’1 of its conclusions.
1) The relationship between mourning and melancholia is 
analogical: the essay attempts to ’shed light on the nature of 
melancholia by comparing it to the normal affect of mourning’.
2) Melancholia is distinguished from normal mourning by ’the 
disorder of self-esteem’. The melancholic compared with the 
mourner suffers ’a reduction in the sense of self’.  
3) His self-criticisms, that he‘s ‘petty, egoistic, insincere and 
dependent‘, that he has ‘only ever striven to conceal the weak-
nesses of his nature‘ suggest a depth of self-knowledge to 
which the melancholic is uniquely privy: ‘we can only wonder 
why one must become ill in order to have access to such truth‘.
4) The work that mourning performs follows reality-testing, 
which reveals that ‘the beloved object no longer exists’:
Normally, respect for reality carries the day. But its task cannot be 
accomplished immediately. It is now carried out piecemeal at great 
expenditure of time and investment of energy, and the lost object 
persists in the psyche. Each individual memory and expectation 
in which the libido was connected to the object is adjusted and 
hyperinvested, leading to its detachment from the libido. 
[…]
1 Sigmund Freud, ’Mourning and Melancholia’ in The Future of an Illusion 
(Penguin, 2008), pp. 73-94.
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‘Last of series—cubism—emotional cubism—gaiety and 
anguish—eyes as mirrors’1: Roland Penrose’s succinct string 
of associations and conclusions regarding the painting in his 
possession, hung above the drinks cabinet in his living room at 
21 Downshire Hill, Hampstead, London. 
The last of cubism. What’s left of cubism, after cubism: 
emotional cubism? Weeping Woman last in the series. Cubism’s 
last? Emotional cubism—a last resort? Gaiety and anguish. 
Emotional cubism for narcissists? Double vision, gaiety and 
anguish. Lost cubism. Cubism lost to emotion. 
Could be. 
There are those who see the disappointments of cubism: 
We can best lay hold of these pictures’ overweening ambition if we 
see them under the sign of failure. They should be looked at in the 
light of—better still, by the measure of—their inability to conclude 
the remaking of representation that was their goal.2 
1 1987 acquisition file for Pablo Picasso’s Weeping Woman (T05010) Tate 
Archives. Information from the unpublished lectures of Roland Penrose 
supplied to Tate Gallery by Michael Sweeney, Archivist/Art Historian, Penrose 
Collection, 8th June 1990.
2 T. J. Clark, Farewell to An Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism (Yale 
University Press, 1999), p. 187. It’s from a sense of dissatisfaction with his own 
essay, says Clark in an interview with Jon-Ove Steihaug for kunstkritikk, that 
his book Picasso and Truth (Princeton University Press, 2013) proceeded: 
“I think it started because I wasn’t quite satisfied with the account of 
Cubism I gave in Farewell to an Idea.” http://www.kunstkritikk.com/artikler/
catastrophic-modernity-t-j-clark-on-picassos-guernica-pictorial-space-
and-modernism/?d=en [accessed online 12th July 2013].
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Agitating over the arrival of a new book. Picasso and Truth. I 
had to wait. Found online available for pre-order. A problem 
of timing. Postman rings, waddle downstairs, print and sign. 
It could undo all the stitches. My doctorate tacked together, 
loose at the seams. New hardback posted from the past. (The 
author’s a star in the constellation of my old education. And 
he writes, this time, right into my hands.) I’m agitating over its 
arrival. How to handle a new book. I had to wait. Months. Buzzer 
sounds. Downstairs, print, sign. It could undo this thing, which 
is just lightly put together. This time the author writes right into 
my hands. Which have swelled with water and heat and typing 
and anticipation. Picasso and Truth.
This new book dressed pale blue duckling yellow minty type. 
Not wearing professorial leathery green debossed gilded 
mahogany. We’re to sit back on our oatmeal couch, ambient 
lighting low, and have our eyes slide themselves in this book. 
Not study it at our desk as bade by the navy serif academe of 
The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his 
Followers, 1985.  (Middle shelf, kitchen-side.) 
Post-it on the wall: ’With a few exceptions man reads seated at 
a table.’  Except. A pre-teen lying on the carpet, elbows pressed 
stiff into synthetic fibres. Turning pages. Face to face with 
Weeping Woman cropped into the page. Look for the caption, 
left, to ease the pull of past futures in the bitumen of her eyes.
The full quotation on cubist semiology reads:
Picasso transformed his painting into a kind of writing, thus re-
pressing the irruption of the carnal and the danger it then posed 
to art. He covered over, one might say, the impossible caesura 
between the visible (vertical) and the bodily (horizontal) by another 
vertical-horizontal opposition, one which eludes the menace 
90
(animality) of the carnal entirely. Painting’s vertical section and 
completely covered surface were always opposed to the horizontal  
and diagrammatic space of writing (with a few exceptions man 
reads seated at a table, especially since the invention of printing), 
but Picasso annulled that antinomy by a 90-degree pivoting (this 
is the radical gesture of his Still Life with Chair Caning of 1912, a 
canvas that asks to be read as the horizontal plane of a café table, 
seen from above): for him, the picture became a system structured 
by arbitrary signs; henceforth, his canvas became a written page.1
Rehearsing postulates of the modernist ontology as repres-
sions—’visual art, especially painting, addresses itself uniquely 
to the sense of sight’, and ’pictures reveal themselves in an 
instant’, disregarding the on-and-on flow of time and formless 
matter of bodies—leads to a third: ’art is addressed to the subject 
as an erect being, far from the horizontal axis that governs the 
life of animals’ (27).
An exception. Pre-teen on her bedroom floor, head propped 
high enough on her hand supported by an elbow dug into the 
carpet. She looks down into the book. Sometimes slides her head 
sideways into a hand cupped round her ear, looks sidelong at 
pages turned and held in her other hand. She sinks right down, 
chin stuck to the back of her hand laid flat to the carpet, eyes 
cast along thin sections of each page. Up again on the elbow, 
fingers flicking through, arresting a page stared at from around 
the bottom edge. She rocks her body forwards, face parallel with 
the page and comes right down to its pulp until she’s nose to 
nose with what’s pictured there. 
Art in a book met with by a child, riveted, on the horizontal 
axis that governs the life of animals? Error of the uninitiated, 
reading books and viewing art on the floor, or inborn deviancy 
lifted by subsequent spells of education … is that it: is it really 
animality—menace of the carnal—that’s covered over by the 
ontological interpretation of modernist art and which must be 
brushed back into it? 
1 Yve-Alain Bois & Rosalind Krauss, Formless: A User’s Guide (Zone Books, 
1997), p. 27. Subsequent references are given in the text.
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The deadening of the emotions, and the ebbing away of the waves 
of life which are the source of these emotions in the body, can 
increase the distance between the self and the surrounding world to 
the point of alienation from the body. As soon as this symptom of 
depersonalization was seen as an intense degree of mournfulness, 
the concept of the pathological state, in which the most simple 
object appears to be a symbol of some enigmatic wisdom because 
it lacks any natural, creative relationship to us, was set in an incom-
parably productive context.1
Is this among the catastrophes to have befallen Weeping 
Woman? Does it paint alienation of self from body as the index 
of an anxiety over other disjunctions, those between affect and 
event, between painting and world. Can painting be affective? 
Can it alter the constitution, down to the bone, of those it 
addresses? 
Modernity induces a fundamental disruption […] literally and met-
aphorically a kind of breakup with and so of the world (and self). At 
some level, human subjects are no longer able to fully throw in their 
lot with the world in a libidinal sense. Their inscription into the space 
of meaning has become depleted of erotic charge, fails to secure a 
powerful libidinal bond with social reality. We are there, in the midst 
of the social space, but this space feels dead and we, too, no longer 
feel alive. Our jouissance is no longer dependably dispersed amid our 
doings in the world but congeals into dense, symptomatic blockages 
that […] can be elaborated only in the realm of (modernist) art, 
and even there only with great difficulty and never fully successfully.2 
The setting of a portrait bust permits the show of gross mis-
alignment: shoulders and head disjointed, as if the latter had 
become suddenly detached from the former and is now held up 
in the frame not by the vertebral column but by a pair of hands. 
Hands that either belong to the shoulders not in the regular 
way—one left, one right—but in the pictorial way: two left 
hands issuing from the same body or the one left hand doubled 
and turned. Or these hands are not really this body’s at all, but 
1  Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John 
Osborne (Verso, 2009), 140.
2 Eric L. Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies And The 
Endgames Of Sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 123. My 
question is whether there’s an anxiety emerging/remaining from the 
seeming success of Guernica over whether it’s possible for painting itself to 
"feel" ’libidinally implicated in the world’ (122) and, concomitantly, to generate 
or make this "feeling" count in the aesthetic encounter. If so, Weeping 
Woman embodies (rather than repairs) this crisis—Weeping Woman itself 
registers as a ’dense symptomatic blockage’. 
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come to it from someone else. Then Weeping Woman is alto-
gether a pile of parts, pressed into the rectangle, as if fragments 
of a dozen zoolites had fallen one on top of the other, fossilized 
at the same terrible moment. Breccia rock finds its equivalent 
here in dense, insensible paint cracked into sections of colour 
and tone: post-mortem green floods wrists, fingers and face 
after the cataclysm strikes; the pliable white of a handkerchief 
imprints a mouth and multi-fingered organism petrified in that 
shared environment.
(The preface to my Phaidon Picasso makes known the debt 
we owe to Roland Penrose and his friendship with Picasso for 
insights we’d otherwise be without. 
A humorous instance of this is his revelation that Picasso grafted 
the snout of his Afghan hound, Kasbec, onto the face of his beloved 
mistress Dora Maar in portraits of her—something one could not 
discover without the chance to observe both at first hand!3
The interest of this observation—the mésalliance of dog’s nose 
and lover’s face—exceeds the anecdotal instance but is never-
theless more poignant for being nourished by the contingen-
cies of personal acquaintance. The snoutness of Dora Maar’s 
’muzzle’ in Weeping Woman is observable, I think, for those who 
haven’t seen Maar and Kasbek at first hand, but the anecdote 
advances further the murk of this painting’s problems: of the 
singular thrust into the generic, the troublesome movement 
of biography at the back of the art historical, the insinuation 
of the unfamiliar within the familiar, all rolled into the queasy 
conjunction of lover and pet, human and animal. So many 
problems of the uncanny, ’that peculiar quality of human 
feeling and experience’4.)
In the profusion of similes that writing sets about this painting, 
I’ve journeyed with others to an ancient period, become archae-
ological, palaeontological5, geological, biological. Organisms, 
organs, species, oceans, rivers, glaciers, aeons. On the other 
3 Roland Penrose, Picasso (Phaidon, 1992), p. 5.
4 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006) p. 189.
5 For example, Judi Freeman describing a related drawing, Mother with 
Dead Child on Ladder, writes: ’the mother looks like a recumbent dinosaur’. 
Picasso and the Weeping Women: The Years of Marie-Thérèse Walter & Dora 
Maar ( Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1994), p. 38. She continues her 
description: ’several strokes of ink define the tears falling from her eyes’. 
There are, though, no ink strokes in this pencil drawing, nor any tears falling 
from the figure’s eyes. There is a mysterious tendency in written descriptions 
of this body of work to manifest imaginary, expressive content.
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hand, there’s the metaphorics of haberdashery tied to putting 
on hats, a false flower, painting fingernails. (The painting’s 
surface is like that: nails lacquered with old, cheap varnish, too 
lumpy and slow to dry smooth, it’s dulled, pitted, ridged, dimpled 
with brush marks. Nails painted this way are a travesty: surface 
glimmer become growth.) With fossils, time and circumstance 
lay the traces of prehistory down; this hat with this lipstick is an 
arrangement of human eye and hand seeking complementa-
rity, contrast. In the associative density of Weeping Woman this 
divided metaphorics is a version of that between contingency 
and intention, just one of those versus on which the painting 
turns. 
It’s so much a picture of splits, cuts, interruptions. I take this 
to be one of Dora Maar’s lessons. Her painting of his painting 
is interrupted. Better in French: interrompu. Which is not the 
title Dora Maar’s painting goes by. Picasso’s version has come 
to be known as Weeping Woman, like Mater Dolorosa, naming a 
genre. Woman in a Red Hat, as Dora Maar’s is known, might be 
prefaced with the silent singular article ’a’, a woman wearing a 
red hat or this/that, this woman wearing a red hat, that woman 
wearing a red hat. ‘This’ and ‘that’ are demonstratives, singling 
out the particular person or thing referred to against a general 
background of people or things. Her painting’s title implies a 
further advance along a path of individuation already taken by 
the series: ‘as if they were organisms caught in an evolutionary 
process, the heads gradually [begin] to take on the particular-
ities of an individual face with angular features, an agonized 
expression, and moist eyes’.6 
As a consequence of their evolution do these heads migrate 
too to those feminized spaces—of the toilette7, the bourgeois 
interior, the kitchen table (Weeping Woman has eyes like 
spoons), ever more distanced from the world of historical 
events?8 In the titling of Dora Maar’s copy the alienation from 
6 Hershel B. Chipp, Picasso’s Guernica: History, Transformation, Meanings 
(University of California Press, 1988), p. 109.
7 See mote_47: Fleeing Woman, for a discussion of the wallpaper temporarily 
affixed to Guernica and its reappearance in Women at their Toilette (1938).
8 Norman Bryson comments on how paintings—such as Christ in the House 
of Martha and Mary (1618) by Diego Velazquez—detailing ’the world of 
kitchen work’ in front of a miniaturised biblical scene, dramatize painting’s 
own negotiation of its place in the world, ’between the heroic world of 
court or history painting, and the no less insistent claims of still life. This is 
not simply a formal choice between genres but a genuine crisis in which 
painting is forced to contemplate two utterly different conceptions of human 
life.’ Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting (Reaktion 
Books, 2001), p. 154. Moreover, he argues, ’the division between the exalted 
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events is pushed still more, since weeping is dropped altogether 
and the colourful hat picked up.
and the mundane is not simply a matter for neutral or philosophical debate, 
of world-views between which an individual might choose’, since the 
opposition between megalography and the confined, domestic spaces—
’outside the charmed circle of history and greatness’, those of ’kitchen work’, 
still life, (and, I'm arguing, in portraiture of Weeping Woman’s kind)—is 
’overdetermined by another polarity, that of gender’ (157).
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(Detail of Fig. 11) Cropped in my book, Weeping Woman comes 
close. Curious proximity of page and paint surface and child’s 
face, reading her books close-up on the floor. Not one of the 
forty-eight paintings given their own page and reproduced in 
colour has been cropped except this one. Fig. 11 is a small black 
and white image of the whole painting printed in the margin of 
Roland Penrose’s introduction on page 19. Plate 39, captioned 
(Detail of Fig. 11), cuts off a sliver of the painting’s left side and 
a chunk of its right side—the figure’s left shoulder and space 
above it—pretty much centring the image on the hat. Problem 
with the crop is: 1) it makes the zones it excises seem dispen-
sable; 2) it centres the figure. Look at the painting in full and 
the shoulders are funny, the right too small, left too big. This 
left one crumples like the handkerchief and the face, making 
weird comparison between materials of flesh, fabric, cubist 
style, agitation, distress. The apparently uneventful section 
above her shoulder? This is the off-balance space the woman 
faces into, the one her exaggerated shoulder feels out, where 
the missing cause of her sorrow is enshrined in its absence. 
And it is the painting’s way of enclosing the room—the fold of 
internal/external—to which this portrait is subject. Without it, 
in (Detail of Fig. 11) on page 108, the face is just looked at and 
looks back; there is no space, left, to impinge on this reciprocity. 
Paradoxically, there’s not enough missing in the encounter 
with (Detail of Fig. 11). 
What’s good about the crop: the feeling of Weeping Woman as 
a close-up. 
CLOSE-UP Kaja Silverman, in the chapter ’Disembodying 
the Female Voice’, from her 1988 book, The Acoustic Mirror, 
discusses Patricia Gruben’s Sifted Evidence, which ’relies 
heavily upon voice-over, using synchronization only to 
dramatize constraint. It also multiplies bodies and voices in 
such a way as to call the concept of memory, as well as that of 
character, quite radically into question.’1 One of these moments 
of synchronization comes after a series of still images, over 
which ‘the female voice delivers its simultaneously academic 
and personal discourse’, ending with one showing a hand 
opening a book, which suddenly fades to white. The character 
Betts ’walks into the frame, speaking as she does so, and her 
1 Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis 
and Cinema (Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 168. Subsequent references 
are given in the text.
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previously disembodied voice is brought into visual alignment 
with her moving lips’ (171).  Betts’s face, with a look of embar-
rassment, is ’cornered by the camera’ as she tries to explain 
why she has become sidetracked from her stated research into 
the female divinities of ancient Mexico. Silverman says of this 
sequence:  
Synchronization is here a mechanism for disempowering the female 
voice—for reducing the authority and indeed the credibility of its 
words. It is thus a very exact enactment of what […] I [describe] as 
the “vocal striptease,” i.e., the castration of a previously anonymous 
voice by returning it forcefully to the body, a return which is docu-
mented most “satisfactorily” through the incriminating close-up. 
(171)
Weeping Woman  The ’cry of outrage’ returned forcefully to 
the body—not any body but this portrait body, brimming with 
details: red hat, a particular hairstyle, fringe, flower, tweedy 
jacket, earring. The caption opposite (Detail of Fig. 11): 
Weeping Woman depicts the moment of impact, when the horror 
of war is registered by someone who has witnessed from afar the 
atrocities in Spain. It was intended to mediate our outrage at an 
event—the bombing of Guernica—that Picasso had represented 
earlier.2
 Does the close-up satisfy and mediate (this the role of all those 
weeping Mary’s and other women in the scenes of Christ’s 
suffering) the viewer’s outrage?  Is the trapped female face 
turned so predictably to register the emotional effects of action 
undertaken by others, appealing to the viewer’s ‘feminine side’? 
An empathetic prompt for some and a sight of satisfaction for 
(already) mournful others? 
 
(Detail of Fig. 11) didn’t strike me that way. At least, not entirely. 
It’s not not possible that the painting’s is a reactionary code. 
But it is not wholly that. David Lomas’s caption does its work 
but doesn’t really touch or seem touched by the painting ful-
gurating there on its facing page. Something of the loss of 
authority described by Kaja Silverman seems more like what’s 
at stake there. (If Weeping Woman was intended to mediate the 
events of Guernica it does more and less than it was supposed 
2 David Lomas's caption to Weeping Woman in Roland Penrose, Picasso 
(Phaidon, 1991), p. 108.
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to.) At the moment of synchronization in Sifted Evidence the 
character Betts continues to oscillate between ’the discourse 
of ethology and disclosures of a much more personal sort but 
the latter now take on the quality of self-extenuation in the 
face of an implied critique’ (171). The voice-over outside is 
compromised as it moves inside, to align with Betts’s moving 
lips. The voice’s authority and credibility becomes uncertain, 
destabilized.
CAPTION in draft form—bits—in oblative mode:
As if … Weeping Woman registers the impact of Guernica the 
painting not just the bombs. Conventionally weeping women, 
the Marys and other women, get included in the scene but 
Weeping Woman is cut-off off-cut and cuts-off from the scene. 
Sceneless. 
As if … Guernica the painting had always been a painting 
bothered with its own spectatorship, with how to see, how to 
register an event and how the event of painting could be can be 
should be must be will be seen. Who is it for?
(On Sunday Amédée Ozenfant tours the pavilion and records 
his observations:
’A well-dressed lady goes past my table […] She looks at Guernica 
and says to her child: “I don’t understand what is going on there, 
but it makes me feel awful. It’s strange, it really makes me feel as if 
I were being chopped to pieces. Come on, let’s go. War is a terrible 
thing! Poor Spain.” And dragging her kid by the hand, she goes off, 
uncertain, into the crowd.’3) 
An encounter with violence at a distance and the distance to 
take from events and the force it takes to return these events to 
the body afar far away body. Or—is this the kernel of anxiety?—
what is the force that takes the place of these events, what’s 
there where the connection is missed? (’Gone, forever gone, is the 
beautiful, free correlation between emotions and events.’)4 
Dora Maar’s snapping. Imagine for a moment her movements: 
3 Quoted in Judi Freeman, Picasso and the Weeping Women: The Years of 
Marie Thérèse Walter & Dora Maar (LA County Museum of Art/Rizzoli, 1994), 
pp. 86-7.
4 Christa Wolf, A Model Childhood, quoted in Eric L. Santner, ’Miracles 
Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and the Matter of the Neighbor’, The 
Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, ed. by Slavoj Zizek (University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 90. 
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photographing Picasso at work, taking his likeness, climbing 
the ladder to look down on him painting, adjusting her studio 
lights, moving the furniture around, sitting back in the room 
contemplating her shot. There she worked in front of Guernica, 
at the painting's front. The space beside it, this domain this room 
she charged with her presence/camera/lights/eyes. Special 
witness to Guernica’s development. This painting comes with 
a witness. 
As if … Dora Maar were characteristically witness and weeping 
woman, more precisely the precise coincidence of both. 
As if … Weeping Woman were Guernica’s punctum: a detail 
added that is already there, a moist signifier developing on its 
surface retroactively, spreading its blind field. The last history 
painting operating under the strain of lost authority but able to 
mobilize, just still, painting’s own as if. On an impossibly grand 
scale. As if the gap might be closed if it were plugged with a 
painting big enough. Cubism upscaled to such an extent its 
metaphorics bend and buckle. Vulnerabilities. Weeping Woman 
blisters with this torture. 
As if … Weeping Woman, weeper and witness, were Guernica’s 
problem punctum trauma. ’The transmission of the witness, 
is embodied in religious tradition—its teachings as well as its 
rites—and it is that witness that ultimately endows that tradition 
with its auctoritas’5. Under the weight of successive enlighten-
ments—‘Enlightenment means break with tradition/break-up 
of tradition’(79)—the eyewitness loses sway as do ‘the various 
religious traditions that are founded on the testimony borne by 
those who actually witnessed the miracles—the original eye-
witnesses—and by those who believe in the credibility of those 
who had transmitted the miracle to them’ (85). What is required 
of our thinking now, says Eric Santner, is not a repudiation of 
the witness of the past but: 
a new conceptualization of the nature of that which registers 
itself in historical experience, a rethinking of that which in such 
experience, in its dense, "creaturely" materiality, calls out toward 
the future as a mode of response to a peculiar sort of ex-citation 
transmitted by the past (one needs to hear/read excitation in its 
5 Eric L. Santner, ’Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and 
the Matter of the Neighbor’ in The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political 
Theology, ed. by Slavoj Zizek (University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.85.
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derivation from ex-citare, a calling out or summoning forth). But 
this is a past that has, so to speak, never achieved ontological 
consistency, that in some sense has not yet been but remains stuck 
in a spectral, protocosmic dimension. (86) 
As if … Weeping Woman were witness to this dimension. That 
which failed to happen (its ‘effect is certain but unlocatable, 
it does not find its sign’6) in Guernica but which nevertheless 
shoots forward into the eye of this condensed, constrained little 
painting and phosphoresces there, awaiting the "miracle" of 
Dora Maar’s act of diffusion. She is a shrewd, delicate copyist.  
6 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage, 
2000), p.51.
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 There were also women looking 
 on afar off: among whom was Mary 
 Magdalene, and Mary the mother of 
 James the less and of Joses, and Salome 
 and many other women 
 which came up with Jesus unto Jerusalem. 
 
 And Joseph of Arimathea 
 bought fine linen, 
 and took him down, and 
 wrapped him in the linen. 
 
 And Mary Magdelene and Mary 
 the mother of Joses beheld where he was laid.1 
You see she eats the page? 
She would consume her own support—
painting is to page as flesh is to bone
page as bone is to flesh
as applied colour is to drawn lines.
Her lesson:
leaving the underdrawing for all to see
and showing herself lay pencil lines on fabric 
below the coloured top
heavy with her name,
capitalized,
DORA MAAR—
The handkerchief
she unpaints 
and couples the canvas 
with it. 
Woman eats cloth.
Woman eats page.
1 Mark 15. 40; 41; 43;  47.
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Their Common Sense, window bookcase, left, third shelf 
down, propped up with a cannonball. Molly Nesbitt, quotes the 
filmmaker Louis Delluc interviewing Charlie Chaplin:
”I always remember this film where you take apart an alarm clock 
piece by piece to see everything there is inside, and when it is 
completely empty you put all this scrap metal pell-mell back into its 
case and go on to something else. To see all that there is in a being 
or object, the cinema should do that. That which Cubism could not 
do, the black and white will get, it will show every individual from all 
sides, but that is not easy and no one more than Charlie Chaplin has 
understood this.” 
 
Chaplin himself said not one word. He replied, as usual, with his 
face, a white space that seemed to take the page into itself, pulling 
it up into a light, a screen, a world. […] This face, which could 
never be held in a hand or touched, was sheer affect, crystal light. 
It compensated for the perpetually incomplete. The insanity of its 
form would cease to be disturbing. This face did not have to think or 
mean. It met with great applause.2
The page eaten by Woman,
the canvas eaten by 
DORA MAAR:
does it promise resurrection 
as face
as sheer affect
to console and compensate
with paralysing effect?
Handkerchief.
Page.
Canvas.
Fine white linen gripped between Saint John’s teeth 
the body of Christ heavy as stone
laid down under the wet eyes of
so many Marys and other women.
[…]
2  Molly Nesbitt, Their Common Sense (Black Dog Publishing, 2000), pp. 
284-6.
102
mote_65
At this time, she was a student. She’d studied painting before, in 
the twenties1, then took up a camera. Now she was becoming a 
painter, though perhaps it wasn’t really like that. Nevertheless, 
she instituted a kind of regime; she would learn painting by 
way of likenesses, by portrait and copy. Heads. His head. Her 
head. This is what she painted. Drew. And photographed.
1 Dora Maar studied painting at the Union Centrale des Arts Décoratifs in the 
1920s. 
fig. 20
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’But is the end ever to be gained?’1  asks Yve-Alain Bois towards 
the close of his argument, having traced painting’s apoca-
lyptic discourse back to the very beginning of modernism, to 
Baudelaire, to Courbet, to Rodchenko’s monochrome which, he 
underlines, is significant not because it is the first “last picture” 
but because ’it showed that painting could have a real existence 
only if it claimed its end.’ The end of painting is integral to 
modernist painting’s existence, to its vitality. ’One did not have 
to wait for the “last painting” of Ad Reinhardt […] all modernist 
abstract paintings had to claim to be the last picture’ (230).
The modernists, exemplified here by Duchamp, Rodchenko, 
Mondrian, all believed in the end of painting, ’Yet has the end 
come?’ Bois asks, then sets out the double bind of the apoca-
lyptic discourse: 
To say no (painting is still alive, just look at the galleries) is un-
doubtedly an act of denial, for it has never been more evident that 
most paintings one sees have abandoned the task that historically 
belonged to modern painting (that, precisely, of working through 
the end of painting) and are simply artefacts created by the market 
(absolutely interchangeable artefacts created by interchangeable 
producers). To say yes, however, that the end has come, is to give 
in to a historicist conception of history as both linear and total (i.e. 
one cannot paint after Duchamp, Rodchenko, Mondrian; their work 
has rendered paintings unnecessary, or: one cannot paint anymore 
in the era of the mass media, computer games, and the simula-
crum). (241)
Our present situation is trapped, Bois says, between two alter-
natives: ’denial of the end or an affirmation of the end of the 
end (it’s all over, the end is over)’ (241). To think us out of this 
trap, he borrows Hubert Damisch’s use of game theory. Painting 
is divided between game and match, match representing a 
specific performance of the game construed as ’an agonistic 
field’: 
Without thereby becoming a theoretical machine for encouraging 
indifference, since one is obliged to take a side, this strategic 
approach deciphers painting as an agonistic field where nothing 
is ever terminated, or decided once and for all, and leads the 
analysis back to a type of historicity that it had neglected, that 
1 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model (MIT Press, 1993), p. 241. Subsequent 
references are given in the text.
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of long duration. In other words, it dismisses all certitudes about 
the absolute truth upon which the apocalyptic discourse is based. 
Rather, the fiction of the end of art (or of painting) is understood as 
a “confusion between the end of the game itself (as if a game could 
really have an end) and that of such and such a match (or series of 
matches)”.
 On Bois’s side, the series of matches “modernist painting” is 
finished but the game of painting is not, ’many years to come 
are ahead for this art’ (242). The fiction of the end, though, 
remains a necessary condition not just of the match but also 
the game, since the agonistic field of painting is historically 
determined ’by the fact of industrialization (photography, the 
commodity etc.)’ and this fact is unchanged, is even amplified, 
in our present situation, for ’reproducibility and fetishization 
have permeated all aspects of life: have become our “natural” 
world’ (242).
A normal, proportionate—rather than pathological, manic 
or simulated—feeling for the end persists beyond the match 
“modernist painting” into our present situation as that which 
painting must muster for itself for its future viability. This end 
must be worked through again by way of non-pathological 
mourning. Which end is this? If the game can not really have an 
end then only a match or series of matches, such as modernist 
painting, can really end. Our task would be to mourn the end 
of the match, modernist painting. But the game is determined 
by historical conditions, which in our present situation are the 
same conditions, ratcheted up some, that determined the game 
according to which the previous series of matches, modernist 
painting, were played. Modernist painting worked through 
the end of painting (of art, of the game) threatened by indus-
trialization; the modernist feeling for the end was dependent 
on a belief in the possibility that the game could end. Now that 
the confusion of match and game has been cleared up can we 
really work through the end again/still, knowing that the end 
of painting is not really possible, that the game’s codes and 
conventions can be altered by the match but without the game, 
painting, ever itself being imperilled? And what kind of game 
can painting be, historically determined—by ’industrializa-
tion (photography, the commodity etc.)’—but at the same time 
invulnerable? 
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Top shelf: a book whose soft jacket curled so far back on itself I 
had to cut if off. Cream endpapers exposed and the front most 
printed left-centre ’On Creaturely Life’. Overleaf,
 
 On Creaturely Life
 RILKE | BENJAMIN | SEBALD
 Eric L. Santner 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
 CHICAGO AND LONDON
Spine given way, it’s splayed again on my table starred and high-
lighted where ’the eternal return of the same that for Benjamin 
defined the world of commodity production and consumption’ 
is sounded out carefully for its ’psychic aspect’, the ’dynamic of 
repetition compulsion’2. ’What is often missed’, on the previous 
page, ’in the correlation of melancholy with death, deadening 
and coldness is […] the manic side of this state.‘3  The dizziness 
pertaining to this melancholy mania, expressed as ’an excess of 
animation’, becomes for Benjamin ’the norm in the culture of 
modern capitalism, a paradoxical mixture of deadness and ex-
citation, stuckness and agitation, [that] might best be captured 
by the term “undeadness”’.4 
2 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), p. 81.
3 The condition of melancholia has traditionally been characterized by 
symptomatic diversity. Aristotle observes in his 4th Century “Problems”: 
’the melancholy temperament, just as it produces illnesses with a variety of 
symptoms, is itself variable, for like water it is sometimes cold and sometimes 
hot’.  Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: 
studies in the history of natural philosophy, religion and art (London: Nelson, 
1964), p. 25. These variations have consolidated into a set of oppositions, 
the most obvious being the divisions between illness and temperament and 
between depressive and manic states. Beyond these particular divisions 
it’s significant that the condition of melancholy is internally divided, that it 
is structurally split. This splitting finds expression in Julia Kristeva’s poetic 
by way of oxymoron, for example, ’sad voluptuousness’, ’despondent 
intoxication’, and in the phrase Eric Santner quotes from Walter Benjamin, 
’petrified unrest’, which is, in turn, taken from a poem by Gotfried Keller. 
Santner is particularly mindful of this characteristic splitting and coupling of 
modes when arguing for the importance of action by way of melancholy that 
maintains the conjunction “and”. See below.
4 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (University 
of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 80-81. If the melancholic does not occupy a 
place from which mourning could begin it is because the melancholic lives 
(impossibly) between worlds, in a state of undeadness: ’the melancholic 
subject […] is situated between two worlds: the world of the dead and the 
world of the living’. The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression 
(Penguin, 2009), 174. Julia Kristeva describes her own depression in these 
terms: ’I live a living death […]. On the frontiers of life and death, occasionally 
I have the arrogant feeling of being witness to the meaninglessness of Being, 
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Following Bois’s argument, that from the beginning modernist 
painting takes up the death of painting as the source of its 
vitality, would it not be possible to think of painting as neither 
alive nor dead but rather undead, in the indeterminate zone of 
existence characteristic of modernity and the melancholic?5  
What Eric Santner sees in Walter Benjamin’s writing on 
modernity is a distinct ambiguity in his attitude towards mel-
ancholy, mirroring the ambiguities of melancholy itself. The 
problem of melancholy ‘withdrawal from the  midst of life’ (83) 
is the ‘fixation or stuckness that can actually inhibit the work 
of remembrance […] a form of remembrance that has passed 
over into the ethical and political dimension of act’. And yet, 
’the dimension of act is one that requires, as part of the con-
struction of its site, the very spectral materialism that can […] be 
mobilized only in and through the gaze of melancholy’ (89). It is, 
suggests Santner, ’this peculiar and fragile tension and alliance 
between the melancholic immersion in creaturely life and the 
realm of action and practice that defines Benjamin’s thinking 
from beginning to end.’ The very paradox of melancholy makes 
it into a potential resource for registering, for seeing the ’agita-
tions of creaturely life that materialize the persistence of deep 
structural stresses in the social body’ (91). The task is twofold:  ’to 
“learn“ from melancholy’ itself how to identify, become respon-
sive to, the site of intervention and thus, also, how to ’sustain 
the conjunction “and”’, between ‘melancholy immersion and 
the dimension of action’ (91).  
of revealing the absurdity of bonds and beings’. Black Sun: Depression and 
Melancholia (Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 4. 
5 The historicist argument would still operate as the delusion Yve-Alain Bois 
sees it as, not, however, as a confusion to be corrected by game theory—an 
irrational belief corrected by reason—but as a delusion that worked to 
partially make sense of painting’s impasses but could not fully articulate 
its haunted existence, which persists into the present. It’s not a question of 
being ’cured of our mania and our melancholy’ so as to restore a belief ’in our 
ability to act in history’; if I understand Eric Santner correctly, the possibility 
of action may itself only be possible by way of learning from melancholy. 
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Lessons from Jean-Louis Gault’s essay1 on treatment and cure: 
1) Jacques Lacan ’lets himself to be taught by psychosis’. 
2) It is in relation to the psychoses—melancholia, paranoia, 
schizophrenia—that Lacan uses the term treatment: ’he does so 
to qualify the objective of the practice with a psychotic subject’.
3) This practice does not interpret or decipher the symptom. One 
of the lessons learnt from the psychoses is that ’the symptom is 
a mode of treatment’. 
4) There is, for Lacan, a possible treatment of psychosis. There 
is no cure. 
The word “cure” designates an analysis, with its beginning, its 
duration and its end. The direction of cure implies a politics as to its 
end, a strategy of transference and tactics of interpretation. In this 
sense, the cure is that of a neurosis.
Even with reference to neurosis, after 1958 Jacques Lacan 
abandons the term cure in favour of ’psychoanalysis, simply’: “a 
psychoanalysis … is the cure we expect from a psychoanalyst”. 
The emphasis is shifted ’away from a formalist definition of the 
cure’ towards ’an interrogation [of] the desire of the analyst’.
5) For Freud, ’analysis was impossible in psychoses’2 . For Lacan, 
’it is presumptuous to propose an analysis to a psychotic subject, 
since he has already obtained the best that can be expected of 
an analysis’, namely that ’beyond his identifications, [he] should 
obtain a glimpse of the real of his being as waste’. 
1 Jean-Louis Gault, ’Two Statuses of the Symptom: “Let Us Turn to Finn 
Again”, The Later Lacan: An Introduction, ed. by Veronique Voruz and 
Bogdan Wolf, (SUNY, 2007), pp. 73-82.
2 Freud’s reasoning was that ’because there is no transference in the sense 
of transference-love, and because transference-love is the condition 
of possibility for psychoanalysis’ the psychoanalysis of psychoses was 
impossible. For the neurotic subject in analysis: ’the subject supposed 
to know something of importance […] is the analysand’s unconscious.’ 
However, the analyst becomes associated with the analysand’s unconscious, 
which the analysand tends to see as coinciding with the analyst ’as 
representative or agent of [its] manifestations’ (i.e. slips or mistakes in the 
analysand’s speech). Thus, ’the subject supposed to know—that is the 
unconscious “within” the analysand—is rejected by the analysand and 
projected onto the analyst. The analyst must agree to occupy the space of or 
stand in (or sit in) for the unconscious—to make the unconscious present 
through his or her presence’. Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 
30-31. 
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6) ’Freud noted that there was no transference to the subject 
supposed to know in psychosis.’ Lacan ’adds that there none-
theless exists a psychotic transference […]: it is an erotomaniac 
and persecutory transference’. The condition of possibility in 
the treatment of psychosis is, then, the handling and transfor-
mation of this transference.
7) ’What can be expected of an analyst in the case of psychosis 
if it is not an analysis?’ 
8) Unlike Freud, who discovered psychoanalysis through his 
work with hysterics (hysteria is a form of neurosis), Lacan 
came to psychoanalysis through his doctoral research with 
a psychotic patient he called Aimée. In his work with Aimée 
’Lacan experienced [erotomaniac and persecutory transfer-
ence]’. He also found that it was possible to change the nature 
of this transference: ’When he had to deal with her, he was not 
for her the agent of a persecutory erotomania, but the reader of 
her writings, and her secretary.’
9) Lacan deduced that it was possible to establish a transference 
in psychosis ’that is neither love addressed to knowledge [as 
would be the case in neurosis] nor erotomaniac transference 
but a transference addressed to an Other’.
10) In the psychoanalysis of neurosis,
the point is to decipher the symptoms, moving from the symbolic 
to the real. It is this deciphering that the very word “analysis” aims 
at. In psychosis, on the contrary, the idea is to go from the real to 
the symbolic, and to construct a symptom. This is where the term 
treatment is justified.3 
11) ’The treatment indicates the modality of action of the 
symbolic on the real where the point is to treat the real with the 
symbolic by means of the constitution of a symptom.’ 
12) ‘Operations of the symptom’ can be designated from the 
3 The treatment called for by psychosis (’psychosis calls for a treatment’, 
writes Gault) lies beyond the classical method of psychoanalysis discovered 
by Freud in his work with neurotics. To end his text, ’On the possible 
treatment of psychosis’, Lacan employs a vivid simile: ’to use the technique 
that [Freud] established, outside the experience for which it was applied, is as 
stupid as to toil at the oars when the ship is on sand.’ Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A 
Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (Routledge, 1977), p. 221.
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list of significations of the word treatment in the dictionary, 
for example, to subject a substance to the action of a physical 
or chemical agent so as to modify it; the process allowing the 
modification of a substance i.e. the treatment of a mineral, the 
thermal treatment of a metal, ‘or even of the treatment of radio-
active waste to deactivate it’. 
13) ‘So the symptom can be conceived as a mode of treatment 
of the enjoying substance by means of the symbol, in order to 
modify it, deactivate it, and render its usage possible for the 
subject.’4 
4 Bruce Fink quotes a neurotic patient’s complaint, that ‘he could not “enjoy 
his enjoyment”, implying that his satisfaction was, in some sense, ruined 
or tainted […]. Perhaps one way of stating the configuration analysis aims 
at is to say that the analysand is at last allowed to be able to enjoy his or 
her enjoyment.’ Ibid., pp. 210-211. Eric L. Santner makes use of a similar 
formulation in describing his relationship with Rainer Maria Rilke’s The 
Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, the novel that caused him to undertake 
his ’labor of theory-building’; in his latest book, he says, ’I have, I think, 
finally learned how to enjoy the enjoyment embedded in this particular 
symptom’. The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames 
of Sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. xviii. See mote_22: 
Pathological.
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A table is a setting, unlike a face, where unrelated objects can be 
left and find some associative arrangement within the round or 
rectangle. 
It is said that Guillaume Apollinaire took inspiration for his cal-
ligrams ’from having seen his tie tossed on the table near the 
watch Serge Ferat had taken out to remind them both about the 
coming time for lunch.’1 Perhaps in the same spirit of juxtaposi-
tion, or for some other reason, Picasso used a sculpture of Dora 
Maar’s head in his memorial to Apollinaire. 
As a space, the table readily twins with painting. Indoors, the 
table is to painting as walking, outdoors, is to writing. In The 
Emergence of Memory, a collection of interviews with W.G. 
Sebald, the writer gives an account of his method, learned from 
dogs: 
If you look at a dog following the advice of his nose, he traverses a 
patch of land in a completely unplottable manner. And he invariably 
finds what he’s looking for. I think that, as I’ve always had dogs, I’ve 
learned from them how to do this.2
He says his PhD research was undertaken in this way, as-
1 Molly Nesbitt, Their Common Sense (Black Dog Publishing, 2000), p. 270.
2 The Emergence of Memory: Conversations with W.G. Sebald, ed. by Lynne 
Sharon Schwartz (Seven Stories Press, 2007), pp. 94-5.
mote_37
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sembling things ’in a haphazard fashion’. With this heteroge-
neous material ’you have to strain your imagination in order 
to create a connection between things’. It is in this straining 
that ’something new’ can emerge in writing; the mind is drawn 
to ‘do something that it hasn’t done before’.  Triggering this 
something is, he says, ‘a very bizarre, erratic fact’, which he 
usually finds ’by the wayside’, walking. 
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’[…] The sitter’s legendary sartorial, emotional colour—darkened 
by her psychological breakdown—may have excited some of 
the painting’s commentators. Refusing this tendency herself, 
Dora Maar painted a copy of Weeping Woman that is singular 
in its flatness.  Her choices of stretcher the same size, drawing 
mapped carefully, colours applied by rote, suggest she set out to 
make a facsimile.  Having worked primarily as a photographer, 
Dora Maar began painting in 1935. During a period of transition 
away from the camera, she painted several copies after Picasso’s 
portraits of her as a weeping woman. In these she redefines 
an outline, alters the colour scheme or introduces a new dec-
orative element, encouraging those who would see in these 
studies a project of defiant reclamation. (‘”I don’t give, I take,” 
Picasso would say to Françoise Gilot. But Dora knew here how 
to take back.’1) Such straightforward possessive intent is more 
difficult to read into the version known as Weeping Woman in a 
Red Hat. Here there are no additions, only a measured thinning 
of the original. Picasso’s dense, gloopy impasto is withdrawn, 
along with any allusion to Van Gogh’s harrowed surfaces. Then 
halfway down the whole exercise in replication is abandoned. 
A lone, black, painted line descends through exposed under-
drawing to acknowledge the bottom edge.
Dora Maar printed her signature prominently on the top right, 
endorsing this incomplete study as a finished statement. One 
that nevertheless falls short of any triumphal repossession of 
her image2. What questions the painting has to ask are posed 
through an embrace of its precarious status as copy, its very 
slightness. The appeal of this insubstantiality is hard to place. 
Perhaps it recalls complicated, unbodied Echo, the nymph who 
in Ted Hughes’s retelling: 
… cannot be silent 
When another speaks. Echo who cannot 
Speak at all 
Unless another has spoken. 
Echo who always answers back.3
Her curse constitutes an odd sort of excess, the repetition of 
parts. (Echo is condemned to repeat only the last words of 
1 Mary Ann Caws, Dora Maar with & without Picasso (Thames & Hudson, 
2000), p. 127.
2 Anne Baldassari wonders: ’was she defending the integrity of an image 
that belonged to no one but herself?’ Picasso: Love and War 1935-1945 
(Flammarion, 2006), p. 202. See mote_6: Echo.
3 Ted Hughes, Tales from Ovid (Faber & Faber, 1997), p. 75.
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another’s statement.) In the exchange of views that took place 
between the artist-paramours in 1937, Dora Maar’s partial reit-
eration of Picasso’s painting apparently eschews the expressive 
point, tailing off into blankness. 
When Weeping Woman hung in Roland Penrose’s London 
home, Antony Penrose asked his father many times why the 
woman was crying. Roland replied that her child had been 
killed by bombs. His answer evades the significance of young 
Antony’s recurring question: the source of the woman’s 
sadness is not given in Picasso’s painting. Viewers have rarely 
studied this condition of absence. And, as if looking the other 
way, descriptions of Weeping Woman often project the imagery 
of deluge into those few, stiff tears—tempest, river, ocean, 
sea. Against this background of overflow, Dora Maar works at 
drainage. The adventure in copying itself appears to run out 
of energy, as if to signal that working through the sedimentary 
thickness of Picasso’s painting will induce torpor. Boredom, 
fatigue, are signifiers not of tragedy but melancholy, whose 
classic formula is sorrow without cause. Stories of the atrocity 
of Guernica or the sitter’s personal turmoil are held at bay. Her 
shallow rendition offers just pencil marks on canvas behind the 
painted surface. […]’4 
Mightn’t Dora Maar’s copy—her work of drainage—be classed as 
a treatment of Pablo Picasso’s painting of her? Recalling lessons 
from the psychoanalytic treatment of psychosis5, the significa-
tions of the word treatment relevant to the operations of the 
symptom include, ‘the process allowing the modification of a 
substance’, such as the ‘treatment of radioactive waste to deac-
tivate it.’6  Something of the bent of deactivation is at work here, 
in the wasting performed and signed by Dora Maar. Doesn’t she 
assume in her activity as copyist, as “reader” of this “writing”, 
4 Excerpted from 'Eve Peasnall on Dora Maar's Weeping Woman in a Red Hat 
(c.1937)', Picpus, 7 (Autumn 2011).
5 In Lacanian psychoanalysis, melancholia is a psychosis, as opposed to 
being a neurosis or perversion. (The other psychoses are paranoia and 
schizophrenia.) Neurosis, psychosis and perversion are fundamental 
psychic structures which can not be altered; a melancholic can not become 
a neurotic, even though they may share certain surface behaviours and 
characteristics. This is why it is not possible for a “normal” mourning to cure 
melancholia, nor the psychoanalytic techniques of the neurotic clinic—
aimed at deciphering the symptom—to be applied straightforwardly to the 
melancholic—treated by way of the symptom. See mote_64: Treatment.
6 My emphasis. Jean-Louis Gault, 'Two Statuses of the Symptom: "Let us turn 
to Finn Again"', in The Later Lacan: An Introduction ed. by Veronique Voruz 
and Bogdan Wolf, (SUNY, 2007), p79. See mote_64: Treatment.
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something akin to the secretary?7 Echo’s, afterall, is a punctu-
ating voice, laying the emphasis, here, in repetition, dissipating 
significance there, attuned to the sonorous substance of what’s 
spoken.
  
7 Portrait-pictures of Dora Maar dominate Picasso’s female figurings in the 
late thirties and early forties, described here by Leo Steinberg: ’in the late 
thirties, and continuing through the early war years, Picasso’s image of 
woman was both rehumanized and embittered—sufficiently like a woman to 
resister as a negation of femininity. The most repellent of Picasso’s females 
date from these years, the violence of their distortion again largely due to the 
forcing of antithetical aspects.’ Steinberg lists the typical inferences drawn 
from ’the violence of their distortion’, for example, they are ’an exercise of 
power over the female, continually experienced in manipulating her image’. 
His own take is that these distortions of la femme fleur are a ‘measure of the 
world’s evil’. It seems, he says, ’hard to deny that [Picasso’s] brutalized women 
of 1940-42 were meant to repel. They are uncompanionable.’ Other Criteria 
(University of Chicago Press, 2007), p226. The question, in part, for me, is 
how Dora Maar manages to make a companion for Weeping Woman (her 
own Woman with a Red Hat) and more generally, how the uncompanionable 
aspects of modernist painting might be companioned.
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Anecdotally, Dora Maar was a person of excess,  ‘renowned 
for her long painted nails’ , a ‘taste for startling outfits’, outré 
hats1. “For me she’s the weeping woman. For years I’ve painted 
her in tortured forms,” recalled Picasso to another lover, “not 
through sadism, and not with pleasure, either; just obeying a 
vision that forced itself on me. It was the deep reality, not the 
superficial one.”2 Dora Maar’s being-in-anguish asserted itself 
in their liaison to the extent that her features (with the addition 
of Kasbec’s muzzle) suggested themselves for the generic 
Weeping Woman. So it goes.
This terrain around the painting is tricky, to be avoided usually. 
Sticky, though. All the cleaving biographical hearsay. Shelve it3. 
Although … isn’t this furniture implicated in the work and in 
this work especially? Isn’t its being both portrait and picture4 a 
provocation to the viewer to entertain this muddle? And doesn’t 
the entwinement of art and life also have a share in what makes 
this painting’s dreadful comedy? Fix here the trimming from 
mote_39: Scissor, that figuring of the relationship between 
comedy and mourning: ’Comedy—or more precisely: the pure 
1 Mary Ann Caws, Dora Maar with and without Picasso: A Biography (Thames 
& Hudson, 2000), p.57. Dora Maar was ‘a thoroughly flamboyant personality. 
Dora dressed in snappy clothing and eye-catching hats, and painted her 
nails different colours according to her mood. […] She was colourful not only 
in Picasso’s portraits of her but in her being and her self-depiction’ (82-3).
2 The comments were made to François Gilot.
3 My own uncertainty about how to handle this material comes from having 
had recourse to an artist's biography disciplined out of me by successive 
humanities degrees in the 1990s and early 2000s. Having become an artist, 
the clean line drawn between life and work, were it consistently possible, is 
not necessarily desirable. Frances Stark pinpoints the problem: ‘The status 
of interpretations based on biographical cues is not high, I know, and 
hasn’t been since ’the death of the author’. I tend to think, however, that 
biographical cues are unavoidable once anyone has enough interest to look 
closely into their ’field of cultural production’, or as the old saying goes ’the 
personal is the political’. The Architect and The Housewife (Book Works, 1999), 
p. 33. Picasso’s work, especially, has suffered from the opposing tendency; 
Rosalind Krauss’s essay, ’In the Name of Picasso’ (1981), counters the tradition 
of viewing Picasso’s art exclusively from the perspective of his biography.
4 This is Henri Matisse’s distinction, used by Tamar Garb in the final chapter 
of The Painted Face: Portraits of Women in France 1814-1914 (Yale University 
Press, 2007). The persistence of portraiture in the twentieth century falls 
beyond the historical scope of the book but its (problematic) existence is 
made almost inconceivable by the seemingly complete and completely 
successful emptying of ’individual subjectivity’ from the portrait at the hands 
of Matisse and Picasso before the First World War: ‘Evacuating the genre of 
its ‘subject’, Picasso revealed the artificial make-up of the female portrait, 
rendered here as entirely a matter of costume, patina and adornment. 
Interiority, whether conceived as the psychological material of which 
subjectivity is constituted  and in which Realist portraiture had revelled, or 
as the inner sanctum of the bourgeois woman, enshrined as the domestic 
interior, is dramatically denied, turned inside out, in a virtuoso display of 
painted effects.’ That Picasso returned, repeatedly, to this genre—especially 
in the years following Guernica and Weeping Woman—suggests, I think, 
that the portraitness of portraiture continued to constitute an important, 
paradoxical impetus for painting’s work.
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joke—is the essential inner side of mourning which from time to time, 
like the lining of a dress at the hem or lapel, makes its presence felt.’5 
Mightn’t the presence of Dora Maar’s face, with all the trouble to in-
terpretation it brings, be similarly felt as the ‘lining’ of this picture, 
insisting on another materiality as pressing as the painting’s? 
To follow this thread: a backwards lunge for The Odd One In, lower shelf 
behind my head, the part beginning with Charlie Chaplin’s The Gold 
Rush, that famous sequence in the cabin where The Tramp becomes 
a chicken for his starving companion, Big Jim. Page 19. The scene 
developed during filming from one in which Big Jim hallucinated a 
plump chicken on the table. He reached for it, it disappeared and re-
appeared in the person of the Tramp and Big Jim chased the chicken 
around the cabin. When Charlie Chaplin ordered a chicken suit and 
dressed up in it himself, the properly comic movement started:
the scene is no longer constructed simply upon the discrepancy between 
what Charlie really is and how the other sees him (as a chicken), but adds 
something else: it brings to light the chickenish properties of the man-
Charlie himself. […] It is this short circuit that constitutes the peak of 
comedy; not simply the fact that Big Jim erroneously sees a chicken when he 
looks at Charlie, but also the fact that, for all his error, he is somehow right—
Charlie looks like a chicken.6  
On this matter of coincidence between the subject-actor and the 
character he or she plays, Charlie Chaplin is mentioned again on page 
37, just before a summary of the last twenty pages, which, drawing 
on Hegel’s distinctions in the Phenomenology, have described the 
different status and stakes of representation in tragedy and comedy: 
In tragedy the acting subject, via the various ordeals that befall her, has to 
let—often at the price of her own death—some universal idea, principle, or 
destiny shine through her. In comedy, in contrast, some universality (“tramp”, 
“worker”, “misanthrope” …) has to let a subject in all his concreteness 
shine through it—not as the opposite of this universal (or as its irreducible 
support), but as its own inherent truth, its flexibility and life.
The footnote to this last point points out:
Comic characters are not simply represented by (different) actors […] their 
link goes “beyond representation” in the usual sense of the term: […] it is by 
5 See mote_39: Scissor.
6 Zupancic, Alenka The Odd One In: On Comedy (MIT Press, 2008), p. 19. Subsequent 
references are given in the text.
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no means uncommon for comic characters (actors) to carry on with their 
“act” beyond the fictional framework (stage, movie) to which they belong. 
(219)
Enid Welsford brings out the special but precarious relationship 
between art and life in the comedy of the buffoon:
The genuine buffoon […] breaks down the distinction both between folly 
and wisdom, and between life and art. The buffoon is neither the uncon-
scious fool, nor the conscious artist who portrays him; he is the conscious 
fool who shows himself up, chiefly for gain but occasionally at least for the 
mere love of folly. The psychological situation is at times curiously subtle. As 
soon as the buffoon rises above the lowest rank of parasite willing to endure 
anything for the sake of a good meal, he must develop a self-awareness 
incompatible with total empty-headedness, yet not so acute as to produce 
a change of habit, or to turn his folly into a temporary superficial pose. For 
genuine buffoonery is not synonymous with acting. The buffoon gives most 
pleasure by being most himself.7 
(Roland Barthes’s punctum introduces a “blind field”, which is a 
movement: 
the “blind field” constantly doubles our partial vision. Now, confronting 
millions of photographs, including those that have a good studium, I sense 
no blind field: everything which happens within the frame dies absolutely 
once this frame is passed beyond. When we define the Photograph as a 
motionless image, this does not mean only that the figures it represents do 
not move; it means that they do not emerge, do not leave: they are anaes-
thetized and fastened down, like butterflies. Yet once there is a punctum,  a 
blind field is created (is divined).8
It is the blind field of the punctum’s activity outside the frame that is 
animating; the punctum ’is a kind of subtle beyond‘ (59). Once there's a 
punctum, the subject of a photograph, for example, registers as having 
‘a whole life external to her portrait’ (58).)
7 Enid Welsford, The Fool: His Social and Literary History (Peter Smith, 1966), p. 27.
8 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage, 2000), p.58.
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For a time there was a fashion for têtes d’expression, single faces 
overcome with emotion: Laughing Man, Weeping Woman. 
These were exercises aimed at preparing the painter for the 
stringent demands of history painting in which facial expression 
(like gesture) could provide an important clue to narrative. In such 
studies, the individuality of the sitter was immaterial. What counted 
was an expression of emotion that needed to be legible on the 
model’s countenance, a visible externalisation of an interior state. 
In the late eighteenth century a competition for independent têtes 
d’expression was instigated by the academie with single figures, 
conceived within the format of portraiture, functioning as vehicles 
for the distillation of feeling rather than the capturing of likeness.9
Weeping Woman-slash-Portrait of Dora Maar is the opposite, 
worked backwards from the (last) history painting: a short 
circuit between the generic and the individual.
9 Tamar Garb, The Painted Face: Portraits of Women in France 1814-1914 (Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 244. 
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I need to get to grips with a reality of production. Which means:
  — clear some space to work in 
  — begin work on things I need 
A figure or character to work with. A self. Which means a head. 
The trouble is I want there to be an exotic something else. A prop. 
Can it just be a shadow?
What is this face for?
I want it to be round and flat.
It’s a face of action or reflection?
Where can this come from?
It could start with […] 
It could start with […]1 
1 A page from my notebook, 2012.
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precis
Precis means summary of the essentials of a text, derived from 
the French adjective, précis, literally ’precise’. The plural can 
be spelt in the same way as the singular. Here it is both plural, 
designating ’precises’—the gathered precis—and singular, des-
ignating each summary of one or more essentials of the text. 
The precis are organized in order of appearance in, or relevance 
to, the numbered motes, and are composed of the following:
• concepts, materials and motifs, mentioned in the motes, 
warranting summarization. 
• definitions combined from four principal sources: Oxford 
English Dictionary, Online Etymology Dictionary, The 
Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Dictionary.com, 
and Fowler’s Modern English Usage.
motley
adj. 1 incongruously varied in appearance or character; disparate. 
2 archaic (of clothing) made up of a variety of colours.
noun 1  [usu. in sing.] an incongruous mixture
2 [mass noun] historical the multicoloured costume of a jester.
The word’s source is unknown but probably derives from: 
mote
►noun A tiny piece of substance; a speck: the tiniest mote of dust. 
mote_4
object
There are two immediately relevant senses of the noun: 
1 a material thing that can be seen and touched: he was dragging 
in a large object.
■ Philosophy a thing external to the thinking mind or subject 2 a 
person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed: 
disease became the object of investigation. 
And the verb form: 
say something to express one’s disapproval of or disagreement 
with something. 
organ
The first sense and etymology: 1 a part of an organism which 
is typically self-contained and has a specific vital function: the 
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internal organs ■ used euphemistically to refer to the penis. 
■ archaic a region of the brain formerly held to be the seat of a 
particular faculty. 
– ORIGIN late Old English, via Latin from Greek organon ’tool, 
instrument, sense organ’. 
arrangement
The Freudian concept of deferred action counters the accusation 
made against psychoanalysis of crude determinism: 
’Psychoanalysis is often rebuked for its alleged reduction of all 
human actions and desires to the level of the infantile past […] In 
actuality Freud had pointed out from the beginning that the 
subject revises past events at a later date (nachträglich), and that it 
is this revision which invests them with significance and even 
with efficacy and pathogenic force.’ [Jean Laplanche & Jean-
Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (Karnac, 
2006), p. 112.] The doctorate is this scene of revision. Freud speaks 
of ’memory-traces being subjected from time to time to a re-
arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances’ (112). 
signifies an open book. As punctuation, this character has an 
associative purpose based on resemblance but also announces, 
at the point where it appears, a leap of loose association which 
put the writer’s whole body to work. The open book appears 
where she has momentarily stopped writing, turned to one or 
other bookshelf in search of a certain book, risen from her seat 
and walked or occasionally crawled or, folding her foot securely 
behind the leg of her stool, stretched her body as far as it will 
allow, to collect a book, open it, find the page, crouch on the 
floor, lie on the sofa or return upright to her seat at table to read, 
sometimes at length, rouse the laptop from sleep mode and type 
into the thesis a quote or thought issuing from the book in hand. 
The physicality of this researching, breaking the sedentary repose 
of writing, is condensed into the undulations of the 
                                  character. Ordinarily fixed at the width of the 
body text, it measures small compared with an actual book but 
relative to other punctuating characters it’s size is exaggerated. 
Punctuation marks, according to Theodor Adorno in his text on 
the subject, ’convey meaning or expression’. ( 
is on the side of expression rather than naming.)  He goes on: 
’the more they constitute the opposite pole in language to names, 
the more each of them acquires a definitive physiognomic status 
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of its own, an expression of its own […] An exclamation point 
looks like an index finger raised in warning; a question mark 
looks like a flashing light or the blink of an eye. A colon, says Karl 
Kraus, opens its mouth wide: woe to the writer who does not fill 
it with something nourishing. Visually, the semicolon looks like 
a drooping moustache; I am even more aware of its gamey taste. 
With self-satisfied peasant cunning, German quotation marks (<< 
>>) lick their lips.’  
Theodor Adorno, ’Punctuation Marks’ (1956), http://www.ubuweb.com/papers 
[accessed 12th July 2013]
self
’One of psychoanalysis’s deepest insights is that we are born 
into a world not merely of things that impinge upon our senses 
to form perceptions, but into the world of an antecedent Other.’ 
[Joan Copjec, ’The Strut of Vision’, Time and The Image, ed. 
by Carolyn Bailey Gill (Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 
44.] Jean Laplanche, in particular, has developed this insight 
of psychoanalysis, bringing out the significance of a primary 
seduction in the constitution of the psychical subject, a process 
of introjection that ’originally comes from the other. Processes 
in which the individual takes an active part are all secondary in 
relation to the originary moment, which is that of a passivity: that 
of seduction.’ “It” (Id)—the unknown drives of the unconscious—
is not, in Jean Laplanche’s schema, at the centre of the individual 
’whom it governs in its own way’; for Laplanche the subject 
is more radically decentred by the originary seduction and 
repression, in which the individual is not an active agent but is 
subject to the desire of the Other. [Jean Laplanche, Essays on 
Otherness ed. by John Fletcher (Routledge, 1999), pp. 133-35.] Eric 
L. Santner draws on Laplanche’s work, in connection with the 
Heideggerean notion of ’thrownness’, to make the fundamental 
point that ’our thrownness into the world does not simply 
mean that we always find ourselves in the midst of a social 
formation that we did not choose (our language, our family, 
our class, our gender, and so on); it means, more importantly, 
that this social formation in which we find ourselves immersed 
is itself permeated by inconsistency and incompleteness, is 
itself haunted by a lack by which we are, in some peculiar 
way, addressed, “ex-cited“, to which we are in some fashion 
answerable. The anxiety correlative to our thrownness […] 
pertains not simply to the fact that we can never fully grasp the 
reality into which we are born (we are forever deprived of the 
Gods-eye view of it), but that rather that reality is never fully 
124
identical with itself, is fissured by a lack.’ [The Neighbor: Three 
Inquiries in Political Theology ed. by Slavoj Zizek (University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 86-7.]
  
mote_25
replication
The appearance of some books is quoted visually along with 
their content. The effort to replicate typography and page layout 
is made for books whose materiality feeds my relationship with 
them; though this is true of all books, some on my shelves have 
acquired or always had a more pronounced material presence. 
Where it’s acquired it tends to be degraded: the book’s body is 
broken through heavy use. In other cases, it might have been the 
look and feel of a book that encouraged me to buy it. 
One of the effects of replication, I find, is to break the style of 
my text, which, rather than containing a series of references 
in its own stylistic coherence, becomes a provisional and 
gappy background for this material. Insomuch as the written 
component of my project is a project of reading—reading 
books in my flat where I’ve made my doctoral fool resident—the 
attempted replication of the typography and layout of those 
books introduces the trouble of setting and surroundings. 
Surroundings—not really, or not quite, "context"—of the things 
encountered, be they books, paintings, statements or people, 
is amongst the problems my project contends with. Weeping 
Woman (1937), for example, is approximately a "besides’ of this 
sort to Guernica; Dora Maar’s copy, Woman in a Red Hat, is yet 
more besides. But there is also the besides of my flat, for example, 
and my own autobiography, as the provincial and contingent 
site of encounter between art history and fine art. How to 
register this not-quite-a-world of besides, of contingency, 
without it consolidating or evaporating is one of the procedural 
problems of my project. Replication is one method of capture I’ve 
experimented with. 
 The word replication has a residual physical aspect: it 
originates in the Latin replicare, “to fold back, repeat”, which later 
becomes “make a reply”. Dora Maar’s Woman in a Red Hat draws 
together repeat, copy, echo, reply; the puzzles of this painting’s 
mode of replication permeate the whole project but are most 
frontally addressed in mote_6: Echo.
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is drawn from the laptop’s character palette where it’s called 
White Diamond Suit. In the setting of my text, the symbol derives 
from the harlequin’s costume—descended from the fool’s motley 
dress—usually composed of diamond shaped pieces of material. 
Or paint, since the harlequin or clown figure appears frequently 
in modernist paintings, sometimes as the presumed surrogate for 
the artist himself. (For paintings of this period female harlequins 
do not exist.) ¯ is the minimal imprint of my fool, a punctuating 
character. The diamond glyph—dressed up in the four colours 
of my bedroom wallpaper and the palette of Weeping Woman 
(1937)—explicitly inscribes a clumsy pirouette within a mote 
(these pirouettes occur "off-stage" between motes), where a leap 
of loose association has spun the text from one colour to another. 
Sometimes, in the turn, the pronoun switches too from I to she 
as the writing character is glimpsed motioning at the periphery 
of the authorial space. She scoops up outlying things and throws 
them into the doctorate.
 Adrian Rifkin has spoken about using the third person 
pronoun to open the space of the not-the-same-as-myself in 
order to seek out the 'thinnest theoretical moment' on which 
to found a set of relationships with other moments ['For a very 
short 20th Century: 1989-2003 (and a very long nineteenth)', 
lecture at Royal College of Art, 8th February 2010], which reminds 
me of the psychoanalytical method that founds itself on the 
slenderest realities, listening to slips of the tongue, fragments of 
dream words. Unconscious desire sounds momentarily in these 
disturbances, manifesting in the subject the sense of what Lacan 
refers to as ’another locality’. [The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Alan Sheridan (W. W.  Norton, 1981), 
p.56.] Punctuation in the clinic has some relevance to the 
function of my fool as a punctuating character: ’When carried out 
systematically, punctuation suggests to patients that they are not 
masters in their own homes.’ [Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction 
to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique (Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 15.] 
When the ¯ appears the reader may be prompted to put on a 
voice as they read, momentarily altering his or her pitch, tone, 
accent, pace. (The adjustment need only be slight.)
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My fool is not an alter ego, insomuch as it has no content; on the 
contrary, like the fool whose dramatic function Enid Welsford 
describes, my fool’s tendency is ‘not to focus but dissolve‘ [The 
Fool: His Social and Literary History (Peter Smith, 1966), p. 13]; 
it contracts the possessive adjective ’my’ to interfere with its 
compulsion to enclose, build, narrate in the third person. My fool 
is an agency of the not-quite-me, sharing a corrosive relation 
to autobiography and other models of coherence with the ’not 
necessarily me’ confessed by Roland Barthes in discussing A 
Lover’s Discourse: not wanting to write ’a treatise on amorous 
discourse’ with ’claims of scientific generality’ he writes instead 
the ’discourse of a lover. Who is not necessarily myself.’ What 
results, he says, is a ’composed, feigned, or, if you prefer, a 
“pieced together” discourse’ [Quoted in Graham Allen, Roland 
Barthes (Routledge, 2003), p. 112]. 
mote_6
wet paint
That Roland Penrose bought Weeping Woman while the paint 
was still wet on the canvas is a tale often repeated. It was recently 
rehearsed in the Daily Mail, 5th April 2013, in an article by Michael 
Portillo [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2304029 
[accessed 12th July 2013]] anticipating ITV’s Perspectives: 
Portillo on Picasso: ’Antony Penrose, whose father was Picasso’s 
biographer and who bought the painting from Picasso before the 
paint had dried, showed me how the ghosts of the massacre were 
imprinted on Weeping Woman. The reflections of aeroplanes can 
be seen in the pupils of her eyes. She was dressed up for market 
day when the bombardment shattered her life and ended that of 
her child.’
 Roland Penrose’s account of this auspicious visit to 
Picasso’s studio begins with his astonishment at ’the captivating 
power of a small canvas placed on an easel as though he were 
still at work on it’ [http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-
weeping-woman-t05010/text-catalogue-entry [accessed 12th 
July 2013]].  In these retold stories the paint never really dries on 
Weeping Woman; there’s a clamminess to it that leaches from 
the figure’s tearful countenance to the object’s own surface. The 
painting is not unfinished it’s just positioned as if the artist had 
not done with it. This is part of its captivating power, the sense 
of its salty claim on the viewer. Its permanent moistness also 
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pertains to its strange animation, as if the whole painting were 
able to function as a sort of lachrymose eye.  
aposiopesis
(Greek, noun of action, corresponding to a verb meaning ’to keep 
silent’.) A rhetorical artifice, in which the speaker (or writer) comes 
to a sudden halt as if unable or unwilling to proceed. Such ellipses 
are often the result of an emotional state of mind. (FMEU).
mechanical
Eric L. Santner summarises nicely psychoanalysis’s insights on 
the mechanicity of psychical processes and the limitations of the 
perspective which fails to take account of them: 
as Jacques Lacan has often emphasized, unconscious mental 
activity has something mechanical, something machine like about 
it. This is why interpretation that remains strictly within the register 
of sense, of the practical unity of life as a space of reason, is 
helpless before the insistence of unconscious formations which are 
ultimately insensitive to the question: “Why are you doing that?”. 
[On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections of Freud and 
Rosenzweig (Chicago University Press, 2001), p. 28]
For a discussion of Weeping Woman’s unresponsiveness to 
the "why?" of "why is she crying?", and the suggestion that the 
semantic field of mien may be more attuned to the painting’s 
mode of address, see mote_27: mien mean. A comparison 
is drawn with Roland Barthes’s opposition of studium and 
punctum, the latter associated with mien. 
mote 20
room
►noun 1  [mass noun] space that can be occupied or where 
something can be done.
■ opportunity or scope for something to happen or be done.
2 a part or division of a building enclosed by wall, floor, and 
ceiling. 
■ the people present in a room: the whole room burst into 
laughter. 
oxymoron
noun 1  a figure of speech in which apparently contradictory terms 
appear in conjunction. 
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– ORIGIN  from Greek oxumoron, neuter (used as a noun) of 
oxumoros ’pointedly foolish’, from oxus, sharp + moros foolish.
at home
Heimlich (literally ’homely’), notes Sigmund Freud, ’becomes 
increasingly ambivalent, until it finally merges with its antonym 
unheimlich’. If room is homely it too develops towards an 
ambivalence. Freud’s argument about the uncanny proceeds 
with Schelling’s definition of the unheimlich: ’uncanny is what 
one calls everything that was meant to remain secret and hidden 
and has come into the open‘ [The Uncanny (Penguin, 1990), pp. 
132-4]. If room is a machine for enclosing the self (see mote_63: 
Ailment head) it is also a machine for producing uncanny 
effects. If room is like a person, then the self it encloses is not the 
centred self—where the ego is master in his own home—but the 
decentred subject of psychoanalysis. See mote_53: Green, fn. 5.
mote_8
knowing
’Austin claims that when I say “I know” I am not claiming to 
penetrate more deeply or certainly into reality than when I say 
“I believe”; I am, rather, taking a different stance toward what 
I communicate, I give my word, stake my mind, differently’ 
[Stanley Cavell, ’The Uncanniness of the Ordinary’, (lectures 
at Stanford University, 1986), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_
documents/a-to-z/c/cavell88.pdf [accessed 12th July 2013]].
 I’ve found it’s quite common to hear an artist or artwork 
disparaged for being too knowing, meaning, perhaps, that 
the object or person in question does not make the adequate 
show of unknowing/forgetting—knowledge disarmed and 
short-circuited—expected from art. The criticism of being ’too 
believing’ is rarely, or more forgivingly, applied; an artist’s or 
an artwork’s conviction is still more likely to be celebrated than 
damned. A doctor—I have a Consultant Obstetrician in mind—
would be commended on her knowledge, which should appear 
quite complete in her area of specialization. Such thorough 
knowing is continually impressed upon the patient by a doctor’s 
use of language, her medical instruments, the consulting 
room etc. Something goes wrong, the mask slips; the effect is 
disturbing. The doctor’s trustworthiness and capacity to cure has, 
it turns out, been wholly dependent on a seamless performance 
of her knowing. If an artist can be too knowing a doctor can 
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never be knowing enough. This is a conundrum facing the 
doctoral candidate in Fine Art.
mote_57
moor-ditch
Prince Hal’s quoted line appears in a comic exchange of 
unsavoury similes between the Prince and Falstaff in Henry IV. 
Moor-ditch was ’a filthy stagnant ditch outside the city walls, 
draining the swampy ground of Moorfields’, C.T. Onions, A 
Shakespeare Glossary (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1911). Links 
between melancholy and excrement are explored in Daniel 
Birnbaum and Anders Olsson, As a Weasel Sucks Eggs (Sternberg 
Press, 2009). See mote_36: Simile and mote_54: Tate Gallery 1988, 
for discussions of simile.
mote_63
face
The psychoanalytical model of companionship is not empathetic 
(see mote_44: Sleep reading) and does not aim to restore to the 
subject a likeable image of themselves. Underlining this point in 
relation to the face, Slavoj Zizek writes: 
how far psychoanalysis is from any defense of the dignity of the 
human face. Is the psychoanalytic treatment not the experience of 
rendering public (to the analyst who stands for the big Other) one’s 
most intimate fantasies and thus the experience of losing one’s face 
in the most radical sense of the term?  
[Slavoj Zizek, ’Melancholy and the Act’, Critical Inquiry, 26, no. 4 
(Summer, 2000), 657-681 (p. 681).]
mote 27
mien
“facial expression,” 1510s, probably a shortening of Middle English, 
demean, “bearing, demeanor” and influenced by Middle French, 
mine, “appearance, facial expression,”. Of unknown origin, 
possibly Celtic (cf. Breton min “beak, muzzle, nose,” Ir. men 
“mouth”). 
►noun 1  a person’s appearance or manner, especially as an 
indication of their character or mood: he has a cautious, 
academic mien.
–ORIGIN  early 16th cent.: probably from French mine ’expression’, 
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influenced by obsolete demean ’bearing, demeanour’. 
From my modern French/English dictionary:
mien, mienne 
pron. mine; of mine; mine, my own
mine [min]
appearance, look; mines pl. simperings; avoir bonne (mauvaise) 
= look well (ill); look good (bad); faire mine de (inf.) make as if to 
(inf.); make a show of (s.th; doing s.th.).
 
The sense of serendipity in the way this word’s prehistory funnels 
together ’facial expression’, ’muzzle’, ’character or mood’, ’my 
own’ and ’make a show’ is what gets me. A feeling made more 
poignant by my muddle over its pronunciation: an English 
tongue makes yet another fold in this word, this time with the 
territory of its other side, meaning. 
an addition of what is nonetheless already there
Roland Barthes refers to this paradoxical addition earlier in 
connection with what he calls the “thinking eye”: ’There is a 
photograph by Kertész (1921) which shows a blind gypsy violinist 
being led by a boy; now what I see, by means of this “thinking 
eye” which makes me add something to the photograph, is the 
dirt road’. [Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (Vintage, 
2000), p. 45.]
mote 26
a certain oddly shaped stone
The phrase is taken from Giovanni Boccaccio’s Famous Women, 
along with several other phrases which I’ve appropriated 
and adapted. Boccaccio gives a rare, brief, portrait of Ops; he 
disparages her past significance, poking fun at the ignorant 
ancients who mistook a mortal queen for a goddess, a ’shameful’ 
error he attributes variously to blindness, madness, Fortune’s 
cruel jest, the snare of devils. He doesn’t give a typical account of 
the mythology of Saturn and Ops; in obedience to the title of his 
collection, he’s preoccupied with Ops’s ’fame’, which he claims 
was without reason: ’Opis did not distinguish herself for any 
deed which has come down to us, except that through feminine 
cunning she saved her children Jupiter, Neptune, and Plato 
from a death planned by Saturn.’ [Giovanni Boccaccio, Famous 
Women, ed. by Virginia Brown (Harvard, 2001), pp. 12-13.]
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milky circle
There are various ancient Greek and Roman stories about the 
origins of the milky way. The best known and most frequently 
represented concerns the ire of Juno who, on awaking to find the 
infant Hercules held at her breast by Jupiter, pushed him away 
and ’let her milk stream forth’ [Meir Stein, ’The Iconography of the 
Marble Gallery at Frederiksborg Palace’,  Journal of the Warburg 
and Courtauld Institutes, 35 (1972), 284-293 (p. 290).]. The Roman 
writer Hygnius, in his Poeticon Astronomicon, gives several 
alternatives including one in which Ops is responsible: 
There is a certain circular figure among the constellations, white in 
color, which some have called the Milky Way. […] At the time Ops 
brought to Saturn the stone, pretending it was a child, he bade 
her offer milk to it; when she pressed her breast, the milk that was 
caused to flow formed the circle which we mentioned above.  
[The Myths of Hyginus, trans. by Mary Grant (University of Kansas 
Press, 1960), p. 229]
mote_1
constrict
early 15c., from Latin constrictus, past participle of constringere 
“compress“. A direct borrowing from Latin of the same word 
which, via French, became:
constrain
from Latin early 14c., constreyen, from Old French constraindre 
”restrain, control,” from Latin constringere ”to bind together, tie 
tightly, fetter, shackle, chain“ from com- ”together“ + stringere ”to 
draw tight“. 
 Weeping Woman is as much a painting of constraint 
and compression as venting and flowing. It does not represent, I 
don’t think, a successful dispersal or outpouring of energy from 
the Guernica project but is a compressed form of response to 
the nervous energy circulating within and brought out by the 
event of that painting. I’m suggesting that Weeping Woman is an 
uncanny surplus or remainder of the Guernica project, connected 
to a tension immanent to the development of the mural, 
concerning painting’s capacity to answer the call of history and 
meaningfully intervene in it. Though for many Guernica satisfies 
this commission, it’s my sense that the Weeping Woman series 
may emerge because something is left undone or, put another 
way, is undone by Guernica. For those, such as Ad Reinhardt, for 
whom Guernica is a success, it is the last painting in a pictorial 
132
tradition, the last point at which this kind of painting seemed 
possible—a dead end. As such, it’s an instance of what Yve-Alain 
Bois calls modernist painting’s apocalyptic discourse. In which 
case, Weeping Woman might be considered an uncanny 
remainder of this instance of ’the end’. But if Guernica produces/
becomes one of painting’s deaths, Weeping Woman ought not 
to be thought of as a ghostly emanation beyond the grave; if, as I 
speculate, the structure of modernist painting is melancholic (see 
mote_40: Foolscap arrangement), then it is itself always already 
undead. Perhaps what Weeping Woman brings to the surface—
what ought to remain hidden but which Guernica is structurally 
unable to hide—is the melancholic condition of painting, of 
its being riveted to a loss that is the mistaken positivization of 
a structural lack. It is to this aspect of the Weeping Woman that 
Dora Maar’s copy as "treatment" is called.
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